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Using Actual Betting Percentages To Analyze Sportsbook Behavior: The Canadian And Arena Football Leagues, Rodney Paul, Andrew P. Weinbach, Kristin K. Paul
Using Actual Betting Percentages To Analyze Sportsbook Behavior: The Canadian And Arena Football Leagues, Rodney Paul, Andrew P. Weinbach, Kristin K. Paul
Falk College Research Center
Sportsbook behavior is tested for the Canadian and Arena Football Leagues using real sportsbook betting percentages from on-line sportsbooks. The balanced book hypothesis of the traditional sportsbook models does not appear to hold for these leagues, as favorites and overs attract more than 50 percent of the betting dollars. Although there is some slight evidence toward shading the line in these directions, there is also no overwhelming evidence supporting the Levitt (2004) hypothesis, as sportsbooks do not appear to be actively pricing to maximize profits. In general, the results seem more consistent with the sportsbook pricing as a forecast, content …
Trusts Versus Corporations: An Empirical Analysis Of Competing Organizational Forms, A. Joseph Warburton
Trusts Versus Corporations: An Empirical Analysis Of Competing Organizational Forms, A. Joseph Warburton
College of Law - Faculty Scholarship
This paper studies the effects of organizational form on managerial behavior and firm performance, from an empirical perspective. Managers of trusts are subject to stricter fiduciary responsibilities than managers of corporations. This paper examines the ramifications empirically, by exploiting data generated by a change in British regulations in the 1990s that allowed mutual funds to organize as either a trust or a corporation. I find evidence that trust law is effective in curtailing opportunistic behavior, as trust managers charge significantly lower fees than their observationally equivalent corporate counterparts. Trust managers also incur lower risk. However, evidence suggests that trust managers …