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Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons™
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Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Organizational Behavior and Theory
Obesity, Educational Attainment, And State Economic Welfare, Martin W. Sivula Ph.D.
Obesity, Educational Attainment, And State Economic Welfare, Martin W. Sivula Ph.D.
MBA Faculty Conference Papers & Journal Articles
For the first time in history, estimates of the overweight people in the world rival estimates of those malnourished. The World Health Organization (WHO, 2002) ranked obesity among the top 10 risks to human health worldwide. In the early 1960s, nearly half of the Americans were overweight and 13% were obese. Today some 64% of U.S. adults are overweight and 30.5% are obese. Even more alarming, twice as many U.S. children are overweight than were twenty years ago, a 66% increase. Non-communicable diseases impose a heavy economic burden on already strained health systems. Health is a key determinant of development …
Divisional Multimarket Contact Within And Between Multiunit Organizations, Arturs Kalnins
Divisional Multimarket Contact Within And Between Multiunit Organizations, Arturs Kalnins
Arturs Kalnins
The theory of multimarket contact has important but uninvestigated implications for interactions among a firm's divisions because divisions often meet and even compete in multiple geographical and product markets. I hypothesize that firms with incentives to induce competition among divisions will act to reduce levels of multimarket contact among those divisions. Further, I predict that, in markets with substantial uncertainty, firms will increase divisional multimarket contact. I find support for these hypotheses in the setting of the franchised fast-food industry.