Law Commons^™

Eroding The Bedrock: The Future Of Public Administration Without Chevron Deference, Rose Keller

Honors Projects

When Congress passes a bill, it produces words on a page. Who decides what those words mean? Historically, the onus of a statute’s interpretation has rested with the federal agencies charged with its implementation. The Chevron doctrine, a two-step standard that affords federal agencies significant latitude in interpreting their own enabling legislation, has been the applicable deference regime in statutory interpretation cases since 1984. Contrary to this tradition, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has reasserted the primacy of the judiciary in statutory interpretation cases, often ignoring Chevron entirely. In 2023, the Court granted certiorari to Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, a …

Judicial Deference To Agency Action Based On Ai, Cade Mallett

Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology

No abstract provided.

Taxes, Administrative Law, And Agency Expertise: Questioning The Orthodoxy, Scott Schumacher

Articles

One of the foundations of administrative law is that federal agencies and their employees are experts in their respective fields. In addition, the many judgments and decisions made by these experts are based on a thorough record after extensive factfinding. As a result, so the theory goes, courts, particularly courts of general jurisdiction like the United States District Courts, should give deference to the determinations made by these experts. But what if the facts underpinning this foundation are not true in all cases? Should courts nevertheless provide deference to decisions by agencies when it is evident that an agency's determinations …

The Ghosts Of Chevron Present And Future, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In the October 2021 term, the Supreme Court decided six cases involving federal agency interpretations of statutes, at least five of which seemingly implicated the Chevron doctrine and several of which explicitly turned on applications of Chevron in the lower courts. But while the Chevron doctrine has dominated federal administrative law for nearly four decades, not a single majority opinion during the term even cited Chevron. Three of those cases formalized the so-called “major questions” doctrine, which functions essentially as an anti-Chevron doctrine by requiring clear congressional statements of authority to justify agency action on matters of great legal and …

The Antiregulatory Arsenal, Antidemocratic Can(N)Ons, And The Waters Wars, William W. Buzbee

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Clean Water Act has become a centerpiece in an enduring multifront battle against both environmental regulation and federal regulatory power in all of its settings. This Article focuses on the emergence, elements, and linked uses of an antiregulatory arsenal now central to battles over what are federally protected “waters of the United States.” This is the key jurisdictional hook for CWA jurisdiction, and hence, logically, has become the heart of CWA contestation. The multi-decade battle over Waters protections has both drawn on emergent antiregulatory moves and generated new weapons in this increasingly prevalent and powerful antiregulatory arsenal. This array …

The Force Of Law After Kisor, Beau J. Baumann

Pace Law Review

No abstract provided.

How Chevron Deference Fits Into Article Iii, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

U.S. Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch, along with Professor Philip Hamburger, assert that Chevron deference-under which courts defer to reasonable agency statutory interpretations-violates Article III. Chevron does so because, they argue, it either permits agencies, not courts, "to say what the law is" or requires judges to forgo independent judgment by favoring the government's position. If they are correct, Congress could not require courts to accept reasonable agency statutory interpretations under any circumstances. This Article does what these critics, perhaps surprisingly, do not do-situates challenges to Chevron within the broad landscape of the Court's current Article III …

Deference Is Dead, Long Live Chevron, Nathan D. Richardson

Faculty Publications

Chevron v. NRDC has stood for more than 35 years as the central case on judicial review of administrative agencies’ interpretations of statutes. Its contours have long been debated, but more recently it has come under increasing scrutiny, with some—including two sitting Supreme Court Justices—calling for the case to be overturned. Others praise Chevron, calling deference necessary or even inevitable. All seem to agree the doctrine is powerful and important.

This standard account is wrong, however. Chevron is not the influential doctrine it once was and has not been for a long time. It has been eroded from the outside …

The Apa And The Assault On Deference, Ronald Levin

Scholarship@WashULaw

Recently, in Kisor v. Wilkie, a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch argued at length that § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act prohibits judicial deference to administrative interpretations of law. That section states that “the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law.” This issue remained unresolved in Kisor, but the Supreme Court may well return to it soon as a potential argument against the validity of Chevron deference. Although a substantial academic literature has supported Gorsuch’s position on the APA question, this article disagrees with it. It argues that the text of § 706, surrounding statutory provisions, the …

Montana Environmental Information Center V. Department Of Environmental Quality, Anthony P. Reed

Public Land & Resources Law Review

The DEQ renewed a 1999 MPDES Permit on September 14, 2012 that allowed Western Energy Company to discharge pollutants from the Rosebud Mine into streams. Environmental groups MEIC and the Sierra Club sued, arguing this violated both the Montana Water Quality Act and federal Clean Water Act because the DEQ’s interpretation of its own regulations that exempted waters with ephemeral characteristics from water quality standards was arbitrary and capricious. The district court agreed, but the Montana Supreme Court reversed. It held the DEQ’s interpretation was lawful and remanded for further fact finding to assess how the DEQ applied the interpretation …

Symmetry's Mandate: Constraining The Politicization Of American Administrative Law, Daniel E. Walters

Michigan Law Review

Recent years have seen the rise of pointed and influential critiques of deference doctrines in administrative law. What many of these critiques have in common is a view that judges, not agencies, should resolve interpretive disputes over the meaning of statutes—disputes the critics take to be purely legal and almost always resolvable using lawyerly tools of statutory construction. In this Article, I take these critiques, and the relatively formalist assumptions behind them, seriously and show that the critics have not acknowledged or advocated the full reform vision implied by their theoretical premises. Specifically, critics have extended their critique of judicial …

A Functional Approach To Judicial Review Of Ptab Rulings On Mixed Questions Of Law And Fact, Rebecca S. Eisenberg

Articles

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has long relied on active appellate review to bring uniformity and clarity to patent law. It initially treated the PTO the same as the federal district courts, reviewing its factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Following reversal by the Supreme Court in Dickinson v. Zurko, the Federal Circuit began giving greater deference to PTO factual findings. But it continued to review the PTO’s legal conclusions de novo, while coding an expansive list of disputed issues in patent cases as legal conclusions, even when they …

Deference To Agency Interpretations Of Regulations: A Post-Chevron Assessment, Thomas A. Schweitzer, Russell L. Weaver

Russell L. Weaver

No abstract provided.

Agency Statutory Abnegation In The Deregulatory Playbook, William W. Buzbee

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

If an agency newly declares that it lacks statutory power previously claimed, how should such a move—what this article calls agency statutory abnegation—be reviewed? Given the array of strategies an agency might use to make a policy change or move the law in a deregulatory direction, why might statutory abnegation be chosen? After all, it is always a perilous and likely doctrinally disadvantageous strategy for agencies. Nonetheless, agencies from time to time have utilized statutory abnegation claims as part of their justification for deregulatory shifts. Actions by agencies during 2017 and 2018, under the administration of President Donald J. Trump, …

The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’S Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

Auer deference holds that reviewing courts should defer to agen­cies when the latter interpret their own preexisting regulations. This doc­trine relieves pressure on agencies to undergo costly notice-and-com­ment rulemaking each time interpretation of existing regulations is neces­sary. But according to some leading scholars and jurists, the doc­trine actually encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules in the first instance, augmenting agency power and violating core separation of pow­ers norms in the process. The claim that Auer perversely encourages agencies to “self-delegate”—that is, to create vague rules that can later be informally interpreted by agencies with latitude due to judicial defer­ence—has helped …

The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference's Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters

All Faculty Scholarship

Auer deference holds that reviewing courts should defer to agencies when the latter interpret their own preexisting regulations. This doctrine relieves pressure on agencies to undergo costly notice-and-comment rulemaking each time interpretation of existing regulations is necessary. But according to some leading scholars and jurists, the doctrine actually encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules in the first instance, augmenting agency power and violating core separation of powers norms in the process. The claim that Auer perversely encourages agencies to “self-delegate”—that is, to create vague rules that can later be informally interpreted by agencies with latitude due to judicial deference—has helped …

Agency Pragmatism In Addressing Law’S Failure: The Curious Case Of Federal “Deemed Approvals” Of Tribal-State Gaming Compacts, Kevin K. Washburn

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA), Congress imposed a decision-forcing mechanism on the Secretary of the Interior related to tribal-state compacts for Indian gaming. Congress authorized the Secretary to review such compacts and approve or disapprove each compact within forty-five days of submission. Under an unusual provision of law, however, if the Secretary fails to act within forty-five days, the compact is “deemed approved” by operation of law but only to the extent that it is lawful. In a curious development, this regime has been used in a different manner than Congress intended. Since the United States …

Endangered Deference: Separation Of Powers And Judicial Review Of Agency Interpretation, Kathryn M. Baldwin

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

This Note proceeds in four parts: Part I consists of a brief history of the development of agency deference doctrine. Part II examines the decline of deference from the perspective of all three branches of government: the overuse by the executive agency that catalyzed deference’s denouement, the underuse by the United States Supreme Court and renewed separation of powers challenges, and the parallel assault from Congress under the pending SOPRA. Part III addresses the proposed de novo review standard and highlights the deficiencies in that solution, emphasizing instead the tools that Congress already employs to meaningfully check agency interpretations. …

The Politics Of Selecting Chevron Deference, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

In this article, we examine an important threshold question in judicial behavior and administrative law: When do federal circuit courts decide to use the Chevron deference framework and when do they select a framework that is less deferential to the administrative agency's statutory interpretation? The question is important because the purpose of Chevron deference is to give agencies-not judges-policy-making space within statutory interpretation. We expect, nonetheless, that whether to invoke the Chevron framework is largely driven by political dynamics, with judges adopting a less deferential standard when their political preferences do not align with the agency's decision. To provide insight, …

In Defense Of A Little Judiciary: A Textual And Constitutional Foundation For Chevron, Terence J. Mccarrick Jr.

San Diego Law Review

This Article hopes to help fill that “important gap in the administrative law literature.” And it proceeds in three parts. Part II offers a brief history of the Chevron doctrine and its discontents. It traces the doctrine’s origin and scope and ends by articulating the textualist and originalist critique of Chevron described above. Part III grapples with that criticism and offers a textualist and originalist defense of Chevron. Section III.A describes the textual footing for Chevron in the APA and argues that Chevron—if not commanded by the APA—does not upset the role it envisions for courts. Section III.B describes the …

Deference To Deference: Examining The Relationship Between The Courts And The Political Branches Through Judicial Deference And The Chevron Doctrine, Christopher Yao

Honors Theses

Judicial review of agency rulemaking sits atop a nexus between all three branches of American government, the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. Chevron v. NRDC (1984), a landmark case in administrative law, and its resulting doctrine of strong judicial deference to agencies in their interpretations of statute, are paradoxical in their creation. Although Chevron was decided at the height of Reagan-era deregulation, it greatly enhanced the power of administrative agencies, allowing them to reinterpret the meaning of their statutory directives as needed to justify changes to regulations with less scrutiny from the courts. It is only in recent years …

Native Ecosystems Council V. Marten, Rebecca A. Newsom

Public Land & Resources Law Review

In Native Ecosystems Council v. Marten, the Ninth Circuit found that the United States Forest Service did not violate the Endangered Species Act, National Forest Management Act, or National Environmental Policy Act, when it proposed the Lonesome Wood Vegetation Management 2 Project in the Gallatin National Forest of Montana, even though the decision was inconsistent with the United States Forest Service’s reports. The Ninth Circuit’s holding demonstrated the wide amount of deference the courts will give the Forest Service when determining the best available scientific data.

The Upsides And Downsides Of Ending Chevron Deference, Steve R. Johnson, Kristin E. Hickman, Joseph B. Judkins, Donald B. Susswein

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

Administrative Law's Political Dynamics, Kent H. Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

Over thirty years ago, the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. commanded courts to uphold federal agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes as long as those interpretations are reasonable. This Chevron deference doctrine was based in part on the Court’s desire to temper administrative law’s political dynamics by vesting federal agencies, not courts, with primary authority to make policy judgments about ambiguous laws Congress charged the agencies to administer. Despite this express objective, scholars such as Frank Cross, Emerson Tiller, and Cass Sunstein have empirically documented how politics influence circuit court review of agency statutory …

Auer Evasions, Jonathan Adler

Faculty Publications

Auer v. Robbins requires federal courts to defer to federal agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations. Auer built upon, and arguably expanded, the Court’s long-standing practice of deferring to agency interpretations of their own regulations born in Bowles v. Seminole Rock. Although initially uncontroversial, the doctrine has come under fire from legal commentators and prominent jurists, including Auer’s author, the late Justice Antonin Scalia. As Justice Scalia came to recognize, Auer deference enables agencies to evade a wide range of legal constraints that are otherwise imposed upon agency behavior, the ability of agencies to take action with the force …

Chevron Step Two's Domain, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

An increasing number of judges, policymakers, and scholars have advocated eliminating or narrowing Chevron deference—a two-step inquiry under which courts defer to federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes the agencies administer. Much of the debate centers on either Chevron’s domain (i.e., when Chevron should apply at all) or how courts ascertain statutory ambiguity at Chevron’s first step. Largely lost in this debate on constraining agency discretion is the role of Chevron’s second step: whether the agency’s resolution of a statutory ambiguity is reasonable. Drawing on the most comprehensive study of Chevron in the circuit courts, this Essay explores how …

Chevron In The Circuit Courts: The Codebook Appendix, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

For our empirical study on the use of Chevron deference in the federal courts of appeals, we utilized the following Codebook. This Codebook draws substantially from the codebook appended to William Eskridge and Lauren Baer's pathbreaking study of administrative law's deference doctrines at the Supreme Court. Our research assistants and we followed the instructions below when coding judicial decisions. To address questions as they arose and to ensure consistent coding, we maintained close contact with each other and our research assistants throughout the project and clarified the Codebook to address additional issues. Further details concerning our methodology (and its limitations) …

Chevron In The Circuit Courts, Kent Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Michigan Law Review

This Article presents findings from the most comprehensive empirical study to date on how the federal courts of appeals have applied Chevrondeference— the doctrine under which courts defer to a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it administers. Based on 1,558 agency interpretations the circuit courts reviewed from 2003 through 2013 (where they cited Chevron), we found that the circuit courts overall upheld 71% of interpretations and applied Chevrondeference 77% of the time. But there was nearly a twenty-five-percentage-point difference in agency-win rates when the circuit courts applied Chevrondeference than when they did …

The President’S Pen And The Bureaucrat’S Fiefdom, John C. Eastman

John C. Eastman

The Rowley Enigma: How Much Weight Is Due To Idea State Administrative Proceedings In Federal Court?, Daniel W. Morton-Bentley

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

In this article, I argue that the phrase "due weight" incorporates a deferential review standard equivalent to the clear error or substantial evidence standard, a conclusion reached by a minority of the circuit courts of appeal. I further argue that, consistent with Rowley, federal courts must afford due weight to administrative officers' substantive or educational conclusions, but no weight to their procedural or non-educational conclusions. Part II offers a general outline of the IDEA, giving special attention to its judicial review provisions. In Part III, I provide a general discussion of judicial review of administrative adjudication. Part IV is devoted …