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Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons™
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Articles 1 - 12 of 12
Full-Text Articles in Organizational Behavior and Theory
Lifting Labor’S Voice: A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice And Power Within American Corporate Governance, Leo E. Strine Jr., Aneil Kovvali, Oluwatomi O. Williams
Lifting Labor’S Voice: A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice And Power Within American Corporate Governance, Leo E. Strine Jr., Aneil Kovvali, Oluwatomi O. Williams
All Faculty Scholarship
In view of the decline in gain sharing by corporations with American workers over the last forty years, advocates for American workers have expressed growing interest in allowing workers to elect representatives to corporate boards. Board level representation rights have gained appeal because they are a highly visible part of codetermination regimes that operate in several successful European economies, including Germany’s, in which workers have fared better.
But board-level representation is just one part of the comprehensive codetermination regulatory strategy as it is practiced abroad. Without a coherent supporting framework that includes representation from the ground up, as is provided …
Corporate Law And The Myth Of Efficient Market Control, William W. Bratton, Simone Sepe
Corporate Law And The Myth Of Efficient Market Control, William W. Bratton, Simone Sepe
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In recent times, there has been an unprecedented shift in power from managers to shareholders, a shift that realizes the long-held theoretical aspiration of market control of the corporation. This Article subjects the market control paradigm to comprehensive economic examination and finds it wanting.
The market control paradigm relies on a narrow economic model that focuses on one problem only, management agency costs. With the rise of shareholder power, we need a wider lens that also takes in market prices, investor incentives, and information asymmetries. General equilibrium theory (GE) provides that lens. Several lessons follow from reference to this higher-order …
Mutually Assured Protection Among Large U.S. Law Firms, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff
Mutually Assured Protection Among Large U.S. Law Firms, Tom Baker, Rick Swedloff
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Top law firms are notoriously competitive, fighting for prime clients and matters. But some of the most elite firms are also deeply cooperative, willingly sharing key details about their finances and strategy with their rivals. More surprisingly, they pay handsomely to do so. Nearly half of the AmLaw 100 and 200 belong to mutual insurance organizations that require member firms to provide capital; partner time; and important information about their governance, balance sheets, risk management, strategic plans, and malpractice liability. To answer why these firms do so when there are commercial insurers willing to provide coverage with fewer burdens, we …
Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
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Directors have traditionally been elected by a plurality of the votes cast. This means that in uncontested elections, a candidate who receives even a single vote is elected. Proponents of “shareholder democracy” have advocated a shift to a majority voting rule in which a candidate must receive a majority of the votes cast to be elected. Over the past decade, they have been successful, and the shift to majority voting has been one of the most popular and successful governance reforms.
Yet critics are sceptical as to whether majority voting improves board accountability. Tellingly, directors of companies with majority voting …
Empowering Employees To Prevent Fraud In Nonprofit Organizations, John M. Bradley
Empowering Employees To Prevent Fraud In Nonprofit Organizations, John M. Bradley
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This Article examines the significant problem of fraud within nonprofit organizations and demonstrates that current anti-fraud measures do not adequately reflect the important role employees play in perpetuating or stopping fraudulent activity. Psychological and organizational behavior studies have established the importance of (1) participation and (2) peers in shaping the behavior of individuals within the organizational context. This Article builds on that research and establishes that to successfully combat fraud, organizations must integrate employees into the design, implementation, and enforcement of anti-fraud strategy and procedures. Engaged, empowered employees will be less likely to commit fraud and more likely to dissuade …
Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story, Lisa Fairfax
Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story, Lisa Fairfax
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Recently, board diversity advocates have relied on market- or economic-based rationales to convince corporate America to increase the number of women and people of color in the boardroom, in lieu of moral or social justifications. This shift away from moral or social justifications has been deliberate, and it stems from a belief that corporate America would better respond to justifications that centered on the corporate bottom line. However, recent empirical data reveals that despite the increased reliance on, and apparent acceptance of, market- or economic-based rationales for board diversity, there has been little change in actual board diversity. This Article …
Virtual Shareholder Meetings Reconsidered, Lisa Fairfax
Virtual Shareholder Meetings Reconsidered, Lisa Fairfax
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In 2000 Delaware enacted a statute enabling corporations to host meetings solely by electronic means of communication rather than in a physical location. Since that time, several states have followed Delaware's lead, and the American Bar Association has proposed changing the Model Business Corporation Act to provide for some form of virtual shareholder meetings. Many states believed that such meetings would prove to be an important device for shareholders who desire to increase their voice within the corporation. Instead, very few companies have taken advantage of the ability to host such meetings. This Article provides some data on state statutes …
Norms & Corporate Law: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Norms & Corporate Law: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
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No abstract provided.
Islands Of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, And The Self-Governing Corporation, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Islands Of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, And The Self-Governing Corporation, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
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No abstract provided.
An Evolutionary Theory Of Corporate Law And Corporate Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel Jr.
An Evolutionary Theory Of Corporate Law And Corporate Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel Jr.
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In this Article, Professor Skeel argues that the important recent literature exploring historical and political influences on American corporate law has neglected a crucial component of corporate governance: corporate bankruptcy. Only by appreciating the complementary relationship between corporate law and corporate bankruptcy can we understand how corporate governance operates in any given nation. To show this, the Article contrasts American corporate governance with that of Japan and Germany. America's market-driven corporate governance can only function effectively if the bankruptcy framework includes a manager-driven reorganization option. The relational shareholding that characterizes Japanese and German corporate governance, by contrast, requires a much …
Saints And Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, Edward B. Rock
Saints And Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, Edward B. Rock
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No abstract provided.
The "Nexus Of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, William W. Bratton
The "Nexus Of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, William W. Bratton
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No abstract provided.