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An Event Study Analysis Of Too-Big-To-Fail After The Dodd-Frank Act: Who Is Too Big To Fail?, Kyle D. Allen, Ken B. Cyree, Matthew D. Whitledge, Drew B. Winters
An Event Study Analysis Of Too-Big-To-Fail After The Dodd-Frank Act: Who Is Too Big To Fail?, Kyle D. Allen, Ken B. Cyree, Matthew D. Whitledge, Drew B. Winters
Marketing Faculty Publications and Presentations
One feature of the Dodd-Frank Act is the elimination of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks. TBTF is a government guarantee of large banks that has been shown to increase the value of these banks, so removing the guarantee should result in a price decline of TBTF bank stock. Using event study methods, we find very limited reaction to the process of eliminating TBTF. Specifically, there is limited reaction among the largest banks and banks receiving special attention, such as Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI) banks. Instead, smaller banks not receiving special attention show some evidence of negative returns with the elimination of …
Are Bond Ratings Informative? Evidence From Regulatory Regime Changes, Louis H. Ederington, Jeremy Goh, Yen Teik Lee, Lisa Yang
Are Bond Ratings Informative? Evidence From Regulatory Regime Changes, Louis H. Ederington, Jeremy Goh, Yen Teik Lee, Lisa Yang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
The recent Dodd-Frank Act (Section 939B) enacted in 2010 repeals credit rating agencies’ (CRAs) exemption from Regulation Fair Disclosure. We test whether CRAs continue to provide new information to the market after the repeal. We find that the significant pre-repeal stock price responses to rating changes disappear after the regime change. Bond price reactions however remain significant. These results are even more significant at the investment-speculative boundary. Our evidence suggests that CRAs serve as a conduit for transmitting private information before the repeal. It also shows that regulatory constraint is a channel by which credit ratings affect cost of financing.