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Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Finance and Financial Management
But Is It Material? A Case Study Evaluating Climate Risk’S Place In Financial Disclosures, Matilda Lindberg
But Is It Material? A Case Study Evaluating Climate Risk’S Place In Financial Disclosures, Matilda Lindberg
Student Theses and Dissertations
The year of 2022 highlighted the importance of understanding how Environment, Social, and Governance (hereafter, ESG) factors impact investors. By the end of 2021, 37.8 trillion USD had been invested in ESG funds, a number expected to grow to $53 trillion by the end of 2025. Despite this bullish projection, controversy has grown about the “materiality” of ESG factors, especially climate risks, as defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter, SEC). On March 21, 2022, the SEC proposed rules to enhance the standardization of climate- related disclosures (hereafter The Proposal) to promote consistent, comparable, and reliable information for investors …
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale G: Hedging Versus Proprietary Trading, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale G: Hedging Versus Proprietary Trading, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
In December 2013, the primary United States financial regulatory agencies jointly adopted final rules to implement Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which is often referred to as the “Volcker Rule”. Section 619 prohibits banks from engaging in activities considered to be particularly risky, including proprietary trading and owning hedge funds or private equity funds. Banking regulators designed the final rule against proprietary trading in part to prevent losses like the $6 billion London Whale loss that took place in 2012 at JPMorgan Chase. Given the controversial nature of the Volcker Rule, it is …
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale F: Required Securities Disclosures, Arwin G. Zeissler, Giulio Girardi, Andrew Metrick
Jpmorgan Chase London Whale F: Required Securities Disclosures, Arwin G. Zeissler, Giulio Girardi, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
On April 13, 2012, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) Chief Financial Officer Douglas Braunstein took part in a conference call to discuss the bank’s first quarter 2012 earnings. Coming just a week after media reports first questioned the risks taken by JPM derivatives trader Bruno Iksil, Braunstein made a series of assertions about the trades. On May 10, JPM finalized its first quarter financial results, which included some disclosures regarding Iksil’s trading that were substantially different from Braunstein’s statements of April 13. At issue is whether the regulatory filings on April 13 and May 10, as well as verbal comments by Braunstein …
What Would We Do Without Them: Whistleblowers In The Era Of Sarbanes-Oxley And Dodd-Frank, Sean Griffith, Jane A. Norberg, Ian Engoron, Alice Brightsky, Tracey Mcneil, Jennifer M. Pacella, Judith Weinstock, Jason Zuckerman
What Would We Do Without Them: Whistleblowers In The Era Of Sarbanes-Oxley And Dodd-Frank, Sean Griffith, Jane A. Norberg, Ian Engoron, Alice Brightsky, Tracey Mcneil, Jennifer M. Pacella, Judith Weinstock, Jason Zuckerman
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
Proxy Access And Optimal Standardization In Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis, Reilly S. Steel
Proxy Access And Optimal Standardization In Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis, Reilly S. Steel
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
According to the conventional wisdom, “one size does not fit all” in corporate governance. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their governance needs, implying that the optimal corporate governance structure must also vary from firm to firm. This one-size-does-not-fit-all axiom has featured prominently in arguments against numerous corporate law regulatory initiatives, including the SEC’s failed Rule 14a-11—an attempt to impose mandatory, uniform “proxy access” on all public companies—which the D.C. Circuit struck down for inadequate cost–benefit analysis.
This Article presents an alternative theory as to the role of standardization in corporate governance—in which investors prefer standardized terms—and empirical …
4th And 205: How A Rush Of Global Comments Blocked The Sec’S First Attempted Punt Of Attorney-Client Privilege Under Sarbanes-Oxley, John Paul Lucci
4th And 205: How A Rush Of Global Comments Blocked The Sec’S First Attempted Punt Of Attorney-Client Privilege Under Sarbanes-Oxley, John Paul Lucci
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Behaviorism In Finance And Securities Law, David A. Skeel Jr.
Behaviorism In Finance And Securities Law, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
In this Essay, I take stock (as something of an outsider) of the behavioral economics movement, focusing in particular on its interaction with traditional cost-benefit analysis and its implications for agency structure. The usual strategy for such a project—a strategy that has been used by others with behavioral economics—is to marshal the existing evidence and critically assess its significance. My approach in this Essay is somewhat different. Although I describe behavioral economics and summarize the strongest criticisms of its use, the heart of the Essay is inductive, and focuses on a particular context: financial and securities regulation, as recently revamped …
In Search Of Safe Harbor: Suggestions For The New Rule 506(C), Usha Rodrigues
In Search Of Safe Harbor: Suggestions For The New Rule 506(C), Usha Rodrigues
Scholarly Works
I devote most of this essay to exploring how, exactly, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) should go about providing guidelines to implement the statutory requirement that issuers have a reasonable belief that a purchaser is accredited. The SEC has proposed rules, but these rules merely restate what Congress has already required, thus sidestepping Congress’s direction that the agency itself articulate some verification methods. Taking the SEC’s decidedly amorphous proposal to task, I recommend that the SEC offer two nonexclusive safe harbors for issuers to guide them in determining whether a natural person is an accredited investor. The paragraphs below …
Lessons From The Flash Crash For The Regulation Of High-Frequency Traders, Edgar Ortega Barrales
Lessons From The Flash Crash For The Regulation Of High-Frequency Traders, Edgar Ortega Barrales
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Are equity markets vulnerable to a sudden collapse if the traders who account for about half of the volume have no regulatory obligations to stabilize prices? After the “Flash Crash” of May 6, 2010, policymakers have resoundingly answered this question in the affirmative. During the worst of the crash, some of the so-called high-frequency trading firms that dominate equity markets stopped trading and prices collapsed, momentarily wiping out almost $1 trillion in market value. In response, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is considering whether high-frequency trading firms should be required to act as the traders of last resort. This …
Inside-Out Corporate Governance, David A. Skeel Jr., Vijit Chahar, Alexander Clark, Mia Howard, Bijun Huang, Federico Lasconi, A.G. Leventhal, Matthew Makover, Randi Milgrim, David Payne, Romy Rahme, Nikki Sachdeva, Zachary Scott
Inside-Out Corporate Governance, David A. Skeel Jr., Vijit Chahar, Alexander Clark, Mia Howard, Bijun Huang, Federico Lasconi, A.G. Leventhal, Matthew Makover, Randi Milgrim, David Payne, Romy Rahme, Nikki Sachdeva, Zachary Scott
All Faculty Scholarship
Until late in the twentieth century, internal corporate governance—that is, decision making by the principal constituencies of the firm—was clearly distinct from outside oversight by regulators, auditors and credit rating agencies, and markets. With the 1980s takeover wave and hedge funds’ and equity funds’ more recent involvement in corporate governance, the distinction between inside and outside governance has eroded. The tools of inside governance are now routinely employed by governance outsiders, intertwining the two traditional modes of governance. We argue in this Article that the shift has created a new governance paradigm, which we call inside-out corporate governance.
Using the …
Falling Short: Has The Sec’S Quest To Control Market Manipulation And Abusive Short-Selling Come To An End Or Has It Really Just Begun?, Richard Ramirez
Falling Short: Has The Sec’S Quest To Control Market Manipulation And Abusive Short-Selling Come To An End Or Has It Really Just Begun?, Richard Ramirez
Richard E. Ramirez, J.D. | CFCS
No abstract provided.
Shareholder Proxy Access To The Ballot: What Will Be The Implications Of The Sec's Proposed Shareholder Access Rule If It Is Adopted From Governance, Implementation And A Public Perspective?, Bryan J. Shea
Seton Hall University Dissertations and Theses (ETDs)
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Warming Up To Climate Change Risk Disclosure, Jeffrey M. Mcfarland
Warming Up To Climate Change Risk Disclosure, Jeffrey M. Mcfarland
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
Investors are clamoring for companies to include more climate change risk disclosure in their periodic reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Yet public companies in the United States do a poor job of disclosing to investors how climate change affects their businesses. Although there have been several proposals for more voluntary disclosure of these risks and one petition for guidance from the SEC, these proposals are not effecting changes in disclosure practices quickly enough. This Article builds on existing proposals to create guidelines for mandatory climate change risk disclosure in periodic securities filings. The guidelines seek to …