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Full-Text Articles in Finance and Financial Management
Hedge Fund Franchises, William Fung, David Hsieh, Narayan Y. Naik, Melvyn Teo
Hedge Fund Franchises, William Fung, David Hsieh, Narayan Y. Naik, Melvyn Teo
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Duplicate, see https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5964/. We investigate the growth strategies of hedge fund firms. We find that firms with successful first funds are able to launch follow-on funds that charge higher performance fees, set more onerous redemption terms, and attract greater inflows. Motivated by the aforementioned spillover effects, first funds outperform follow-on funds, after adjusting for risk. The multiple-product growth strategy hurts investors while benefiting hedge fund firms; multiple-product firms underperform single-product firms but harvest greater fee revenues. Investors respond to this growth strategy by redeeming from first funds of firms with follow-on funds that do poorly. Moreover, skilled investors allocate …
Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Song Wee Melvyn Teo
Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Song Wee Melvyn Teo
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly underperform funds managed by unlisted firms. The underperformance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the underperformance, listed asset management firms raise more capital, by growing existing funds and launching new funds post listing, and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.
Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Song Wee Melvyn Teo
Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Song Wee Melvyn Teo
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly underperform funds managed by unlisted firms. The underperformance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the underperformance, listed asset management firms raise more capital, by growing existing funds and launching new funds post listing, and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.
Sensation-Seeking Hedge Funds, Stephen Brown, Yan Lu, Sugata Ray, Melvyn Teo
Sensation-Seeking Hedge Funds, Stephen Brown, Yan Lu, Sugata Ray, Melvyn Teo
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Using a novel dataset of hedge fund manager automobile purchases, we show that, motivated by sensation seeking, hedge fund managers often take risk for personal and non-pecuniary reasons. In line with the sensation seeking view, managers who own powerful sports cars take on more investment risk but do not deliver higher returns, resulting in lower Sharpe ratios. Moreover, funds managed by performance car owners exhibit higher operational risk and are more likely to fail. Performance car owners demonstrate other attributes associated with sensation seeking, such as a preference for lottery-like stocks, unconventional strategies, and active trading.