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Essays On Tax Impacts On Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance And Regional Disparity, Mei Li Jun 2023

Essays On Tax Impacts On Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance And Regional Disparity, Mei Li

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

This dissertation consists of three chapters that cover topics on tax impacts on corporate finance, regional disparity and corporate governance.

Chapter 1 - How Do Net Operating Loss Carryforwards Affect Tax Impact on Corporate Capital Structure? This paper examines the impact of net operating loss (NOL) carryforwards on the tax implications of corporate capital structure. Leveraging the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), the largest tax reform in four decades, this paper investigates the effect of NOL carryforwards on firms' sensitivity to tax reforms. As NOL carryforwards have become increasingly significant since 2000, but not widely researched due …


Are All Risks Created Equal? Rethinking The Distinction Between Legal And Business Risk In Corporate Law, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky Aug 2022

Are All Risks Created Equal? Rethinking The Distinction Between Legal And Business Risk In Corporate Law, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky

All Faculty Scholarship

Should corporate legal risk be treated similarly to corporate business risks? Currently, the law draws a clear-cut distinction between the two sources of risk, permitting the latter type of risk and banning the former. As a result, fiduciaries are shielded from personal liability in the case of business risk and are entirely exposed to civil and criminal liability that arises from legal risk-taking. As corporate law theorists have underscored, the differential treatment of business and legal risk is highly problematic from the perspective of firms and shareholders. To begin with, legal risk cannot be completely averted or eliminated. More importantly, …


Biodiversity Disclosure Of Indonesian Companies And The Role Of The Board Of Commissioners, Ahmad Hambali, Desi Adhariani Jun 2022

Biodiversity Disclosure Of Indonesian Companies And The Role Of The Board Of Commissioners, Ahmad Hambali, Desi Adhariani

Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia

The environmental damage that occurs on a large scale has an impact on reducing biodiversity. Biodiversity has an important role that is useful for human life and plays a central role in economic development. This condition makes various parties aware of their role in preventing further damage. Companies, whether directly or indirectly, owe a great deal to the environment. This study seeks to examine the role of the Board of Commissioners as proxied by the size of the Board of Commissioners, the proportion of Independent Boards, and the proportion of women on the Board of Commissioners as a corporate governance …


Coporate Governance, Institutional Ownership, And The Decision To Pay The Amount Of Dividends: Evidence From Usa, John Obradovich, Amarjit Gill May 2019

Coporate Governance, Institutional Ownership, And The Decision To Pay The Amount Of Dividends: Evidence From Usa, John Obradovich, Amarjit Gill

John Obradovich

The decision to pay dividends is influenced by many financial factors. The purpose of this study is to find the relationships between corporate governance, institutional ownership, and the decision to pay dividends in American service firms. A sample of 296 American firms listed on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for a period of 3 years (from 2009-2011) was selected. This study applied a co-relational and non-experimental research design. The findings of this study indicate that the decision to pay dividends is a positive function of board size, CEO duality, and internationalization of the firm, and a negative function of institutional …


Activist Investors: A Corporate Social Responsibility Perspective On Hedge Fund Activism And The Need For Focus On All Stakeholders, Lucy Marie Ankenbauer Mar 2019

Activist Investors: A Corporate Social Responsibility Perspective On Hedge Fund Activism And The Need For Focus On All Stakeholders, Lucy Marie Ankenbauer

Honors Theses

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) can result in distinctly different visions when instituted under the enlightened stakeholder theory or the shareholder maximization theory. The critical variation between these two theories is the principal party that businesses consider when instituting strategic decisions. Firms following the enlightened stakeholder theory will base decisions on all the various stakeholders of the company and develop policies which increase long-term firm value. Companies pursuing shareholder value maximization will consider all strategies through the eyes of the stockholders and how these individuals will be affected. Neither theory is more valid than the other, since many factors must be …


You Can Run But You Can’T Hide: The Advance Of Shareholder Activism, Kendall Greenberg Jan 2018

You Can Run But You Can’T Hide: The Advance Of Shareholder Activism, Kendall Greenberg

CMC Senior Theses

Shareholder activism has exploded in popularity since the turn of the century, due in large part to impressive relative returns generated by its major participants. The result has thus been a surge in assets invested in the category, to in excess of $170 billion today up from less than $3 billion in 2000 (Inglis 2015; Romito 2015). This influx of capital, in absolute dollars and pace of growth, has caused many to wonder whether activists truly create shareholder value and, if so, if the value generated is sustainable. Numerous studies of activist interventions prior to 2009 reveal significant stock price …


Proxy Access And Optimal Standardization In Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis, Reilly S. Steel Dec 2017

Proxy Access And Optimal Standardization In Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis, Reilly S. Steel

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

According to the conventional wisdom, “one size does not fit all” in corporate governance. Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their governance needs, implying that the optimal corporate governance structure must also vary from firm to firm. This one-size-does-not-fit-all axiom has featured prominently in arguments against numerous corporate law regulatory initiatives, including the SEC’s failed Rule 14a-11—an attempt to impose mandatory, uniform “proxy access” on all public companies—which the D.C. Circuit struck down for inadequate costbenefit analysis.

This Article presents an alternative theory as to the role of standardization in corporate governance—in which investors prefer standardized terms—and empirical …


Dividend Policy In A Frontier Market And Sector Equity Traded Funds In The United States, Abdulrahman Alharbi Aug 2017

Dividend Policy In A Frontier Market And Sector Equity Traded Funds In The United States, Abdulrahman Alharbi

University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations

In chapter 1, we examine the nature and scale of the relationship between returns on sector Equity Traded Funds (ETFs) and their volatility. We discuss the source and direction of the effect between returns and risk and whether behavioral biases are prominent among sector ETFs. The study has implications for financial sector practitioners and investors, as it provides more information about the risk in sector ETF and whether that risk differs from that of other investment instruments. To this end, we test three hypotheses based on the relevant literature on volatility and returns: the leverage effect hypothesis, feedback hypothesis, and …


Powerful Blockholders And Ceo Turnover, Chi Shen Wei, Lei Zhang Aug 2017

Powerful Blockholders And Ceo Turnover, Chi Shen Wei, Lei Zhang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We identify the power of institutional blockholders to influence management using previous occurrences of forced CEO turnover at other firms in the blockholders’ overall portfolio. We create a “powerful blockholder linkage” measure that strongly predicts future forced CEO turnover. These effects are larger when “powerful” blockholders are more motivated to monitor and when they have had valuable monitoring experience. Moreover, firms with powerful blockholders display higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, pursue more value-increasing mergers, and have higher firm value. Overall, our results suggest that an identifiable group of powerful blockholders play an important role in corporate governance.


Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz Mar 2017

Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz

William & Mary Law Review

This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.


Quasi-Appraisal: Appraising Breach Of Duty Of Disclosure Claims Following "Cash-Out" Mergers In Delaware, Zachary A. Paiva Jan 2017

Quasi-Appraisal: Appraising Breach Of Duty Of Disclosure Claims Following "Cash-Out" Mergers In Delaware, Zachary A. Paiva

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

In recent years, Delaware has served as the hot bed for the dramatic increase in merger appraisal litigation and the proliferation of “appraisal arbitrage” whereby opportunistic shareholders buy into companies following merger announcements and challenge announced deal prices as an investment strategy. While this has not always proved profitable, it has increased scrutiny over the Delaware appraisal regime and the ability for shareholders to avail themselves of the opportunity for a judicial valuation of their shares. Furthermore, it has highlighted information asymmetries in which controlling shareholders, particularly those seeking to cash out their minority shareholders, are incentivized to underpay or …


Do Government Linked Companies Hold More Cash?, Chenxi Liu, Kian Leong Nelson Yap, Sili Zhou Jul 2016

Do Government Linked Companies Hold More Cash?, Chenxi Liu, Kian Leong Nelson Yap, Sili Zhou

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

In this paper, we investigate the cash holings of government linked corporations (GLCs) in Singapore, with different levels of Temasek Holdings ownership. We find evidence that Temasek owned public firms hold on average substantially more cash than otherwise similar public firms listed on SGX. This result is robust to different measures of Temasek ownership. We also show that when GLCs have excess cash, they do not spend it on capital expenditure, acquisition, dividends or share repurchase. Instead, they hoard these excess cash leading to an accumulation of cash. In addition, we show that Temasek firms are on average more profitable, …


Role Of Inside Directors In Mitigating Negative Effects Of Outside Directors’ Busyness, Syed Mainuddin Kamal May 2016

Role Of Inside Directors In Mitigating Negative Effects Of Outside Directors’ Busyness, Syed Mainuddin Kamal

Doctoral Dissertations

In this study, I investigate the effect of outside directors’ busyness on firm performance, and how the presence of a certified inside director (CID) on the board alters the busyness effect. Busy outside directors are over-stretched to provide adequate monitoring. Certified inside directors (CIDs), inside directors holding a directorship at an unaffiliated firm, have director labor market incentives to focus on their own firm’s performance and share firm-specific information to outside directors for effective monitoring. I find that the negative effect of outside directors’ busyness on firm performance is mitigated when a firm’s board includes a certified inside director (CID). …


Open Market Share Repurchase Programs And Corporate Governance: Company Performance, Gary Caton, Jeremy Goh, Yen Teik Lee, Scott C. Linn Dec 2015

Open Market Share Repurchase Programs And Corporate Governance: Company Performance, Gary Caton, Jeremy Goh, Yen Teik Lee, Scott C. Linn

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Payout policies based on share repurchase programs provide greater flexibility than do those based on cash dividends. We develop and test an empirical model in which strongly-governed companies outperform weakly-governed companies after announcing share repurchase programs. Our findings include positive associations between strong governance and both post-announcement adjusted operating performance and abnormal stock returns. The results are robust to sample selection bias, different sample criteria, governance measurement, and various control variables. In addition, governance strength is associated with larger post-announcement changes in CEO incentive compensation and merger and acquisition activity, both of which we argue are consistent with strongly-governed companies …


Governance Matter: Morningstar Stewardship Grades And Mutual Fund Performance, Jerry X. Cao, Aurobindo Ghosh, Jeremy Goh, Wee Seng Ng Nov 2014

Governance Matter: Morningstar Stewardship Grades And Mutual Fund Performance, Jerry X. Cao, Aurobindo Ghosh, Jeremy Goh, Wee Seng Ng

Research Collection School Of Economics

Mutual fund investors have the arduous task of disentangling luck from ability of mutual fund managers’ performance. In this paper we investigate the role of mutual fund corporate governance (measured by Morningstar Stewardship grade) in mutual fund performance. We propose an objective data-driven corporate governance score based on principal components of Morningstar Stewardship Grades. Furthermore, we establish corporate governance scores have Granger Causality on long-term risk-adjusted returns. The findings suggest that corporate governance grades of mutual funds carry information content beyond the usual star rating measures for predicting long-term mutual fund performance and provide an effective tool for selecting funds.


Corporate Or Network Governance? The Case Of The Italian Productive Chains And Their Scaffolding Finance Approach., Guido Max Mantovani, Teresa Guidone Jan 2014

Corporate Or Network Governance? The Case Of The Italian Productive Chains And Their Scaffolding Finance Approach., Guido Max Mantovani, Teresa Guidone

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance

We investigate and find out the inner differences between stand-alone firms and those participating to Productive Chain Networks (PCNs) as far as ownership and corporate governance characteristics are concerned. PCNs are typical Italian economic realities made of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which behave like a unique meta-firm. Different clusters are found from an empirical analysis: firms outside PCNs, leaders in PCNs and suppliers participating to PCNs. The clusters differentiate on corporate governance practices and the consequent capability to attract funding from financial institutions. The inner differences in governance structure relate to the underpinnings of the competitive advantage of the …


Coporate Governance, Institutional Ownership, And The Decision To Pay The Amount Of Dividends: Evidence From Usa, John Obradovich, Amarjit Gill Feb 2013

Coporate Governance, Institutional Ownership, And The Decision To Pay The Amount Of Dividends: Evidence From Usa, John Obradovich, Amarjit Gill

Faculty Publications and Presentations

The decision to pay dividends is influenced by many financial factors. The purpose of this study is to find the relationships between corporate governance, institutional ownership, and the decision to pay dividends in American service firms. A sample of 296 American firms listed on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for a period of 3 years (from 2009-2011) was selected. This study applied a co-relational and non-experimental research design. The findings of this study indicate that the decision to pay dividends is a positive function of board size, CEO duality, and internationalization of the firm, and a negative function of institutional …


Il Comitato Per Il Controllo Interno E Per La Revisione Contabile Introdotto Dall’Art. 19 Del D.Lgs. 39/2010: Riflessioni In Sede Di Prima Istituzione Alla Luce Delle Indicazioni Dell’Unione Europea, Claudio Sottoriva Mar 2011

Il Comitato Per Il Controllo Interno E Per La Revisione Contabile Introdotto Dall’Art. 19 Del D.Lgs. 39/2010: Riflessioni In Sede Di Prima Istituzione Alla Luce Delle Indicazioni Dell’Unione Europea, Claudio Sottoriva

Claudio Sottoriva

L’esperienza nazionale in tema di costituzione di “comitati” interni all’organo amministrativo si arricchisce, alla luce del D.Lgs. 39/2010, del comitato per il controllo interno e per la revisione contabile ai sensi dell’art. 19 dello stesso. Facendo riferimento alla realtà italiana ed europea in generale si evidenzia la progressiva sperimentazione di formule compositive degli organi amministrativi e di controllo finalizzate ad una loro maggiore specializzazione secondo quanto previsto dai principali codici di autodisciplina (soprattutto avuto riguardo alle società aventi titoli negoziati in mercati regolamentati). Il comitato ex art. 19 del D.Lgs. 39/2010 è previsto per tutti gli enti di interesse nazionale …


Beyond The Dichotomous Worlds Hypothesis: Towards A Plurality Of Corporate Governance Logics, Jordan Otten Jan 2007

Beyond The Dichotomous Worlds Hypothesis: Towards A Plurality Of Corporate Governance Logics, Jordan Otten

Jordan Otten

The dichotomous worlds hypothesis holds that corporate governance systems worldwide are either based on the Anglo-American shareholder model or the Eurasian stakeholder model. We suggest a more fine-grained classification, based on five corporate governance logics –socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which all parties involved in economic productive activities structure their material interdependencies and provide meaning to the social reality of corporate life. These logics are discovered through a content analysis of the corporate governance reform codes of 38 countries.