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Full-Text Articles in Operations Research, Systems Engineering and Industrial Engineering

Macroeconomic Aspects Of Maintenance Optimization Of Critical Infrastructures, S. A. Timashev, A. V. Bushinskaya Nov 2020

Macroeconomic Aspects Of Maintenance Optimization Of Critical Infrastructures, S. A. Timashev, A. V. Bushinskaya

Engineering Management & Systems Engineering Faculty Publications

The main goal of maintenance is prevention, timely detection and elimination of failures and damage. From the point of view of critical infrastructures (CIs), the main purpose of their maintenance is to increase the safety of CIs and / or to ensure life safety. CIs should be optimal in terms of their purpose, cost, as a source of income and profit at all stages of their life cycle, and also acceptable in terms of possible loss of human lives or injuries. The paper considers the assessment of necessary optimal investments in the maintenance (time interval between subsequent maintenance), to increase …


Hedonic Games And Monte Carlo Simulation, Sheida Etemadidavan, Andrew J. Collins Jan 2020

Hedonic Games And Monte Carlo Simulation, Sheida Etemadidavan, Andrew J. Collins

Engineering Management & Systems Engineering Faculty Publications

Hedonic games have applications in economics and multi-agent systems where the grouping preferences of an individual is important. Hedonic games look at coalition formation, amongst the players, where players have a preference relation over all the coalition. Hedonic games are also known as coalition formation games, and they are a form of a cooperative game with a non-transferrable utility game. Some examples of hedonic games are stable marriage, stable roommate, and hospital/residence problem. The study of hedonic games is driven by understanding what coalition structures will be stable, i.e., given a coalition structure, no players have an incentive to deviate …