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Full-Text Articles in Finance and Financial Management

Teleinvestmentevangelists: Celebrity, Ritual And Religion And The Quest To “Beat The Market”, E. Douglas, Mary Keller, Elton Mcgoun Dec 2014

Teleinvestmentevangelists: Celebrity, Ritual And Religion And The Quest To “Beat The Market”, E. Douglas, Mary Keller, Elton Mcgoun

Mary L Keller

Purpose – This paper aims to offer a cultural understanding of investor faith in stock picking despite overwhelming evidence questioning its efficacy. Why, in the face of very widely communicated findings calling into question the advice and assistance offered by financial professionals to help them pick stocks or manage their mutual funds, do so many people persist in these practices? The authors believe that the best way to understand investor faith in the efficacy of stock picking is through teleinvestmentevangelists such as Jim Cramer, whose fusion of celebrity and religion taps into the ritualistic elements of investment that usually lie …


Alternative Estimators Of Cointegrating Parameters In Models With Non-Stationary Data: An Application To Us Export Demand, James Forest, Paul Turner Dec 2012

Alternative Estimators Of Cointegrating Parameters In Models With Non-Stationary Data: An Application To Us Export Demand, James Forest, Paul Turner

James J Forest

This paper presents Monte Carlo simulations which compare the empirical performance of two alternative single equation estimators of the equilibrium parameters in a dynamic relationship. The estimators considered are Stock and Watson’s dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) estimator and Bewley’s transformation of the general autoregressive distributed lag model. The results indicate that the Bewley transformation produces a lower mean-square error as well as superior serial correlation properties even with lower truncation lags for the lagged variables included in the estimation equation. An application is then provided which examines the nature of the equilibrium relationship between aggregate US exports, world trade …


Economic Integration, Political Integration Or Both?, Daniel Brou, Michele Ruta Nov 2011

Economic Integration, Political Integration Or Both?, Daniel Brou, Michele Ruta

Daniel Brou

We study the effects of economic and political integration by presenting a model in which firms compete with each other in both an economic market—where they produce a good and compete for market share—and in a political (rent seeking) market—where they compete for transfers from the government. Growth is driven by firms’ cost-reducing innovation activity and economic and political integration affect firms’ incentive to innovate differently. In this setting, economic and political integration can be seen as complementary. Economic integration, when not accompanied by political integration, can lead to less innovation and slower growth as firms respond to increased competition …


Are Ceos Expected Utility Maximizers?, John List, Charles Mason Dec 2010

Are Ceos Expected Utility Maximizers?, John List, Charles Mason

Charles F Mason

Are individuals expected utility maximizers? This question represents much more than academic curiosity. In a normative sense, at stake are the fundamental underpinnings of the bulk of the last half-century’s models of choice under uncertainty. From a positive perspective, the ubiquitous use of benefit-cost analysis across government agencies renders the expected utility maximization paradigm literally the only game in town. In this study, we advance the literature by exploring CEO’s preferences over small probability, high loss lotteries. Using undergraduate students as our experimental control group, we find that both our CEO and student subject pools exhibit frequent and large departures …


Sheep And Their Herders: Testing The Myth Of Rational Voters – A Latvian Case Study, Daniel Brou, Kirk Collins, Brent Mckenzie Dec 2010

Sheep And Their Herders: Testing The Myth Of Rational Voters – A Latvian Case Study, Daniel Brou, Kirk Collins, Brent Mckenzie

Daniel Brou

Through the use of a simple behavioural political economy model, we cast doubt on the assumption that voters behave in predictable ways dependent on their expected support for government policies. We show that under certain conditions an unfavourable (i.e. welfare reducing) policy may result, even with well-informed, welfare maximising voters. While true that voter behaviour may align with government policies, this alignment has more to do with a perceived lack of influence, rather than policy support. The case of Latvia's accession to the European Union is used as a case study to evaluate the government's policy in terms of voting …


Globalization And Economic Integration: Winners And Losers In The Asia-Pacific Dec 2009

Globalization And Economic Integration: Winners And Losers In The Asia-Pacific

Ahmed Khalid

‘Noel Gaston and Ahmed M. Khalid’s volume offers fascinating insights on the development, causes, and consequences of globalization in the Asia-Pacific. The outstanding collection of articles combines theory with rigorous econometrics, making the book a must-read for every student of globalization. At a time where the global crisis gave new arguments to the critics of globalization, the questions raised in this book, and the answers given, are essential reading for academics and politicians alike.’ – Axel Dreher, University of Goettingen, Germany Given the importance of globalization in today’s world, this salutary and timely book explores how globalization is specifically shaping …


On The Political Substitutability Between Tariffs And Subsidies, Daniel Brou, Michele Ruta Dec 2008

On The Political Substitutability Between Tariffs And Subsidies, Daniel Brou, Michele Ruta

Daniel Brou

This paper provides a simple model that highlights the political substitutability between import tariffs and production subsidies.1 When taxes are distortionary, political pressures by domestic interest groups representing the import competing sector induce the government to set inefficiently high tariffs and subsidies. If the government commits the tariff to a lower level - for instance by signing a binding commitment in a trade agreement - interest groups demand (and in the political equilibrium obtain) a larger production subsidy. This political substitutability between tariffs and subsidies is shown to reduce social welfare.