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Organizational Behavior and Theory Commons™
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- Antitrust (2)
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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Organizational Behavior and Theory
Appreciating The Overlooked Contributions Of The New Harvard School, Christopher S. Yoo
Appreciating The Overlooked Contributions Of The New Harvard School, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
My colleague, Herbert Hovenkamp, is almost universally recognized as the most cited and the most authoritative US antitrust scholar. Among his many honors, his status as the senior author of the authoritative Areeda and Hovenkamp treatise makes him the unquestioned leader of the New Harvard School, which has long served as the bellwether for how courts are likely to resolve emerging issues in modern antitrust doctrine. Unfortunately, its defining tenets and its positions on emerging issues remain surprisingly obscure. My contribution to this festschrift explores the core commitments that distinguish the New Harvard School from other approaches to antitrust. It …
Corporate Law And The Myth Of Efficient Market Control, William W. Bratton, Simone Sepe
Corporate Law And The Myth Of Efficient Market Control, William W. Bratton, Simone Sepe
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In recent times, there has been an unprecedented shift in power from managers to shareholders, a shift that realizes the long-held theoretical aspiration of market control of the corporation. This Article subjects the market control paradigm to comprehensive economic examination and finds it wanting.
The market control paradigm relies on a narrow economic model that focuses on one problem only, management agency costs. With the rise of shareholder power, we need a wider lens that also takes in market prices, investor incentives, and information asymmetries. General equilibrium theory (GE) provides that lens. Several lessons follow from reference to this higher-order …
Buying Monopoly: Antitrust Limits On Damages For Externally Acquired Patents, Erik N. Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Buying Monopoly: Antitrust Limits On Damages For Externally Acquired Patents, Erik N. Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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The “monopoly” authorized by the Patent Act refers to the exclusionary power of individual patents. That is not the same thing as the acquisition of individual patent rights into portfolios that dominate a market, something that the Patent Act never justifies and that the antitrust laws rightfully prohibit.
Most patent assignments are procompetitive and serve to promote the efficient commercialization of patented inventions. However, patent acquisitions may also be used to combine substitute patents from external patentees, giving the acquirer an unearned monopoly position in the relevant technology market. A producer requires only one of the substitutes, but by acquiring …
Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, Stephen Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
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Directors have traditionally been elected by a plurality of the votes cast. This means that in uncontested elections, a candidate who receives even a single vote is elected. Proponents of “shareholder democracy” have advocated a shift to a majority voting rule in which a candidate must receive a majority of the votes cast to be elected. Over the past decade, they have been successful, and the shift to majority voting has been one of the most popular and successful governance reforms.
Yet critics are sceptical as to whether majority voting improves board accountability. Tellingly, directors of companies with majority voting …
Norms & Corporate Law: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Norms & Corporate Law: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
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No abstract provided.
Islands Of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, And The Self-Governing Corporation, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Islands Of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, And The Self-Governing Corporation, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
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No abstract provided.
An Evolutionary Theory Of Corporate Law And Corporate Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel Jr.
An Evolutionary Theory Of Corporate Law And Corporate Bankruptcy, David A. Skeel Jr.
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In this Article, Professor Skeel argues that the important recent literature exploring historical and political influences on American corporate law has neglected a crucial component of corporate governance: corporate bankruptcy. Only by appreciating the complementary relationship between corporate law and corporate bankruptcy can we understand how corporate governance operates in any given nation. To show this, the Article contrasts American corporate governance with that of Japan and Germany. America's market-driven corporate governance can only function effectively if the bankruptcy framework includes a manager-driven reorganization option. The relational shareholding that characterizes Japanese and German corporate governance, by contrast, requires a much …
The "Nexus Of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, William W. Bratton
The "Nexus Of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, William W. Bratton
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No abstract provided.