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Full-Text Articles in Finance and Financial Management

From Tether To Terra: The Current Stablecoin Ecosystem And The Failure Of Regulators, Mary E. Burke Jan 2023

From Tether To Terra: The Current Stablecoin Ecosystem And The Failure Of Regulators, Mary E. Burke

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

The Tether controversy and Terra crash have placed stablecoins in the regulatory spotlight. Stablecoins are often portrayed as posing systemic risks to financial markets, with some pundits labelling them “the villain of the finance world.” Global regulatory bodies, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank of International Settlement (BIS), and political leaders, including the Biden Administration, have all called for stablecoin regulation. These officials allege that stablecoins’ structure, combined with their exponential growth, pose a unique risk to global markets. Before the May 2022 Terra crash, government reports superficially treated stablecoins by exclusively focusing on asset-backed coins. Post …


Cryptocurrencies: An Overview, Investment Investigation, Comparative Analysis, And Regulatory Proposals, Jacob Franzen May 2020

Cryptocurrencies: An Overview, Investment Investigation, Comparative Analysis, And Regulatory Proposals, Jacob Franzen

Theses/Capstones/Creative Projects

With cryptocurrencies moving out of obscurity and into the public eye, the initial purpose of this research paper is to provide the history of cryptocurrencies, to explain the complex workings in and around cryptocurrencies, investigate their investment potential, and to draw attention to their potential for misuse. To follow, the primary purpose is to create a platform on which to compare cryptocurrencies with more common mediums of exchange, analyze their current international regulatory climate, highlight their trends within influential nations, discuss their pending and future regulation, and provide personal proposals for additional regulation. Due to the complex nature of the …


How Access To Finances Affects Gender Inequality Across Cultures, Allison Muntin Jan 2020

How Access To Finances Affects Gender Inequality Across Cultures, Allison Muntin

Williams Honors College, Honors Research Projects

While many studies of financial inclusion have been undertaken, very few discuss the inclusion of women. Financial inclusion plays a large role in unlocking resources for the disadvantaged, resulting in higher economic growth and development. The economic opportunity allows individuals and businesses to have a greater contribution to society as a whole, enhancing all aspects of the economy. This paper furthers the conversation of women’s access to financial institution accounts across cultures and what underlying factors play a key role. The results indicate that the female demographic has fewer financial institution accounts in comparison to men when: (i) a country’s …


Jpmorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick Aug 2019

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

As a global financial service provider, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) is supervised by banking regulatory agencies in different countries. Bruno Iksil, the derivatives trader primarily responsible for the $6 billion trading loss in 2012, was based in JPM’s London office. This office was regulated both by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) of the United States (US) and by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which served as the sole regulator of all financial services in the United Kingdom (UK). Banking regulators in the US and the UK have entered into agreements with one another to define basic parameters …


Jpmorgan Chase London Whale G: Hedging Versus Proprietary Trading, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick Aug 2019

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale G: Hedging Versus Proprietary Trading, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In December 2013, the primary United States financial regulatory agencies jointly adopted final rules to implement Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which is often referred to as the “Volcker Rule”. Section 619 prohibits banks from engaging in activities considered to be particularly risky, including proprietary trading and owning hedge funds or private equity funds. Banking regulators designed the final rule against proprietary trading in part to prevent losses like the $6 billion London Whale loss that took place in 2012 at JPMorgan Chase. Given the controversial nature of the Volcker Rule, it is …


Jpmorgan Chase London Whale F: Required Securities Disclosures, Arwin G. Zeissler, Giulio Girardi, Andrew Metrick Aug 2019

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale F: Required Securities Disclosures, Arwin G. Zeissler, Giulio Girardi, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

On April 13, 2012, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) Chief Financial Officer Douglas Braunstein took part in a conference call to discuss the bank’s first quarter 2012 earnings. Coming just a week after media reports first questioned the risks taken by JPM derivatives trader Bruno Iksil, Braunstein made a series of assertions about the trades. On May 10, JPM finalized its first quarter financial results, which included some disclosures regarding Iksil’s trading that were substantially different from Braunstein’s statements of April 13. At issue is whether the regulatory filings on April 13 and May 10, as well as verbal comments by Braunstein …


Financial Repression In China: Short-Term Growth But Long-Term Crisis, Guangdong Xu, Michael Faure Feb 2019

Financial Repression In China: Short-Term Growth But Long-Term Crisis, Guangdong Xu, Michael Faure

Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review

No abstract provided.


Proxy Access And Optimal Standardization In Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis, Reilly S. Steel Dec 2017

Proxy Access And Optimal Standardization In Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis, Reilly S. Steel

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

According to the conventional wisdom, “one size does not fit all” in corporate governance. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their governance needs, implying that the optimal corporate governance structure must also vary from firm to firm. This one-size-does-not-fit-all axiom has featured prominently in arguments against numerous corporate law regulatory initiatives, including the SEC’s failed Rule 14a-11—an attempt to impose mandatory, uniform “proxy access” on all public companies—which the D.C. Circuit struck down for inadequate costbenefit analysis.

This Article presents an alternative theory as to the role of standardization in corporate governance—in which investors prefer standardized terms—and empirical …


Benchmark Regulation, Gina-Gail S. Fletcher Jan 2017

Benchmark Regulation, Gina-Gail S. Fletcher

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Benchmarks are metrics that are deeply embedded in the financial markets. They are essential to the efficient functioning of the markets and are used in a wide variety of ways-from pricing oil to setting interest rates for consumer lending to valuing complex financial instruments. In recent years, benchmarks have also been at the epicenter of numerous, multi-year market manipulation scandals. Oil traders, for example, deliberately execute trades to drive benchmarks lower artificially, allowing the traders to capitalize on the manipulated benchmarks. This ensures that later trades relying on the benchmarks will be more profitable than they otherwise would have been. …


The Mess At Morgan: Risk, Incentives And Shareholder Empowerment, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2015

The Mess At Morgan: Risk, Incentives And Shareholder Empowerment, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

The financial crisis of 2008 focused increasing attention on corporate America and, in particular, the risk-taking behavior of large financial institutions. A growing appreciation of the “public” nature of the corporation resulted in a substantial number of high profile enforcement actions. In addition, demands for greater accountability led policymakers to attempt to harness the corporation’s internal decision-making structure, in the name of improved corporate governance, to further the interest of non-shareholder stakeholders. Dodd-Frank’s advisory vote on executive compensation is an example.

This essay argues that the effort to employ shareholders as agents of public values and, thereby, to inculcate corporate …


Transnational Regulatory Regimes In Finance: A Comparative Analysis Of Their (Dis-)Integrative Effects, Katharina Pistor Jan 2014

Transnational Regulatory Regimes In Finance: A Comparative Analysis Of Their (Dis-)Integrative Effects, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

Financial markets have become increasingly interconnected with financial intermediaries and instruments linking local and national markets to form regional or even global ones. The global financial crisis of 2008 demonstrated once more that financial interdependence can be both a blessing and a curse. It facilitates the movement of capital and the expansion of credit, and as such promotes economic development in good times; however, in bad times it transmits liquidity shortages throughout the system triggering financial crises and economic recessions where credit expansion earlier fuelled expansion and growth. A critical question therefore is how to structure the governance of transnational …


Lessons From The Flash Crash For The Regulation Of High-Frequency Traders, Edgar Ortega Barrales Jan 2012

Lessons From The Flash Crash For The Regulation Of High-Frequency Traders, Edgar Ortega Barrales

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Are equity markets vulnerable to a sudden collapse if the traders who account for about half of the volume have no regulatory obligations to stabilize prices? After the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010, policymakers have resoundingly answered this question in the affirmative. During the worst of the crash, some of the so-called high-frequency trading firms that dominate equity markets stopped trading and prices collapsed, momentarily wiping out almost $1 trillion in market value. In response, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is considering whether high-frequency trading firms should be required to act as the traders of last resort. This …


Inside-Out Corporate Governance, David A. Skeel Jr., Vijit Chahar, Alexander Clark, Mia Howard, Bijun Huang, Federico Lasconi, A.G. Leventhal, Matthew Makover, Randi Milgrim, David Payne, Romy Rahme, Nikki Sachdeva, Zachary Scott Jan 2011

Inside-Out Corporate Governance, David A. Skeel Jr., Vijit Chahar, Alexander Clark, Mia Howard, Bijun Huang, Federico Lasconi, A.G. Leventhal, Matthew Makover, Randi Milgrim, David Payne, Romy Rahme, Nikki Sachdeva, Zachary Scott

All Faculty Scholarship

Until late in the twentieth century, internal corporate governance—that is, decision making by the principal constituencies of the firm—was clearly distinct from outside oversight by regulators, auditors and credit rating agencies, and markets. With the 1980s takeover wave and hedge funds’ and equity funds’ more recent involvement in corporate governance, the distinction between inside and outside governance has eroded. The tools of inside governance are now routinely employed by governance outsiders, intertwining the two traditional modes of governance. We argue in this Article that the shift has created a new governance paradigm, which we call inside-out corporate governance.

Using the …


Insurance Against Misinformation In The Securities Market, Tom Baker Jun 2006

Insurance Against Misinformation In The Securities Market, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

Prepared at the request of the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, this study describes and evaluates evaluate a new capital markets insurance concept: securities misinformation insurance. This new insurance would compensate investors for losses caused by securities law violations. The most powerful objection to this new concept is that investors do not need a new insurance program for securities misinformation losses. Individual and institutional investors already can spread securities misinformation losses by holding a diversified portfolio. Nevertheless, a securities misinformation insurance program has the potential to provide systemic benefits: improved compliance with securities laws (resulting from cost …