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Articles 31 - 60 of 1465
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Summary Judgment Revolution That Wasn't, Jonathan R. Nash, D. Daniel Sokol
The Summary Judgment Revolution That Wasn't, Jonathan R. Nash, D. Daniel Sokol
Faculty Articles
The U.S. Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases on summary judgment in 1986. Questions remain as to how much effect these cases have had on judicial decision-making in terms of wins and losses for plaintiffs. Shifts in wins, losses, and what cases get to decisions on the merits impact access to justice. We assemble novel datasets to examine this question empirically in three areas of law that are more likely to respond to shifts in the standard for summary judgment: antitrust, securities regulation, and civil rights. We find that the Supreme Court’s decisions had a statistically significant effect in …
Renewing Faith In Antitrust: Unveiling The Hidden Network Behind Pharmaceutical Product Hopping, Victoria Field
Renewing Faith In Antitrust: Unveiling The Hidden Network Behind Pharmaceutical Product Hopping, Victoria Field
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Patents grant time-limited market exclusivity to drug manufacturers, meaning that other companies are prohibited from copying and selling the patented pharmaceutical. This allows manufacturers to lawfully charge monopoly prices. Generic competition starts at the expiration of the patent. To maintain coveted monopoly power, manufacturers often release an alternative formulation of the drug with a fresh patent that enjoys continued market exclusivity. Manufacturers who can convert their consumer base to the new formulation can continue charging peak prices. This process, called “product hopping,” has been the target of significant antitrust inquiry, with mixed results.
A product hop may be the result …
Race-Ing Antitrust, I. Bennett Capers, Gregory Day
Race-Ing Antitrust, I. Bennett Capers, Gregory Day
Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust law has a race problem. To spot an antitrust violation, courts inquire into whether an act has degraded consumer welfare. Since anticompetitive practices are often assumed to enhance consumer welfare, antitrust offenses are rarely found. Key to this framework is that antitrust treats all consumers monolithically; that consumers are differently situated, especially along lines of race, simply is ignored.
We argue that antitrust law must disaggregate the term “consumer” to include those who disproportionately suffer from anticompetitive practices via a community welfare standard. As a starting point, we demonstrate that anticompetitive conduct has specifically been used as a tool …
Section 5 In Action: Reinvigorating The Ftc Act And The Rule Of Law, Lina M. Khan
Section 5 In Action: Reinvigorating The Ftc Act And The Rule Of Law, Lina M. Khan
Faculty Scholarship
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 didn’t just create a new agency. It created new law for that agency to enforce. The heart of that law is Section 5, which provides that ‘unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce’ are ‘hereby declared unlawful’. In passing this law, Congress also tasked the FTC with identifying the range of methods of competition that qualify as unfair, since lawmakers recognized they could not specify them all prospectively.
This is a straightforward reading of the statute, and yet it is somewhat controversial. There is a school of thought that considers Section 5’s …
Coercive Rideshare Practices: At The Intersection Of Antitrust And Consumer Protection Law In The Gig Economy, Christopher L. Peterson, Marshall Steinbaum
Coercive Rideshare Practices: At The Intersection Of Antitrust And Consumer Protection Law In The Gig Economy, Christopher L. Peterson, Marshall Steinbaum
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship
This Essay considers antitrust and consumer protection liability for coercive practices vis-à-vis drivers that are prevalent in the rideshare industry. Resale price maintenance, nonlinear pay practices, withholding data, and conditioning data access on maintaining a minimum acceptance rate all curtail platform competition, sustaining a high-price, tacitly collusive equilibrium among the few incumbents. Moreover, concealing relevant trip data from drivers is both deceptive and unfair when the platforms are in full possession of the relevant facts. In the absence of these coercive practices, customers too would be better off due to platform competition, which would lower average prices by sharpening competition …
The Role Of Secondary Algorithmic Tacit Collusion In Achieving Market Alignment, Maurice E. Stucke, Ariel Ezrachi
The Role Of Secondary Algorithmic Tacit Collusion In Achieving Market Alignment, Maurice E. Stucke, Ariel Ezrachi
Scholarly Works
The antitrust risks associated with the use of the same hub’s pricing algorithm by many sellers are now well-accepted. But what if many rivals use several different hubs for dynamic pricing? The common assumption is that in such instances, competition among the pricing hubs would support competition among the sellers. However, in this paper we argue differently and introduce the concept of secondary algorithmic tacit collusion, which leads to anticompetitive effects, independent of the conditions on the primary market. This phenomenon may lead to the evils of price-fixing but on far a wider scale. Contrary to traditional tacit collusion, this …
Addressing Personal Data Collection As Unfair Methods Of Competition, Maurice E. Stucke
Addressing Personal Data Collection As Unfair Methods Of Competition, Maurice E. Stucke
Scholarly Works
Enforcers, policymakers, scholars, and the public are concerned about Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and recently Microsoft and their influence. That influence comes in part from personal data. These companies are “data-opolies,” in that they are powerful firms that control our data. The data comes from their vital ecosystems of interlocking online platforms and services, which attract users; sellers; advertisers; website publishers; and software, app, and accessory developers.
The public sentiment is that a few companies, in possessing so much data, possess too much power. Something is amiss. Cutting across political lines, many Americans think Big Tech’s economic power is a …
The Power Of Antitrust Personhood, Herbert Hovenkamp
The Power Of Antitrust Personhood, Herbert Hovenkamp
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law
Antitrust law addresses conspiracy, or collaborative conduct, more harshly than it does unilateral conduct. One person acting alone can get away with far more than groups of firms acting by agreement. In most cases that distinction is justified. Creating substantial market power unilaterally is difficult and relatively uncommon, but it can be created in a moment’s time by an agreement among firms. But how do antitrust tribunals determine when conduct is unilateral rather than collaborative? Often the ansawer is obvious, but sometimes it is not. Two statutory provisions were intended to be the umpire of such decisions. A section of …
Antitrust Worker Protections: Rejecting Multi-Market Balancing As A Justification For Anticompetitive Harms To Workers, Laura Alexander, Steven C. Salop
Antitrust Worker Protections: Rejecting Multi-Market Balancing As A Justification For Anticompetitive Harms To Workers, Laura Alexander, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Anticompetitive conduct toward upstream trading partners may have the effect of benefiting downstream consumers even as the conduct harms the firms’ workers or suppliers. Defendants may attempt to justify their upstream conduct—and may rely on the ancillary restraints doctrine in doing so—on the grounds that the restraints create efficiencies benefitting ` purchasers, rather than focusing solely on the impact of the restraint on the workers or suppliers in the upstream market. Such balancing of harms against out-of-market benefits achieved by a different group should be rejected by antitrust doctrine generally, and specifically in the case of harms to workers. This …
Fixing "Litigating The Fix", Steven C. Salop, Jennifer E. Sturiale
Fixing "Litigating The Fix", Steven C. Salop, Jennifer E. Sturiale
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Merging firms have increasingly been asking trial courts to adjudicate their merger “as remedied” by a voluntary “fix.” These are remedies that have been rejected by (or never proposed to) the agency. This procedure is known as Litigating-the-Fix” (“LTF”). This article proposes a judicial procedure for managing cases in which the merging parties attempt to LTF. Our recommendations flow from a decision theory approach informed by the relevant LTF case law, the merger enforcement record, the language and goals of Section 7, and an economic analysis of the incentives of the parties and agencies created by LTF. Our recommendation addresses …
Cookies, Pop-Ups And Commercials: How Tech Companies' Privacy Promises Are Preserving Their Data Dominance, Cailley Lapara
Cookies, Pop-Ups And Commercials: How Tech Companies' Privacy Promises Are Preserving Their Data Dominance, Cailley Lapara
Capstones
As antitrust sentiment focused on Big Tech from regulators and consumers grows, companies like Google and Apple and more have announced plans to move away from the behavioral ad business model that brought the companies to the size they are today. This trend is marketed to customers as a way to address their growing concerns over privacy and data collection. It also comes as the companies face sweeping antitrust litigation and legislation that would break up the firms. But the companies' claims of moving towards privacy are sketchy at best, and appear to serve as a way for the companies …
Dynamic Pricing Algorithms, Consumer Harm, And Regulatory Response, Alexander Mackay, Samuel Weinstein
Dynamic Pricing Algorithms, Consumer Harm, And Regulatory Response, Alexander Mackay, Samuel Weinstein
Articles
Pricing algorithms are rapidly transforming markets, from ride-sharing, to air travel, to online retail. Regulators and scholars have watched this development with a wary eye. Their focus so far has been on the potential for pricing algorithms to facilitate explicit and tacit collusion. This Article argues that the policy challenges pricing algorithms pose are far broader than collusive conduct. It demonstrates that algorithmic pricing can lead to higher prices for consumers in competitive markets and even in the absence of collusion. This consumer harm can be initiated by a single firm employing a superior pricing algorithm. Higher prices arise from …
On The Misuse Of Regressions Of Price On The Hhi In Merger Review, Jonathan Baker
On The Misuse Of Regressions Of Price On The Hhi In Merger Review, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
The article explains why regressions of price on HHI should not be used in merger review. Both price and HHI are equilibrium outcomes determined by demand, supply, and the factors that drive them. Thus, a regression of price on the HHI does not recover a causal effect that could inform the likely competitive effects of a merger. Nonetheless, economic theory is consistent with the legal presumption that a merger is likely to have adverse competitive effects if it occurs in a concentrated market and makes that market more concentrated.
Antitrust Class Actions In The Wake Of Procedural Reform, Christine P. Bartholomew
Antitrust Class Actions In The Wake Of Procedural Reform, Christine P. Bartholomew
Indiana Law Journal
What is the current vitality of antitrust enforcement? Antitrust class actions—the primary mode of competition oversight—has weathered two decades of procedural reform. This Article documents the effects of those reforms. Relying on an original dataset of over 1300 antitrust class action settlements, this Article finds such cases alive but far from well. Certain suits do succeed on an impressive scale, returning billions of dollars to victims. But class action reform has made antitrust enforcement narrower, more time-consuming, and costlier than only a decade ago. And, as this Article’s sources reveal, new battle lines are forming. Across the political spectrum, people …
Optimal Standards Of Proof In Antitrust, Murat C. Mungan, Joshua Wright
Optimal Standards Of Proof In Antitrust, Murat C. Mungan, Joshua Wright
Faculty Scholarship
Economic analyses of antitrust institutions have thus far focused predominantly on optimal penalties and the design of substantive legal rules, and have largely ignored the standard of proof used in trials as a policy tool in shaping behavior. This neglected tool can play a unique role in the antitrust context, where a given firm may have the choice to engage in exceptional anticompetitive or procompetitive behavior, or simply follow more conventional business practices. The standard of proof used in determining the legality of a firm’s conduct affects not only whether the firm chooses to engage in pro- versus anticompetitive behavior, …
Big Tech Is Why I Have (Anti)Trust Issues, Sophie Copenhaver
Big Tech Is Why I Have (Anti)Trust Issues, Sophie Copenhaver
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
“There is a cost to bigness, even if it’s not passed onto the consumer.” Antitrust laws were once an effective tool to break up companies that had grown too large. However, subsequent rulings have altered their original meaning, and they are no longer useful in regulating large technology companies such as Amazon, Facebook, and Google. This Note will argue that judicial interpretation of antitrust laws should no longer be governed by the consumer welfare standard. Rather, judges should apply a two-part test, focusing on the market power and any anticompetitive business practices of the defendant corporation.
Selling Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Selling Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Antitrust enforcers and its other defenders have never done a good job of selling their field to the public. That is not entirely their fault. Antitrust is inherently technical, and a less engaging discipline to most people than, say, civil rights or criminal law. The more serious problem is that when the general press does talk about antitrust policy it naturally gravitates toward the fringes, both the far right and the far left. Extreme rhetoric makes for better press than the day-to-day operations of a technical enterprise. The extremes are often stated in overdramatized black-and-white terms that avoid the real …
President Biden's Executive Order On Competition: An Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
President Biden's Executive Order On Competition: An Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In July, 2021, President Biden signed a far ranging Executive Order directed to promoting competition in the American economy. This paper analyzes issues covered by the Order that are most likely to affect the scope and enforcement of antitrust law. The only passage that the Executive Order quoted from a Supreme Court antitrust decision captures its antitrust ideology well – that the Sherman Act:
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time …
Anticompetitive Merger Review, Samuel N. Weinstein
Anticompetitive Merger Review, Samuel N. Weinstein
Articles
U.S. antitrust law empowers enforcers to review pending mergers that might undermine competition. But there is growing evidence that the merger-review regime is failing to perform its core procompetitive function. Industry concentration and the power of dominant firms are increasing across key sectors of the economy. In response, progressive advocates of more aggressive antitrust interventions have critiqued the substantive merger-review standard, arguing that it is too friendly to merging firms. This Article traces the problem to a different source: the merger-review process itself. The growing length of reviews, the competitive restrictions merger agreements place on acquisition targets during review, and …
Criminal Enforcement Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: An Empirical Assessment, Daniel A. Crane
Criminal Enforcement Of Section 2 Of The Sherman Act: An Empirical Assessment, Daniel A. Crane
Law & Economics Working Papers
The Biden Justice Department has announced that it may begin to bring criminal monopolization cases under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a practice that the Department has not employed in almost half a century. The Department's leadership has justified this idea by asserting that it used to be common practice for the Antitrust Division to bring such cases. This Article presents the findings of an empirical study of all of the Justice Department's antitrust case filings. It finds that the Justice Depart brought 175 criminal monopolization cases between 1903 and 1977, but that only 20 of these involved unilateral …
Antitrust Liability For False Advertising: A Response To Carrier & Tushnet, Susannah Gagnon, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust Liability For False Advertising: A Response To Carrier & Tushnet, Susannah Gagnon, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This reply briefly considers when false advertising can give rise to antitrust liability. The biggest difference between tort and antitrust liability is that the latter requires harm to the market, which is critically dependent on actual consumer response. As a result, the biggest hurdle a private plaintiff faces in turning an act of false advertising into an antitrust offense is proof of causation – to what extent can a decline in purchase volume or other market rejection be specifically attributed to the defendant’s false claims? That requirement dooms the great majority of false advertising claims attacked as violations of the …
A New Antitrust Framework To Protect Mom And Pop From Big Tech, Cara Macdonald
A New Antitrust Framework To Protect Mom And Pop From Big Tech, Cara Macdonald
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
While the economy declined during the COVID-19 pandemic, big technology companies like Amazon and Oracle experienced unprecedented growth and influence. Critics argue big technology companies are finding this level of success in-part due to anticompetitive practices. The crux of the debate rests on whether current, traditional antitrust laws are sufficient to cope with big technology companies. Some theorists argue that current laws are adequate, while others assert that antitrust laws are insufficient to regulate big technology companies because they are so different from the types of companies antitrust laws were designed to regulate. This article concludes that big tech companies …
Ftc V. Qualcomm And The Need To Reboot Antitrust Goals, Beatriz Del Chiaro Da Rosa
Ftc V. Qualcomm And The Need To Reboot Antitrust Goals, Beatriz Del Chiaro Da Rosa
University of Miami Business Law Review
The antitrust community is facing a demanding question: Is antitrust enforcement ultimately about protecting consumers, competition, or both? This question has sparked debates about the ultimate goals of antitrust law. On one side of the debate, supporters of the consumer welfare standard; and on the other side, supporters of the Neo-Brandeisian standard of enforcement. At this crucial time in the debate of overarching antitrust goals, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Incorporated, one of the most important antitrust cases in the twenty-first century, poses many issues for the consumer welfare standard and antitrust enforcement in the …
Probing For Holes In The 100-Year-Old Baseball Exemption: A New Post-Alston Challenge, Sam C. Ehrlich
Probing For Holes In The 100-Year-Old Baseball Exemption: A New Post-Alston Challenge, Sam C. Ehrlich
University of Cincinnati Law Review
As professional baseball’s unique exemption to antitrust law celebrates its one-hundredth year of existence, it faces a new attack in Nostalgia Partners v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, a claim by a group of minor league owners shut out of MLB’s recent restructuring of its minor league affiliate system. While the baseball exemption has weathered dozens of similar challenges over the past century, the Nostalgia Partners plaintiffs claim that circumstances on the Supreme Court have changed enough that the justices would be willing to overturn or narrow the exemption in their favor. This claim rests with the Court’s …
Antitrust Philosophy And Its Impact On Rural Industry, Logan Gary Johnson
Antitrust Philosophy And Its Impact On Rural Industry, Logan Gary Johnson
Honors Thesis
The United States is a nation steeped in values, and tradition. One of these values has always been the preservation of competition in the pursuit of liberty. The philosophical backing of America’s founding can be traced back to a handful of European thinkers, most notably John Locke. The connection between Locke, America’s founding, and continued struggles with antitrust enforcement are worthy of exploration. Though likely unintentional, rural communities have been left to deal with the impacts of weak antitrust enforcement in a number of key sectors. Chief of which is Agriculture. Consolidation is the new norm, with each stage of …
Digital Cluster Markets, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Digital Cluster Markets, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This paper considers the role of “cluster” markets in antitrust litigation, the minimum requirements for recognizing such markets, and the relevance of network effects in identifying them.
One foundational requirement of markets in antitrust cases is that they consist of products that are very close substitutes for one another. Even though markets are nearly always porous, this principle is very robust in antitrust analysis and there are few deviations.
Nevertheless, clustering noncompeting products into a single market for purposes of antitrust analysis can be valuable, provided that its limitations are understood. Clustering contributes to market power when (1) many customers …
Rebuilding Platform Antitrust: Moving On From Ohio V. American Express, Steven C. Salop, Daniel Francis, Lauren Sillman, Michaela Spero
Rebuilding Platform Antitrust: Moving On From Ohio V. American Express, Steven C. Salop, Daniel Francis, Lauren Sillman, Michaela Spero
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Now that the immediate fallout from the Supreme Court’s blockbuster Amex decision has cooled, this Article aims to give a first draft of its place in antitrust history and to offer a roadmap for the next stage of the evolution of platform antitrust analysis. We focus on several issues that have not been fully analyzed in the literature. First, we argue that, rather than mangling the law of market definition, the Court should have explicitly permitted multi-market balancing of effects across the separate markets in which the platform was active. Second, we propose standards to implement such balancing in cases …
Sovereignty 2.0, Anupam Chander, Haochen Sun
Sovereignty 2.0, Anupam Chander, Haochen Sun
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Digital sovereignty-the exercise of control over the internet-is the ambition of the world's leaders, from Australia to Zimbabwe, seen as a bulwark against both foreign states and foreign corporations. Governments have resoundingly answered first-generation internet law questions of who, if anyone, should regulate the internet. The answer: they all will. Governments now confront second-generation questions--not whether, but how to regulate the internet. This Article argues that digital sovereignty is simultaneously a necessary incident of democratic governance and democracy's dreaded antagonist. As international law scholar Louis Henkin taught, sovereignty can insulate a government's worst ills from foreign intrusion. Assertions of digital …
Megacorporations Are Jacking Up Prices 'Because They Can,' Pushing Red-Hot Inflation To Historic Levels, Robert H. Lande
Megacorporations Are Jacking Up Prices 'Because They Can,' Pushing Red-Hot Inflation To Historic Levels, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
This article argues that corporations may be taking advantages of supply chain bottlenecks and shortages to collude and raise prices illegally. Although price fixing is illegal, the current levels of penalties are far too low. This gives firms an incentive to collude. Before the pandemic, when inflation was low, consumers and the antitrust enforcers would have been more likely to notice any sudden price increases and investigate whether they were caused by collusion. But using bottlenecks and shortages as cover, companies can take advantage of their years of consolidation and collude more easily with less chance of it being detected. …
Note: Trust In The Digital Marketplace: Amazon, Third-Party Sellers, And Informational Fiduciaries, Jesse-Paul Crane
Note: Trust In The Digital Marketplace: Amazon, Third-Party Sellers, And Informational Fiduciaries, Jesse-Paul Crane
Notre Dame Journal on Emerging Technologies
The rise of e-commerce has created a number of online marketplaces where digital platforms connect buyers and sellers. Consumers use platforms like Amazon, Etsy, Instacart, Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb to purchase goods and services from third parties while the platform itself takes a fee for operating the marketplace. Online platforms are not the only businesses that use such a “two-sided” marketplace model. The Supreme Court recently addressed antitrust concerns in this type of marketplace in Ohio v. Am. Express Co. 1 Two-sided markets invoke a number of novel legal issues that impact both those who buy and sell over them, …