Insurance Commons^™

Tontines For The Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks Into The Health-Insurance Pool With An Idea From Insurance History And Behavioral Economics, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman

All Faculty Scholarship

Over one third of the uninsured adults in the U.S. below retirement age are between 19 and 29 years old. Young adults, especially men, often go without insurance, even when buying it is mandatory and sometimes even when it is a low cost employment benefit. This paper proposes a new form of health insurance targeted at this group—the “Young Invincibles”—those who (wrongly) believe that they don’t need health insurance because they won’t get sick. Our proposal offers a cash bonus to those who turn out to be right in their belief that they did not really need health insurance. The …

Deposit Insurance Coverage, Ownership, And Banks' Risk-Taking In Emerging Markets, Apanard P. Angkinand, Clas Wihlborg

Business Faculty Articles and Research

We ask how deposit insurance systems and ownership of banks affect the degree of market discipline on banks' risk-taking. Market discipline is determined by the extent of explicit deposit insurance, as well as by the credibility of non-insurance of groups of depositors and other creditors. Furthermore, market discipline depends on the ownership structure of banks and the responsiveness of bank managers to market incentives. An expected U-shaped relationship between explicit deposit insurance coverage and banks' risk-taking is influenced by country specific institutional factors, including bank ownership. We analyze specifically how government ownership, foreign ownership and shareholder rights affect the disciplinary …

Crisis Opportunism: Bail Outs And E-Scads In The Gfc, Judy Johnston, Alexander Kouzmin, Kym Thorne, Stephen Kelly

Adjunct Professor Stephen J Kelly

As a response to the “junk-debt”- inspired, global, economic crisis, governments, with supra-national organizational approval, have appropriated billions of taxpayers’ dollars for bail-outs, have set-up special funds and under-written depositors’ savings in the desperate hope of alleviating the threat of rapid, economic decline and systemic destruction of value. Whether these governments have a democratic mandate for such unprecedented action is debatable. More importantly, though, is whether such decisions amount to good re-regulatory policy.

First, it is known that some of the bail-out money to large corporations has been squandered by oligarchic recipients and appropriated by them in their own interests. …