Labor Relations Commons^™

Rémunération «De La Main À La Main» Dans L’Union Européenne, Colin C. Williams

Colin C Williams

Missing Links: Referrer Behavior And Job Segregation (Appendix), Brian Rubineau, Roberto Fernandez

Brian Rubineau

No abstract provided.

Missing Links: Referrer Behavior And Job Segregation, Brian Rubineau, Roberto Fernandez

Brian Rubineau

The importance of networks in labor markets is well-known, and their job segregating effects in organizations taken as granted. Conventional wisdom attributes this segregation to the homophilous nature of contact networks, and leaves little role for organizational influences. But employee referrals are necessarily initiated within a firm by employee referrers subject to organizational policies. We build theory regarding the role of referrers in the segregating effects of network recruitment. Using mathematical and computational models, we investigate how empirically-documented referrer behaviors affect job segregation. We show that referrer behaviors can segregate jobs beyond the effects of homophilous network recruitment. Further, and …

Securing Access To Lower-Cost Talent Globally: The Dynamics Of Active Embedding And Field Structuration, Stephan Manning, Joerg Sydow, Arnold Windeler

Stephan Manning

This article examines how multinational corporations (MNCs) shape institutional conditions in emerging economies to secure access to high-skilled, yet lower-cost science and engineering talent. Based on two in-depth case studies of engineering offshoring projects of German automotive suppliers in Romania and China we analyze how MNCs engage in ‘active embedding’ by aligning local institutional conditions with global offshoring strategies and operational needs. MNCs thereby contribute to the structuration of field relations and practices of sourcing knowledge-intensive work from globally dispersed locations.Our findings stress the importance of institutional processes across geographic boundaries that regulate and get shaped by MNC activities.

Clergy Authority And Friendship With Parishioners, Phillip E. Hammond, Albert Gedricks, Edward J. Lawler, Louise Allen Turner

Edward J Lawler

[Excerpt] Without challenging the general truth of the observation, one can nevertheless note considerable variation in the friendliness of clergymen. Is that variation owing simply to "personality" differences, or are there further structural features that differentially apply within the occupation? This paper argues that there are further structural features which can usefully be employed in understanding the friendship patterns of clergy with parishioners.

Level-Of-Aspiration Theory And Initial Stance In Bargaining, Bruce K. Macmurray, Edward J. Lawler

Edward J Lawler

This research focuses on the effect of initial stance in bargaining. Following level-of-aspiration theory, the research examines whether the pattern of early concession making modifies the impact of tough vs. soft initial stance. The experiment manipulated opponent's concession pattern (decreasing, constant, increasing) in the early phase of bargaining within an overall tough or soft initial stance. Results indicated that a decreasing concession pattern within the early bargaining extracted larger initial concessions than a constant or increasing concession pattern. Implications for Siegel and Fouraker's (1960) level-of-aspiration theory are discussed.

Bargaining And Influence In Conflict Situations, Edward J. Lawler, Rebecca Ford

Edward J Lawler

[Excerpt] This chapter examines bargaining as an influence process through which actors attempt to resolve a social conflict. Conflict occurs when two or more interdependent actors have incompatible preferences and perceive or anticipate resistance from each other (Blalock 1989; Kriesberg 1982). Bargaining is a basic form of goal-directed action that involves both intentions to influence and efforts by each actor to carry out these intentions. Tactics are verbal and/or nonverbal actions designed to maneuver oneself into a favorable position vis-a-vis another or to reach some accommodation. Our treatment of bargaining subsumes the concept of "negotiation" (see Morley and Stephenson 1977). …