Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Technology and Innovation
Step By Step: The Benefits Of Stage-Based R&D Licensing Contracts, Pascale Crama, Bert De Reyck, Zeger Degraeve
Step By Step: The Benefits Of Stage-Based R&D Licensing Contracts, Pascale Crama, Bert De Reyck, Zeger Degraeve
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We examine how a licensor can optimally design licensing contracts for multi-phase R&D projects when he does not know the licensee’s project valuation, leading to adverse selection, and cannot enforce the licensee’s effort level, resulting in moral hazard. We focus on the effect of the phased nature typical of such projects, and compare single-phase and multi-phase contracts. We determine the optimal values for the upfront payment, milestone payments and royalties, and the optimal timing for outlicensing. Including multiple milestones and accompanying payments can be an effective way of discriminating between licensees holding different valuations, without having to manipulate the royalty …
Milestone Payments Or Royalties? Contract Design For R&D Licensing, Pascale Crama, Bert De Reyck, Zeger Degraeve
Milestone Payments Or Royalties? Contract Design For R&D Licensing, Pascale Crama, Bert De Reyck, Zeger Degraeve
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We study how innovators can optimally design licensing contracts when there is incomplete information on the licensee's valuation of the innovation, and limited control over the licensee's development efforts. A licensing contract typically contains an up-front payment, milestone payments at successful completion of a project phase, and royalties on sales. We use principal-agent models to formulate the licensor's contracting problem, and we find that under adverse selection, the optimal contract structure changes with the licensee's valuation of the innovation. As the licensee's valuation increases, the licensor's optimal level of involvement in the development-directly or through royalties-should decrease. Only a risk-averse …
R&D/Marketing Communication During The Fuzzy Front-End, Rudy K. Moenaert, Arnoud De Meyer, William E. Souder, Dirk Deschoolmeester
R&D/Marketing Communication During The Fuzzy Front-End, Rudy K. Moenaert, Arnoud De Meyer, William E. Souder, Dirk Deschoolmeester
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
The planning stage of an innovation project has a great effect on the commercial performance of the project. During the "fuzzy front-end", the organization formulates a concept of the product to be developed, and determines whether or not the organization will invest resources in the concrete development of the idea. The integration of R&D and marketing activities is a necessary condition for success in innovation projects. The research question of this study is: from an information processing perspective, what role does information transfer play in integrating R&D and marketing functions during the planning stage, and what effects do project formalization …
R&D-Marketing Integration Mechanisms, Communication Flows, And Innovation Success, Rudy K. Moenaert, William E. Souder, Arnoud De Meyer, Dirk Deschoolmeester
R&D-Marketing Integration Mechanisms, Communication Flows, And Innovation Success, Rudy K. Moenaert, William E. Souder, Arnoud De Meyer, Dirk Deschoolmeester
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
The authors report the results of their study of forty technologically innovative Belgian companies to examine the interaction between marketing and R&D. They studied one commercially successful and one commercially unsuccessful technological product innovation project in each participating company and collected data from one marketing and one R&D respondent per project. Communication flows between marketing and R&D are increased under conditions involving formalization of projects, decentralization, positive inter-functional climate, and role flexibility.