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Full-Text Articles in Finance and Financial Management
Corporate Governance Mechanisms And Performance Related Ceo Turnover, Atreya Chakraborty, Shahbaz A. Sheikh
Corporate Governance Mechanisms And Performance Related Ceo Turnover, Atreya Chakraborty, Shahbaz A. Sheikh
Atreya Chakraborty
This study investigates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on performance related turnover. Our results indicate that smaller boards and institutional block holders are positively related to the likelihood of performance related turnover. CEOs that also hold the position of the chairman of the board or belong to a founding family face lower likelihood of turnover. CEO stock ownership is negatively related to turnover and CEOs who own 3 percent or more of their company stock face a significantly lower likelihood of performance related turnover. Moreover, protection from external control market has no effect either on the likelihood of turnover.
Termination Risk And Managerial Risk Taking, Atreya Chakraborty, Shahbaz A. Sheikh, Narayanana Subramanian
Termination Risk And Managerial Risk Taking, Atreya Chakraborty, Shahbaz A. Sheikh, Narayanana Subramanian
Atreya Chakraborty
We test the hypothesis that managers who face a high termination risk make less risky investments than the managers who face a low termination risk. A 10% increase in our measure of termination risk is associated with a 5%–23% decline in stock returns volatility for the median firm in our sample. We also find that for CEOs who are more likely to be fired in the event of investment failure, the inhibiting effect of termination risk appears to offset the positive effect of convexity of managerial compensation on managerial risk taking. These results are robust to alternative definitions of forced …
Uncertainty In Executive Compensation And Capital Investment: A Panel Study, Atreya Chakraborty
Uncertainty In Executive Compensation And Capital Investment: A Panel Study, Atreya Chakraborty
Atreya Chakraborty
We investigate whether uncertainty in CEO compensation influences the firm's investment decisions. We use panel data on compensation to estimate CEO income uncertainty and cross-sectional investment data to measure capital investment. Given the prospect of bearing extra risk, a rational agent reacts to minimize the impact of such risk. We provide evidence that CEOs with high earnings uncertainty invest less. We find that the negative impact of permanent earnings uncertainty on firm investment is larger than that of transitory earnings uncertainty. Our results are robust to several alternate specifications and can be helpful in building compensation packages that lead to …