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Human Resources Management Commons

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Full-Text Articles in Human Resources Management

Unions And The Labor Market For Managers, John Dinardo, Kevin F. Hallock, Jörn-Steffen Pischke Jun 2017

Unions And The Labor Market For Managers, John Dinardo, Kevin F. Hallock, Jörn-Steffen Pischke

Kevin F Hallock

We examine the relationship between the employment and compensation of managers and CEOs and the presence of a unionized workforce. We develop a simple efficiency wage model, with a tradeoff between higher wages for workers and more monitoring, which requires more managers. The model also assumes rent sharing between workers, managers and the owners of the firm. Unions, by redistributing rents towards the workers, lead to lower employment and lower pay for managers. Using a variety of data sets, we examine the implications of the model for the relationship between the employment and wages of managers and unionization. We find …


The Value Of Stock Options To Non-Executive Employees, Kevin F. Hallock, Craig A. Olson Jun 2017

The Value Of Stock Options To Non-Executive Employees, Kevin F. Hallock, Craig A. Olson

Kevin F Hallock

This study empirically investigates the value employees place on stock options using information from the option exercise behavior of individuals. Employees hold options for another period if the value from holding them and reserving the right to exercise them later is higher than the value of exercising them immediately and collecting a profit equal to the stock price minus the exercise price. This simple model implies the hazard describing employee exercise behavior reveals information about the value to employees of holding options another time period. We show the parameters of this model are identified with data on multiple option grants …


Reciprocally Interlocking Boards Of Directors And Executive Compensation, Kevin F. Hallock Jun 2009

Reciprocally Interlocking Boards Of Directors And Executive Compensation, Kevin F. Hallock

Kevin F Hallock

Is executive compensation influenced by the composition of the board of directors? About 8% of chief executive officers (CEOs) are reciprocally interlocked with another CEO—the current CEO of firm A serves as a director of firm B and the current CEO of firm B serves as a director of firm A. Roughly 20% of firms have at least one current or retired employee sitting on the board of another firm and vice versa. I investigate how these and other features of board composition affect CEO pay by using a sample of 9,804 director positions in America's largest companies. CEOs who …


A Descriptive Analysis Of Layoffs In Large U.S. Firms Using Archival Data Over Three Decades And Interviews With Senior Managers, Kevin F. Hallock Jun 2009

A Descriptive Analysis Of Layoffs In Large U.S. Firms Using Archival Data Over Three Decades And Interviews With Senior Managers, Kevin F. Hallock

Kevin F Hallock

This paper uses data on over 4,600 layoff announcements in the U.S., covering each firm that ever existed in the Fortune 500 between 1970 and 2000, along with 40 interviews of senior managers in 2001 and 2002 to describe layoffs in large U.S. firms over this period. In order to motivate further work in the area, I investigate six main issues related to layoffs: timing of layoffs, reasons for layoffs, the actual execution of layoffs, international workers, labor unions, and the types of workers by occupation and compensation categories. The paper draws on literature from many fields to help further …


Ceo Pay-For-Performance Heterogeneity: Examples Using Quantile Regression, Kevin F. Hallock, Regina Madalozzo, Clayton G. Reck Mar 2009

Ceo Pay-For-Performance Heterogeneity: Examples Using Quantile Regression, Kevin F. Hallock, Regina Madalozzo, Clayton G. Reck

Kevin F Hallock

We provide some examples of how quantile regression can be used to investigate heterogeneity in pay–firm size and pay-performance relationships for U.S. CEOs. For example, do conditionally (predicted) high-wage managers have a stronger relationship between pay and performance than conditionally low-wage managers? Our results using data over a decade show, for some standard specifications, there is considerable heterogeneity in the returns to firm performance across the conditional distribution of wages. Quantile regression adds substantially to our understanding of the pay-performance relationship. This heterogeneity is masked when using more standard empirical techniques.


Managerial Pay And Governance In American Nonprofits, Kevin F. Hallock Mar 2009

Managerial Pay And Governance In American Nonprofits, Kevin F. Hallock

Kevin F Hallock

This article examines the compensation of top managers of nonprofits in the United States using panel data from tax returns of the organizations from 1992 to 1996. Studying managers in nonprofits is particularly interesting given the difficulty in measuring performance. The article examines many areas commonly studied in the executive pay (within for-profit firms) literature. It explores pay differences between for-profit and nonprofit firms, pay variability within and across nonprofit industries, managerial pay and performance (including organization size and fund raising) in nonprofits, the effect of government grants on managerial pay, and the relationship between boards of directors and managerial …


The Timeliness Of Performance Information In Determining Executive Compensation, Kevin F. Hallock, Paul Oyer Mar 2009

The Timeliness Of Performance Information In Determining Executive Compensation, Kevin F. Hallock, Paul Oyer

Kevin F Hallock

We study whether boards of directors concentrate on performance near compensation decision times rather than providing consistent incentives for chief executive officers (CEO). throughout the fiscal year. We show empirically that managers can profit by moving sales revenue among fiscal quarters. Though this may suggest that boards use short-term trends when determining rewards, we find evidence consistent with boards tying pay to recent sales growth so as to use the best information about future performance. We also find that the timing of profits throughout the year does not affect CEO pay, which may suggest that smoothing firm income is important …