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Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons™
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- Acquisitions (1)
- And nondiscriminatory (FRAND) (1)
- Antitrust (1)
- Bundling (1)
- Clarke-Groves-Ledyard (1)
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- Damages (1)
- Fair (1)
- Incentive incompatibility (1)
- Intellectual property (1)
- Mechanism design (1)
- Monopolization (1)
- Patent assertion entities (1)
- Patent royalties (1)
- Patents (1)
- Price discrimination (1)
- Reasonable (1)
- Remedies (1)
- Samuelson condition (1)
- Standard setting organizations (1)
- Vickery auctions (1)
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Organizational Behavior and Theory
Buying Monopoly: Antitrust Limits On Damages For Externally Acquired Patents, Erik N. Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Buying Monopoly: Antitrust Limits On Damages For Externally Acquired Patents, Erik N. Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The “monopoly” authorized by the Patent Act refers to the exclusionary power of individual patents. That is not the same thing as the acquisition of individual patent rights into portfolios that dominate a market, something that the Patent Act never justifies and that the antitrust laws rightfully prohibit.
Most patent assignments are procompetitive and serve to promote the efficient commercialization of patented inventions. However, patent acquisitions may also be used to combine substitute patents from external patentees, giving the acquirer an unearned monopoly position in the relevant technology market. A producer requires only one of the substitutes, but by acquiring …
Public Good Economics And Standard Essential Patents, Christopher S. Yoo
Public Good Economics And Standard Essential Patents, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
Standard essential patents have emerged as a major focus in both the public policy and academic arenas. The primary concern is that once a patented technology has been incorporated into a standard, the standard can effectively insulate it from competition from substitute technologies. To guard against the appropriation of quasi-rents that are the product of the standard setting process rather than the innovation itself, standard setting organizations (SSOs) require patentholders to disclose their relevant intellectual property before the standard has been adopted and to commit to license those rights on terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND).
To date …