Engineering Commons^™

High Consequence Scenarios For North Korean Atmospheric Nuclear Tests With Policy Recommendations For The U.S. Government, Thomas S. Popik, Jordan T. Kearns, George H. Baker Iii, Henry F. Cooper, William R. Harris

George H Baker

The government of North Korea has declared high-altitude EMP-capability to be a “strategic goal” and has also threatened an atmospheric test of a hydrogen bomb. Atmospheric nuclear tests have the potential to cripple satellites and the undersea cable networks critical to communication, and navigation necessary for trans-Pacific trade among the U.S., China, and other nations. When a nuclear warhead is detonated at high altitude, a series of electromagnetic pulses radiate downward within the line of sight of the blast. These pulses can disable equipment with miniature electronics and long conductors. Electric grid controls and transmission systems are especially vulnerable. Intense …

Damage Analysis Modified Trac Computer Program (Damtrac), George H. Baker Iii, Alan D. Mcnutt, G. Bradford Shea, David M. Rubenstein

George H Baker

A computer program tailored for EMP damage analysis of solid-state circuitry has been developed by modifying the existing TRAC network analysis program. Modification of the TRAC diode and transistor models to include breakdown parameters and the addition of a semiconductor device parameter library have greatly simplified the analyst's task. An added feature is a subroutine that automatically calculates the amplitude and duration of transient power dissipated in electronic circuit components.

Evolution And Rationale For United States Department Of Defense Electromagnetic Pulse Protection Standard, George H. Baker Iii

George H Baker

The United States (US) Department of Defense (DoD) Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) protection standard offers a solid basis for protecting commercial communication, data, and control facilities. Because of the standard’s shielded barrier and test requirements, it is not surprising that there is a strong temptation within industry and government to dismiss the MIL-STD 188-125 approach in favor of less rigorous protection methods. It is important to understand that US DoD EMP protection standard for fixed facilities, MIL-STD-188-125, reflects an evolution by trial and error that spanned a period of decades beginning with the acquisition of the Minuteman Missile System in the …

Proposal For A Dod Combined Battlefield Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Initiative, George H. Baker Iii

George H Baker

The presentation emphasizes the growing importance of electromagnetic survivability and compatibility. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the clear military advantage provided by sophisticated electronic weapon and communication systems. In addition, the offensive tactic of taking out the enemy's eyes and ears during the air war paid off, giving our military decisive air superiority. The lessons for the future are clear. High-tech electronics now so dominates the battlefield that the outcome of future conflicts could well be decided by electronics attrition rather than human casualties. Our Desert Storm experience thus accentuates the importance of guaranteeing that our electronic systems will not be …

Testimony Of Dr. George H. Baker, Senior Advisor To The Congressional Emp Commission, George H. Baker Iii

George H Baker

This is the script of testimony before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. It offers a vision for a future in which our electric power systems will be able to operate through or quickly recover from catastrophic failure due to electromagnetic pulse (EMP), cyber, and physical attacks. The scope of the term ‘EMP’ used in this testimony includes both naturally occurring solar storms and the more energetic man-made EMP hazards. The vision has been discussed with members of the electric power industry, and prominent EMP/cyber/physical protection advocates who find it to be supportable and actionable. The nature of EMP, cyber, and …

Testimony Before The House Committee On National Security And The House Committee On Oversight And Government Reform, George H. Baker Iii

George H Baker

The Commission to Assess the threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse, on which I served as principal staff, made a compelling case for protecting critical infrastructure against the nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and geomagnetic disturbances (GMD) caused by severe solar storms. Their 2008 Critical Infrastructure Report explains EMP effects, consequences, and protection means for critical infrastructure sectors. EMP and GMD are particularly challenging in that they interfere with electrical power and electronic data, control, transmission, and communication systems organic to nearly all critical infrastructures. The affected geography may be continental in scale. EMP and GMD events thus represent …

National Infrastructure Protection Priorities For Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (Emp) And Solar Storm Geomagnetic Disturbance Catastrophes, George H. Baker Iii

George H Baker

The Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack has provided a compelling case for protecting civilian infrastructure against the effects of EMP and geomagnetic disturbances (GMD) caused by severe solar storms. Similar to protecting critical infrastructure against any hazard, it will be important to take a risk-based priority approach for these two electromagnetic threats, recognizing that it will be fiscally impracticable to protect everything. In this regard, EMP and GMD are particularly challenging in that they interfere with electrical and electronic data, control, transmission, and communication systems organic to nearly all critical infrastructures, simultaneously, …

Protecting The Electric Power Grid From Electromagnetic Pulse: Legal And Policy Aspects, George H. Baker Iii, William R. Harris, Thomas S. Popik

George H Baker

Since the release of the 2004 and 2008 reports of the congressionally-authorized Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack (“EMP Commission”), there has been a growing societal realization that civilian infrastructure is vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse (EMP) threats. And among the DHS list of critical infrastructure sectors, the electric power grid is both the most vulnerable, because EMP couples most efficiently to long power lines, and the most critical, because the grid is the keystone infrastructure upon which all other infrastructures depend. Simply put, grid failure is an existential threat to national governance and …

Emp And Geomagnetic Storm Protection Of Critical Infrastructure, George H. Baker Iii

George H Baker

EMP and solar storm wide geographic coverage and ubiquitous system effects beg the question of “Where to begin?” with protection efforts. Thus, in addressing these “wide area electromagnetic (EM) effects,” we must be clever in deciding where to invest limited resources. Based on simple risk analysis, the electric power and communication infrastructures emerge as the highest priority for EM protection. Programs focused on these highest risk infrastructures will go a long way in lessoning societal impact. Given the national scope of the effects, such programs must be coordinated at the national level but implemented at local level. Because wide-area EM …

Risk-Based Critical Infrastructure Priorities For Emp And Solar Storms, George H. Baker Iii

George H Baker

Two electromagnetic phenomena have the potential to create continental-scale disasters. The first, nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP), results from a nuclear detonation high above the tropopause. The second, a major solar storm, or "solar tsunami" occurs naturally when an intense wave of charged particles from the sun perturbs the earth's magnetic field. Both phenomena can debilitate electrical and electronic systems necessary for the operation of infrastructure systems and services. One reason why a U.S. protection program has yet to be initiated is that policy makers continue to wrestle with the question of where to begin, given the Department of Homeland Security’s …

Risk-Based Critical Infrastructure Protection Priorities For Emp And Solar Storms, George H. Baker Iii

George H Baker

The Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack has provided a compelling case for protecting civilian infrastructure against the effects of EMP. As with protecting infrastructure against any hazard, it will be important to take a risk-based priority approach for EMP, recognizing that it is fiscally impracticable to protect everything. In this regard, EMP is particularly challenging in that it interferes with electrical and electronic data, control, transmission, and communication systems organic to nearly all infrastructures in a simultaneous and wide-scale manner. And, for nuclear burst altitudes of 100s of kilometers, the exposed geography …

Emp: A Brief Tutorial, George H. Baker Iii

George H Baker

A nuclear detonation at altitudes from about 30 to 500 kilometers generates a strong electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that propagates to points on the ground within the line-of-sight of the burst. For bursts above 100 kilometers, electronics can be affected over continental scale areas. The EMP induces large voltages and currents in antennas and cables of electronic systems that will upset operation or damage circuit components if protection measures are not present. The article provides a brief tutorial on EMP environments, effects and protection.

High Power Electromagnetic Weapons: A Brief Tutorial, George H. Baker Iii

George H Baker

High power electromagnetic weapons, also referred to as high power radiofrequency (HPRF) weapons, are a type of directed energy weapons. The system effects of high power electromagnetic environments are well recognized by world scientific and military communities. Former CIA Director John Deutch has said that, "the electron is the ultimate precision-guided weapon." In the course of the investigation ofnuclear EMP effects on electronics during the Cold War period, it became evident that garden variety, unprotected electronics would malfunction, in some cases burn out, in the presence of electromagnetic fields in the hundreds to thousands of volts per meter. The EMP …

Proceedings Of The 2009 Nrc Federal Facilities Council/James Madison University Symposium On Protecting Large Facility Complexes;, George H. Baker, Cheryl E. Wilkins

George H Baker

Large, complex facilities pose unique protection challenges involving multidisciplinary expertise and collaboration among government, academia, and the private sector. The symposium served as a forum for sharing experiences in dealing with large facility catastrophic events and risk management. The symposium was organized based on the value of interaction among different people representing diverse disciplines. In many instances, such interactions lead to solutions that would not have been developed within disciplinary stovepipes. The venue was divided into three panels addressing physical security, cyber security, and real facility case studies. We were also privileged to have three keynote speakers including Dr. Charles …

Investigation Of Stun Guns As Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (Emi) Sources, George H. Baker, Ryan C. Tuttle

George H Baker

Determined malefactors have demonstrated the use of common systems as effective weapons against civilian infrastructures, e.g. commercial jetliners used as kinetic weapons and cell phones used to trigger explosive devices. This undergraduate research project investigated the possibility of using readily available stun gun devices for electro-magnetic interference with or disruption of personal computers. At present, the system effects of high power electromagnetic sources are well recognized by world scientific and military communities. Former CIA Director John Deutch has said that, "the electron is the ultimate precision-guided weapon."1 There has been much research on the deleterious effects of pulsed voltages and …

Investigation Of Stun Guns As Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (Emi) Sources, George H. Baker, Ryan C. Tuttle

George H Baker

Because the operation and control of most critical infrastructures are highly dependent on electronics, it is important to understand the vulnerability of those electronics to intentional electromagnetic interference (EMI). The possibility of interference using readily available consumer devices is a particular concern. We investigated the feasibility and effectiveness of using compact stun guns to intentionally interfere with electronic systems. Test articles included individual computers and computers networked through a central hub. 60KV and 600KV devices were used in the experiments. Results indicate that stun guns are effective in disabling digital electronic systems.

Report Of The Commission To Assess The Threat To The United States From Emp Attack: Critical National Infrastructures, William R. Graham

George H Baker

The physical and social fabric of the United States is sustained by a system of systems; a complex and dynamic network of interlocking and interdependent infrastructures (“critical national infrastructures”) whose harmonious functioning enables the myriad actions, transactions, and information flow that undergird the orderly conduct of civil society in this country. The vulnerability of these frastructures to threats — deliberate, accidental, and acts of nature — is the focus of greatly heightened concern in the current era, a process accelerated by the events of 9/11 and recent hurricanes, including Katrina and Rita. This report presents the results of the Commission’s …

Summary Of 2008 Homeland Security Symposium At The National Academies: Fostering Public-Private Partnerships, George H. Baker, Cheryl J. Elliott

George H Baker

Recent U.S. high consequence events have made clear the importance of government collaboration with industry. The benefits of such collaboration were clearly seen as a lesson from Hurricane Katrina. The resources owned and controlled by American industry dwarf those available to local, state and even the federal government departments. Better agreements and incentives to bring the full capabilities of industry squarely into the national response agenda will be indispensable in effectively responding to large-scale catastrophes. General Russel Honoré who led the National Guard response to Katrina has said, “We need the partnering between local, state, and federal governments; but the …

Cascading Infrastructure Failures: Avoidance And Response, George H. Baker, Cheryl J. Elliott

George H Baker

No critical infrastructure is self-sufficient. The complexity inherent in the interdependent nature of infrastructure systems complicates planning and preparedness for system failures. Recent wide-scale disruption of infrastructure on the Gulf Coast due to weather, and in the Northeast due to electric power network failures, dramatically illustrate the problems associated with mitigating cascading effects and responding to cascading infrastructure failures once they have occurred.

The major challenge associated with preparedness for cascading failures is that they transcend system, corporate, and political boundaries and necessitate coordination among multiple, disparate experts and authorities. This symposium brought together concerned communities including government and industry …

Electric Power: Cyber And Electromagnetic Security Issues, George H. Baker

George H Baker

Electric power is essential to the functioning of U.S. society. The electric power system increasingly operates at or near its reliability limits. The geographic scale of the tightly coupled networks involved makes the system susceptible to large-scale outages. More frequent natural and accidental failures portend possible catastrophes from intentional disruption. Deregulation has been a major factor to the lack of investment in system upgrades. Techniques to prevent attacks and reduce vulnerabilities are available and affordable.

Emp: A National-Scale Threat To The U.S. Infrastructure, George H. Baker

George H Baker

Since the nuclear weapon atmospheric test days of the 1950s, it has been known that a single nuclear weapon detonated at altitudes from about 30-500 kilometers generates a strong electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that can disrupt electronic systems on the ground at large distances. During the Cold War, the effects of high altitude nuclear detonations were considered by many to be ephemeral, second order effects in comparison to direct blast/thermal/radiation effects from near-surface bursts in the context of mutually-assured-destruction (or MAD) scenarios. However, as infrastructure objectives have gained prominence in military operations, the likelihood of high altitude nuclear scenarios have gained …

Homeland Security: Engaging The Frontlines - Symposium Proceedings, George H. Baker, Cheryl J. Elliott

George H Baker

The rise of the American homeland security endeavor under the leadership of the new Department of Homeland Security has been heralded by several major national strategy documents. These documents have served to organize efforts at top levels within the government and industry. However, the national strategy guidance is not getting to many organizations and people at the grass-roots level who can make the most difference in preventing attacks, protecting systems, and recovering from catastrophic events, viz. the general citizenry, private infrastructure owners, and local governments. To better understand grass-roots issues and solutions, James Madison University, in cooperation with the Federal …

Mil-Std-188-125-1, High-Altitude Emp Protection For Fixed Ground-Based Facilities

George H Baker

MIL-STD-188-125-1 establishes minimum requirements and design objectives for high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) hardening of fixed ground-based facilities that perform critical, time-urgent command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) missions. The standard prescribes minimum performance requirements for low-risk protection from mission-aborting damage or upset due to HEMP environments. It also addresses minimum testing requirements for demonstrating that prescribed performance has been achieved and for verifying that the installed protection subsystem provides the operationally required hardness for the completed facility. Covered fixed ground-based facility types include subscriber terminals and data processing centers, transmitting and receiving communications stations, and relay facilities. Use of …

Network Security Risk Assessment Modeling Tools For Critical Infrastructure Assessment, George H. Baker, Samuel Redwine, Joseph Blandino

George H Baker

The James Madison University (JMU) CIPP research team is developing Network Security Risk Assessment Modeling (NSRAM) tools that will enable the assessment of both cyber and physical infrastructure security risks. The effort is driven by the need to predict and compute the probability of adverse effects stemming from system attacks and malfunctions, to understand their consequences, and to improve existing systems to minimize these consequences.

The tools are targeted at systems supporting critical infrastructures varying from individual systems to organization-wide systems, to systems covering entire geographical regions. Early work emphasizes computing systems, but systems sharing the network nature of computing …

Applications Of Underground Structures For The Protection Of Critical Infrastructure, George H. Baker, Richard G. Little, Don A. Linger

George H Baker

The U.S. President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), convened in the wake of the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, concluded that the nation’s physical security and economic security depend on our critical energy, communications, and computer infrastructures. While a primary motivating event for the establishment of the commission was the catastrophic physical attack of the Murrah Building, it is ironic that the commission focused its attention primarily on cyber threats. Their rationale was that cyber vulnerabilities posed a new, unaddressed challenge to infrastructure security. This approach was further questioned by the events of September 11, …

Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (Scada) Systems, George H. Baker, Allan Berg

George H Baker

Our critical national infrastructure systems have become almost universally dependent upon computer-based control systems technically referred to as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. SCADA systems evolved from the telemetry and event-alarm systems developed in the early days of utilities. With the widespread use of SCADA systems, computers have become the "basis element" for much of our critical infrastructure. Thus, the disruption of controlling computer terminals and networks due to natural disasters, electric power failure, accidents or malicious activity can have catastrophic consequences.

Time Domain Probabilistic Risk Assessment:, George H. Baker, Charles T. C. Mo

George H Baker

For critical facilities, survivability and reconstitution in stressful environments generated by electromagnetic transients, sabotage, terrorist activity, military conflict, or Murphy’s laws are issues of concern. Critical fixed facilities are likely to be functionally complex and their system-wide failure probabilities, modes, and consequences are often not obvious. To analyze and quantify survivability, existing probabilistic risk assessment tools usually provide a “snapshot” of failure modes at a single point of time for certain initiating conditions. Likewise, elaborate physics models developed to treat weapons effects on structures and individual functional components compute effects at a single time point.

We have developed a tool …

Mil-Std-188-125-2, High-Altitude Emp Protection For Transportable Systems

George H Baker

This standard establishes minimum requirements and design objectives for high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) hardening of transportable1 ground-based systems that perform critical, time-urgent command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) missions. Systems required to fully comply with the provisions of the standard will be designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Military Department Headquarters, or a Major Command.

The standard prescribes minimum performance requirements for low-risk protection from mission-aborting damage or upset due to HEMP threat environments. The standard also addresses minimum testing requirements for demonstrating that prescribed performance has been achieved and for verifying that the installed protection measures …

A Unified Topological Approach To Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Protection, George H. Baker, J. Philip Castillo, Edward F. Vance

George H Baker

The presentation recommends an approach for unifying electronic system protection designs for a wide spectrum of electromagnetic environments. A general electromagnetic topological construct is developed as the basis for a consistent shielding and terminal protection methodology. Spectral characteristics of multiple interfering electromagnetic sources, both internal and external, are described. Effects addressed include EMI/EMC, lightning, nuclear EMP, and RF weapons. Protection practices for individual effects are discussed and means for integrating these into a single protection topology.

Nuclear Emp Hardening Approach As The Basis For Unified Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Protection, George H. Baker Iii

George H Baker

Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated the clear military advantage that was provided by our sophisticated electronic C4I and weapons systems. High tech means so dominate the battlefield that the outcome of future conflicts could be decided by electronics attrition rather than human casualties. However, the electromagnetic threat landscape is highly complex. The already formidable list of environments (EMI, lighting, ESD, EMP, HERO, TEMPEST, EW, etc.) is lengthened by emerging threats from high power microwave (HPM) and ultra-wide band (UWB) electromagnetic weapons. Many of these environments overlap in the frequency and amplitude of the electrical stresses they create.

The large number of …