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Full-Text Articles in Finance and Financial Management
Short Selling Meets Hedge Fund 13f: An Anatomy Of Informed Demand, Yawen Jiao, Massimo Massa, Hong Zhang
Short Selling Meets Hedge Fund 13f: An Anatomy Of Informed Demand, Yawen Jiao, Massimo Massa, Hong Zhang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
The existing literature treats the short side (i.e., short selling) and the long side of hedge fund trading (i.e., fund holdings) independently. The two sides, however, complement each other: opposite changes in the two are likely to be driven by information, whereas simultaneous increases (decreases) of the two may be motivated by hedging (unwinding) considerations. We use this intuition to identify informed demand and document that it exhibits highly significant predictive power over returns (approximately 10% per year). We also find that informed demand forecasts future firm fundamentals, suggesting that hedge funds play an important role in information discovery. (C) …
Limited Attention, Marital Events And Hedge Funds, Yan Lu, Sugata Ray, Melvyn Teo
Limited Attention, Marital Events And Hedge Funds, Yan Lu, Sugata Ray, Melvyn Teo
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We explore the impact of limited attention by analyzing the performance of hedge fund managers who are distracted by marital events. We find that marriages and divorces are associated with significantly lower fund alpha, during the six-month period surrounding and the two-year period after the event. Busy managers who manage multiple funds and who are not part of a team are more affected by marital transitions. Inattentive managers place fewer active bets relative to their style peers, load more on index stocks, exhibit higher R-squareds with respect to systematic factors, and are more prone to the disposition effect.
Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Melvyn Teo
Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Melvyn Teo
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly underperform funds managed by unlisted firms. The underperformance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the underperformance, listed firms raise more capital and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results cannot be explained by endogeneity, backfill bias, serial correlation, or manager manipulation, and are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.