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Full-Text Articles in Insurance
Does Finance Make Us Less Social?, Henrik Cronqvist, Mitch Warachka, Frank Yu
Does Finance Make Us Less Social?, Henrik Cronqvist, Mitch Warachka, Frank Yu
Business Faculty Articles and Research
Informal risk sharing within social networks and formal financial contracts both enable households to manage risk. We find that financial contracting reduces participation in social networks. Specifically, increased crop insurance usage decreased local religious adherence and congregation membership in agricultural communities. Our identification utilizes the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 that doubled crop insurance usage nationally within a year, although changes in usage varied across counties. Difference-in-difference and Spatial First Difference tests confirm that households substituted insurance for religiosity. This substitution was associated with reductions in crop diversification and crop yields, indicating an increase in moral hazard.
Further Evidence On The Ability Of Fifo And Lifo Earnings To Predict Operating Cash Flows: An Industry Specific Analysis, Brock Murdoch, Bruce Dehning, Paul Krause
Further Evidence On The Ability Of Fifo And Lifo Earnings To Predict Operating Cash Flows: An Industry Specific Analysis, Brock Murdoch, Bruce Dehning, Paul Krause
Accounting Faculty Articles and Research
The continuing convergence of U.S. GAAP with International Accounting Standards has brought into question the future use of the LIFO inventory method in the U.S. Since the Financial Accounting Standards Board (2010) has stipulated that earnings should aid investors and creditors in their quest to forecast future cash flows to the enterprise, this research examines whether FIFO earnings or LIFO earnings is preferable, for this purpose, as an aid to ex ante operating cash flow itself,over a three-year forecast horizon. We conclude that ex ante operating cash flows are quite useful in forecasting operating cash flows across industries for up …
Deposit Insurance Coverage, Ownership, And Banks' Risk-Taking In Emerging Markets, Apanard P. Angkinand, Clas Wihlborg
Deposit Insurance Coverage, Ownership, And Banks' Risk-Taking In Emerging Markets, Apanard P. Angkinand, Clas Wihlborg
Business Faculty Articles and Research
We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline on banks' risk-taking. Market discipline is determined by the extent of explicit deposit insurance, as well as by the credibility of non-insurance of groups of depositors and other creditors. Furthermore, market discipline depends on the ownership structure of banks and the responsiveness of bank managers to market incentives. An expected U-shaped relationship between explicit deposit insurance coverage and banks' risk-taking is influenced by country specific institutional factors, including bank ownership. We analyze specifically how government ownership, foreign ownership and shareholder rights affect the disciplinary …
Optimal Insurance Coverage, Vernon L. Smith
Optimal Insurance Coverage, Vernon L. Smith
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
There is limited treatment of the optimal protection of assets against casualty or liability loss. The problem of optimal insurance coverage is formally similar to the problem of optimal inventory stockage under uncertainty. If casualty or liability loss (demand) is less than the insurance coverage (inventory level), excessive insurance cost (inventory holding cost) is incurred. If casualty or liability loss (demand) is greater than the insurance coverage (inventory level), one must absorb the cost of the unrecoverable loss (sales loss). These two components of loss must be balanced in determining optimal insurance (inventory) levels.