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- Keyword
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- Power (2)
- Tactical action (2)
- Bargaining (1)
- Conciliation (1)
- Conciliatory tactics (1)
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- Conflict (1)
- Conflict resolution (1)
- Dependence (1)
- Dyadic negotiations (1)
- Emotional processes (1)
- Explicit bargaining (1)
- GRIT (1)
- Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction (1)
- Hostile tactics (1)
- Hostility (1)
- Institutional patterns (1)
- Punitive capability (1)
- Structural power (1)
Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Labor Relations
Power Processes In Bargaining, Edward J. Lawler
Power Processes In Bargaining, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
This is a theoretical article that integrates and extends a particular program of work on power in bargaining relationships. Power is conceptualized as a structurally based capability, and power use as tactical action falling within either conciliatory or hostile categories. The core propositions are (1) the greater the total amount of power in a relationship, the greater the use of conciliatory tactics and the lower the use of hostile tactics; and (2) an unequal power relationship fosters more use of hostile tactics and less use of conciliatory tactics than an equal power relationship. Distinct research on power dependence and bilateral …
Structural Power And Emotional Processes In Negotiation: A Social Exchange Approach, Edward J. Lawler, Jeongkoo Yoon
Structural Power And Emotional Processes In Negotiation: A Social Exchange Approach, Edward J. Lawler, Jeongkoo Yoon
Edward J Lawler
This chapter focuses in the abstract on when and how repeated negotiations between the same actors foster positive feelings or emotions and, in turn, an affective commitment to their relationship. However, we have in mind applications to pivotal dyads within organizations and also to the emergence of "friction” or "stickiness” in market relations. Implicit in the idea that negotiations in pivotal dyads shape institutional patterns is the notion that repeated negotiations between the same two actors are likely to become more than instrumental ways for the particular actors to get work done. We suggest a simple process by which dyadic …
Resolving Conflict Through Explicit Bargaining, Elizabeth Heger Boyle, Edward J. Lawler
Resolving Conflict Through Explicit Bargaining, Elizabeth Heger Boyle, Edward J. Lawler
Edward J Lawler
This article analyzes the impact of conciliatory initiatives on conflict resolution in two-party bargaining. It specifically develops and tests a theory of unilateral initiatives derived from Osgood's (1962) notion of Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction (GRIT). The major propositions of the theory indicate that, given a pattern of mutual resistance or hostility, unilateral initiatives and tit-for-tat retaliation in response to punitive action will produce more conciliation and less hostility by an opponent. To test the theory, a bargaining setting was created in a laboratory experiment in which parties exchanged offers and counteroffers on an issue across a number …
Comparison Of Dependence And Punitive Forms Of Power, Edward J. Lawler, Samuel B. Bacharach
Comparison Of Dependence And Punitive Forms Of Power, Edward J. Lawler, Samuel B. Bacharach
Edward J Lawler
This paper deals with the impact of power on tactical action in conflict. The theory and research is organized around two conceptual distinctions: one between power based on dependence versus punitive capability, and the other between relative power (i.e., power difference) and "total power" in a relationship (i.e., across actors). The paper will argue that these distinctions are important on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, they are important to explicate the connection between conceptions of power that stress the coercive foundation of power (Bierstedt 1950; Tedeschi, Schlenker & Bonoma 1973) and those that treat power as dependence (Bacharach & …