Finance and Financial Management Commons^™

The Effects Of Ceo Dismissal Risk And Skills On Risky Corporate Decisions And Ceo Compensation, Son T. Dang

Theses and Dissertations in Business Administration

This dissertation consists of three distinct essays on the effects of CEO dismissal risk on M&A megadeal decisions, the association between CEO compensation and generalist managerial ability in the presence of CEO dismissal risk, and the alignment of the initial compensation of new CEOs following CEO dismissals with their managerial ability.

In Essay 1, I study the link between CEO dismissal risk and risky M&A decisions and find that higher-dismissal-risk CEOs engage in more M&A megadeals than their counterparts. Such megadeal transactions lead to lower acquirer post-M&A abnormal returns, suggesting that risky investment decisions are driven by CEOs’ career concerns. …

Three Essays On Ceo Characteristics And Corporate Bankruptcy, Rajib Chowdhury

Theses and Dissertations in Business Administration

Scholarly studies have focused on the impact of managerial characteristics on various corporate activities. Following this stream of literature, this dissertation empirically examines the potential effects of three major Chief Executive Officer (CEO) characteristics, i.e., CEO ability, CEO risk taking behavior induced by compensation structure, and CEO overconfidence on corporate bankruptcies. Essay 1 examines whether chief executive officers (CEOs) are to be blamed for corporate failure. Using alternative measures of CEO ability, we document that high-ability CEOs are less likely to be associated bankruptcy. Bankruptcy-related high-ability CEOs manage to salvage their post-bankruptcy careers either with the reorganized firms or with …

Two Essays On The Microstructure Of The Housing Market: Agents' Diffused Effort And Sellers' Behavior Bias, Zhaohui Li

Theses and Dissertations in Business Administration

For the first essay, we generalize the classic Williams [1998 RFS] brokerage model by introducing the diffused effort. That is, the agent can cross-utilize effort spending on one listing to another one. Besides, the agent can manage heterogeneous housing assets. One counterintuitive finding in Williams’ paper is the absence of the agency problem. As a special case in our model, we recover the agency problem. We examine the positive externality due to the diffused effort and show that it depends on the agent’s inventory size. Hence there exists a trade-off between agents’ effort spending on existing listings and on finding …