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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Engineering
Investigation Of Stun Guns As Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (Emi) Sources, George H. Baker, Ryan C. Tuttle
Investigation Of Stun Guns As Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (Emi) Sources, George H. Baker, Ryan C. Tuttle
George H Baker
Determined malefactors have demonstrated the use of common systems as effective weapons against civilian infrastructures, e.g. commercial jetliners used as kinetic weapons and cell phones used to trigger explosive devices. This undergraduate research project investigated the possibility of using readily available stun gun devices for electro-magnetic interference with or disruption of personal computers. At present, the system effects of high power electromagnetic sources are well recognized by world scientific and military communities. Former CIA Director John Deutch has said that, "the electron is the ultimate precision-guided weapon."1 There has been much research on the deleterious effects of pulsed voltages and …
Investigation Of Stun Guns As Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (Emi) Sources, George H. Baker, Ryan C. Tuttle
Investigation Of Stun Guns As Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (Emi) Sources, George H. Baker, Ryan C. Tuttle
George H Baker
Because the operation and control of most critical infrastructures are highly dependent on electronics, it is important to understand the vulnerability of those electronics to intentional electromagnetic interference (EMI). The possibility of interference using readily available consumer devices is a particular concern. We investigated the feasibility and effectiveness of using compact stun guns to intentionally interfere with electronic systems. Test articles included individual computers and computers networked through a central hub. 60KV and 600KV devices were used in the experiments. Results indicate that stun guns are effective in disabling digital electronic systems.
Report Of The Commission To Assess The Threat To The United States From Emp Attack: Critical National Infrastructures, William R. Graham
Report Of The Commission To Assess The Threat To The United States From Emp Attack: Critical National Infrastructures, William R. Graham
George H Baker
The physical and social fabric of the United States is sustained by a system of systems; a complex and dynamic network of interlocking and interdependent infrastructures (“critical national infrastructures”) whose harmonious functioning enables the myriad actions, transactions, and information flow that undergird the orderly conduct of civil society in this country. The vulnerability of these frastructures to threats — deliberate, accidental, and acts of nature — is the focus of greatly heightened concern in the current era, a process accelerated by the events of 9/11 and recent hurricanes, including Katrina and Rita. This report presents the results of the Commission’s …
Mil-Std-188-125-1, High-Altitude Emp Protection For Fixed Ground-Based Facilities
Mil-Std-188-125-1, High-Altitude Emp Protection For Fixed Ground-Based Facilities
George H Baker
MIL-STD-188-125-1 establishes minimum requirements and design objectives for high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) hardening of fixed ground-based facilities that perform critical, time-urgent command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) missions. The standard prescribes minimum performance requirements for low-risk protection from mission-aborting damage or upset due to HEMP environments. It also addresses minimum testing requirements for demonstrating that prescribed performance has been achieved and for verifying that the installed protection subsystem provides the operationally required hardness for the completed facility. Covered fixed ground-based facility types include subscriber terminals and data processing centers, transmitting and receiving communications stations, and relay facilities. Use of …
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (Scada) Systems, George H. Baker, Allan Berg
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (Scada) Systems, George H. Baker, Allan Berg
George H Baker
Our critical national infrastructure systems have become almost universally dependent upon computer-based control systems technically referred to as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. SCADA systems evolved from the telemetry and event-alarm systems developed in the early days of utilities. With the widespread use of SCADA systems, computers have become the "basis element" for much of our critical infrastructure. Thus, the disruption of controlling computer terminals and networks due to natural disasters, electric power failure, accidents or malicious activity can have catastrophic consequences.
A Unified Topological Approach To Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Protection, George H. Baker, J. Philip Castillo, Edward F. Vance
A Unified Topological Approach To Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Protection, George H. Baker, J. Philip Castillo, Edward F. Vance
George H Baker
The presentation recommends an approach for unifying electronic system protection designs for a wide spectrum of electromagnetic environments. A general electromagnetic topological construct is developed as the basis for a consistent shielding and terminal protection methodology. Spectral characteristics of multiple interfering electromagnetic sources, both internal and external, are described. Effects addressed include EMI/EMC, lightning, nuclear EMP, and RF weapons. Protection practices for individual effects are discussed and means for integrating these into a single protection topology.