Law Commons^™

Deference To Agency Interpretations Of Regulations: A Post-Chevron Assessment, Thomas A. Schweitzer, Russell L. Weaver

Russell L. Weaver

No abstract provided.

The President’S Pen And The Bureaucrat’S Fiefdom, John C. Eastman

John C. Eastman

Minimally Democratic Administrative Law, Jud Mathews

Jud Mathews

A persistent challenge for the American administrative state is reconciling the vast powers of unelected agencies with our commitment to government by the people. Many features of contemporary administrative law — from the right to participate in agency processes, to the reason-giving requirements on agencies, to the presidential review of rulemaking — have been justified, at least in part, as means to square the realities of agency power with our democratic commitments. At the root of any such effort there lies a theory of democracy, whether fully articulated or only implicit: some conception of what democracy is about, and what …

Deference Lotteries, Jud Mathews

Jud Mathews

When should courts defer to agency interpretations of statutes, and what measure of deference should agencies receive? Administrative law recognizes two main deference doctrines — the generous Chevron standard and the stingier Skidmore standard — but Supreme Court case law has not offered a bright-line rule for when each standard applies.Many observers have concluded that courts’ deference practice is an unpredictable muddle. This Article argues that it is really a lottery, in the sense the term is used in expected utility theory. Agencies cannot predict which deference standard a court will apply or with what effect, but they have a …

King V. Burwell And The Chevron Doctrine: Did The Court Invite Judicial Activism?, Matthew A. Melone

Matthew A. Melone

No abstract provided.

Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

The Constitution vests all legislative powers in Congress, yet Congress grants expansive lawmaking authority to federal agencies. As positive political theorists have long explored, Congress intends for federal agencies to faithfully exercise their delegated authority, but ensuring fidelity to congressional wishes is difficult due to asymmetries in information, expertise, and preferences that complicate congressional control and oversight. Indeed, this principal-agent problem has a democratic and constitutional dimension, as the legitimacy of administrative governance may well depend on whether the unelected bureaucracy is a faithful agent of Congress. Despite the predominance of lawmaking by regulation and the decades-long application of principal-agent …

Searching For Proportionality In U.S. Administrative Law, Jud Mathews

Jud Mathews

Chevron Inside The Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

For three decades, scholars (as well as courts and litigants) have written thousands of articles (and opinions and briefs) concerning the impact of the Chevron deference regime on judicial review of agency statutory interpretation. Little attention, however, has been paid to how Chevron and its progeny have actually shaped statutory interpretation inside the regulatory state. As part of the Fordham Law Review symposium Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward, this Essay presents the findings of the first comprehensive empirical investigation into the effect of Chevron and related doctrines on how federal agencies interpret statutes they administer.

The Essay …

Foreword — Chevron At 30: Looking Back And Looking Forward, Peter M. Shane, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

This Foreword introduces a Fordham Law Review symposium held in March 2014 to mark the thirtieth anniversary of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The most-cited administrative-law decision of all time, Chevron has sparked thirty years of scholarly discussion concerning what Chevron deference means, when (or even if) it should apply, and what impact it has had on the administrative state. Part I of the Foreword discusses the symposium contributions that address Chevron’s scope and application, especially in light of City of Arlington v. FCC. Part II introduces the contributions that explore empirically and theoretically Chevron’s impact outside of …

Deferential Review Of The U.S. Tax Court, After Mayo Foundation V. United States (2011), Andre L. Smith

Andre L. Smith

Deferential Review of the U.S. Tax Court, After Mayo examines whether the Chevron doctrine requires federal circuit courts of appeal to deferentially review the U.S. Tax Court decisions of law. Mayo Foundation v. US (2011) rejects tax exceptionalism and requires the U.S. Tax Court to defer to Treasury regulations carrying the force of law. But Mayo avoids dealing with whether Chevron applies to appellate review of the Tax Court. In “The Fight Over ‘Fighting Regs’ and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation”, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 643 (2012), Professor Leandra Lederman (Indiana) contends that deference belongs to the agency and not …

The Ordinary Remand Rule And The Judicial Toolbox For Agency Dialogue, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

When a court concludes that an agency’s decision is erroneous, the ordinary rule is to remand to the agency to consider the issue anew (as opposed to the court deciding the issue itself). Despite that the Supreme Court first articulated this ordinary remand rule in the 1940s and has rearticulated it repeatedly over the years, little work has been done to understand how the rule works in practice, much less whether it promotes the separation-of-powers values that motivate the rule. This Article is the first to conduct such an investigation—focusing on judicial review of agency immigration adjudications and reviewing the …

Deciding Who Decides: Searching For A Deference Standard When Agencies Preempt State Law, John R. Ablan

John R Ablan

When a federal agency determines that the statute that it administers or regulations it has promulgated preempt state law, how much deference must a federal court give to that determination? In Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide what standard of deference courts should apply when an agency makes a preemption determination pursuant to a specific congressional delegation to do so. Under this circumstance, this Article counsels against applying any single deference standard to an agency’s entire determination. Instead, it observes that preemption determinations are a complex inquiry involving questions of federal law, state law, and …

How To Win The Deference Lottery, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

In response to Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 Texas Law Review 1349 (2013).

In Deference Lotteries, Jud Mathews proposes that the deference framework in administrative law be viewed through the game theory lens of a lottery. Such an approach helps us think critically about how varying standards of review may affect the behavior of agencies and courts engaged in the judicial review process. This Response suggests that the lottery lens can also help agencies think more strategically about how to develop and defend interpretations of statutes they administer. Assuming the validity of the lottery framework, the Response suggests a playbook …

Deference To Agency Interpretations Of Regulations: A Post-Chevron Assessment, Thomas A. Schweitzer, Russell L. Weaver

Thomas A. Schweitzer

No abstract provided.

Chevron's Sliding Scale In Wyeth V. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), Gregory M. Dickinson

Gregory M Dickinson

In Wyeth v. Levine the Supreme Court once again failed to reconcile the interpretive presumption against preemption with the sometimes competing Chevron doctrine of deference to agencies' reasonable statutory interpretations. Rather than resolve the issue of which principle should govern where the two principles point toward opposite results, the Court continued its recent practice of applying both principles halfheartedly, carving exceptions, and giving neither its proper weight.

This analysis situates Wyeth within the larger framework of the Court's recent preemption decisions in an effort to explain the Court's hesitancy to resolve the conflict. The analysis concludes that the Court, motivated …

"Streamlining" The Rule Of Law: How The Department Of Justice Is Undermining Judicial Review Of Agency Action, Shruti Rana

Shruti Rana

Judicial review of administrative decision making is an essential institutional check on agency power. Recently, however, the Department of Justice dramatically revised its regulations in an attempt to insulate its decision making from public and federal court scrutiny. These “streamlining” rules, carried out in the name of national security and immigration reform, have led to a breakdown in the rule of law in our judicial system. While much attention has been focused on the Department of Justice’s recent attempts to shield executive power from the reach of Congress, its efforts to undermine judicial review have so far escaped such scrutiny. …