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Full-Text Articles in Technology and Innovation

Turning The Tables In Research And Development Licensing Contracts, Niyazi Taneri, Pascale Crama Sep 2021

Turning The Tables In Research And Development Licensing Contracts, Niyazi Taneri, Pascale Crama

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Research and development (R&D) collaborations between an innovator and her partner are often undertaken when neither party can bring the product to market individually, which precludes value creation without a joint effort. Yet, the uncertain nature of R&D complicates the monitoring of effort, and the resulting moral hazard reduces a collaboration’s value. Either party can avoid this outcome by acquiring the capability that is missing and then taking sole ownership of the project. That approach involves two types of risks: one related to whether the other party’s capability will be acquired and one related to how well it will be …


Joint Product Improvement By Client And Customer Support Center: The Role Of Gain-Share Contracts In Coordination, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Alok Gupta, Sameer Hasija Mar 2014

Joint Product Improvement By Client And Customer Support Center: The Role Of Gain-Share Contracts In Coordination, Shantanu Bhattacharya, Alok Gupta, Sameer Hasija

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We study the role of different contract types in coordinating the joint product improvement effort of a client and a customer support center. The customer support center's costly efforts at joint product improvement include transcribing and analyzing customer feedback, analyzing market trends, and investing in product design. Yet this cooperative role must be adequately incentivized by the client, since it could lead to fewer service requests and hence lower revenues for the customer support center. We model this problem as a sequential game with double-sided moral hazard in a principal-agent framework (in which the client is the principal). We follow …