Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering Commons^™

Inpatient Discharge-By-Noon: Are Fewer Better Than All?, Nicholas Ballester, Pratik J. Parikh, Kara Combs, Jordan S. Peck

Journal of Maine Medical Center

Introduction: To address boarding in hospital emergency departments, discharge-by-noon could free up inpatient beds earlier in the day. However, discharging all patients by noon can heavily burden inpatient units and may not be feasible. In this study, we determine the number of discharges after which the benefits of an additional discharge-by-noon diminish.

Methods: We conducted a simulation analysis to quantify how occupancy rate, mean daily number of discharges, and peak discharge time impact upstream boarding time in an inpatient neurology unit at Maine Medical Center. Using a day-of-discharge simulation model with one year of retrospective data, we assessed configurations approximating …

The Probability Of Success-Through Fault Tree Analytical Binomial Result, Tyleka Riddle

Night Flight Journal

Prestigious Appeal Rule of Thumb (Ear Drum Plugs)

In truant fashion, with proven accidental probabilistic perception for proposed cued facial expression recognition and voice commands without filtering. The estimated cost analysis for design and development generated from the enhanced project in the word "no”: Additionally, an audio noise effect size (ES) for desired level of comprehensive sensory receptors in sound reference to noisy party syndrome. Sytoss, (2019) "Resulting in a cocktail party theory for chalkboard distinction and conversation with applied facial recognition. As well as, the enhanced project management tool, EPMT, to provide output and input determination for higher-level acoustic …

A Game-Theoretic Approach To Share The Costs Of Cooperating Healthcare Networks, Jay M. Lightfoot

Journal of International Technology and Information Management

The growing demand for healthcare services combined with the disarray in the health insurance market in the United States has created a situation where rival health networks are aggressively competing by building duplicate health facilities and providing redundant services in localized geographic regions. Unfortunately, this strategy can reduce the quality of patient care and decrease profits (Kaissi & Charland, 2013). A solution to this problem is for health networks to cooperate and share healthcare equipment, facilities, and personnel. Toward that end, this paper presents a game-theoretic method that can share these costs in a fair, efficient, and repeatable manner.