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Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Finance and Financial Management
The Dynamics Of Market Entry: The Effects Of Mergers And Acquisitions On Entry In The Banking Industry, Allen N. Berger, Seth D. Bonime, Lawrence G. Goldberg, Lawrence J. White
The Dynamics Of Market Entry: The Effects Of Mergers And Acquisitions On Entry In The Banking Industry, Allen N. Berger, Seth D. Bonime, Lawrence G. Goldberg, Lawrence J. White
Faculty Publications
We study the dynamics of market entry following mergers and acquisitions (M&As) using banking industry data. The findings suggest that M&As are associated with statistically and economically significant increases in the probability of entry. The data suggest that M&As affect the proportion of the markets with entry by about 10-20%. These findings also suggest that entry may be part of an "external" effect of M&As that helps supply credit to some relationship-dependent small business borrowers. Our results are robust to the use of alternative econometric methods, changes in specifications of the exogenous variables, and alteration of the data samples.
Some Evidence On The Empirical Significance Of Credit Rationing, Allen N. Berger, Gregory F. Udell
Some Evidence On The Empirical Significance Of Credit Rationing, Allen N. Berger, Gregory F. Udell
Faculty Publications
This paper examines the credit rationing debate using detailed contract information on over one million commercial bank loans from 1977 to 1988. While commercial loan rates are "Sticky," consistent with rationing, this stickiness varies with loan contract terms in ways that are not predicted by equilibrium credit rationing theory. In addition, the proportion of new loans issued under commitment does not increase significantly when credit markets are tight, despite the fact that borrowers without commitments can be rationed whereas commitment borrowers are contractually insulated from rationing. Overall, the data suggest that equilibrium rationing is not a significant macroeconomic phenomenon.