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Full-Text Articles in Finance and Financial Management

The Effect Of The Options Backdating Scandal On The Stock-Price Performance Of 110 Accused Companies, Gennaro Bernile, Gregg A. Jarrell, Howard Mulcahey Dec 2006

The Effect Of The Options Backdating Scandal On The Stock-Price Performance Of 110 Accused Companies, Gennaro Bernile, Gregg A. Jarrell, Howard Mulcahey

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Since academic scholars and the Wall Street Journal reported widespread evidence indicating that option grants to executives were backdated, an avalanche of news stories followed documenting this ever-widening corporate scandal. In this study we ask: "How do disclosures of backdating affect shareholder value?" We closely examine 110 companies listed in the Wall Street Journal's Perfect Payday webpage, collecting all news stories related to options backdating. We find that shareholders of these 110 companies suffer on average significant stock-price declines, ranging between 20% and 50%. Moreover, these losses do not seem to be due to temporary overreactions (at least so far). …


Government Ownership And The Performance Of Government-Linked Companies: The Case Of Singapore, James Ang, David K. Ding Feb 2006

Government Ownership And The Performance Of Government-Linked Companies: The Case Of Singapore, James Ang, David K. Ding

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

In an emerging economy, the alternative to government control is often no governance. We investigate the governance structure of government-linked companies (GLCs) in Singapore under the ownership/control structure of Temasek Holdings, the government holding entity, which typically owns substantial cash flow rights but disproportional control rights and exercises no operational control. We compare the financial and market performance of GLCs with non-GLCs, where each has a different set of governance structure, the key difference being government ownership. We show that Singaporean GLCs have higher valuations and better corporate governance than a control group of non-GLCs. The results hold even when …