Finance and Financial Management Commons^™

How Does Credit Risk Affect Cost Management Strategies? Evidence On The Initiation Of Credit Default Swap And Sticky Cost Behavior, Jing Dai, Nan Hu, Rong Huang, Yan Yan

Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems

In this paper, we examine the effect of credit defaults swaps (CDS) initiation on reference firms' cost management strategies. CDS contracts provide insurance protection for creditors, inducing a shift in bargaining power from borrowers to creditors and an excessive incidence of bankruptcy. Anticipating more intransigent creditors in debt renegotiations and higher bankruptcy risk, CDS firms are incentivized to mitigate risk through decreasing cost stickiness after CDS initiation, as cost stickiness lowers liquidity and triggers early covenant violations. We find that, on average, CDS initiation is associated with a decline in reference firms' cost stickiness. This association is more pronounced for …

Cds Channels Of Influence On Discretionary Accruals, Hao Cheng, Kian Guan Lim

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Existing studies indicated that firm debt holders can use the credit default swap (CDS) market to hedge their credit risk, and thus they would reduce their monitoring of the firms, leading to largely distressed firms shirking and increasing positive abnormal earnings accruals. Besides providing insurance, however, the CDS spreads also perform price discovery of credit risk information sought by trade creditors and potential lenders who are not protected. High absolute abnormal discretionary accruals or bad earnings quality, especially negative abnormal accruals, would lead adverse CDS price signals that are very costly to the firm. This compels the firm under nondistressed …

Inside-Out Corporate Governance, David A. Skeel Jr., Vijit Chahar, Alexander Clark, Mia Howard, Bijun Huang, Federico Lasconi, A.G. Leventhal, Matthew Makover, Randi Milgrim, David Payne, Romy Rahme, Nikki Sachdeva, Zachary Scott

All Faculty Scholarship

Until late in the twentieth century, internal corporate governance—that is, decision making by the principal constituencies of the firm—was clearly distinct from outside oversight by regulators, auditors and credit rating agencies, and markets. With the 1980s takeover wave and hedge funds’ and equity funds’ more recent involvement in corporate governance, the distinction between inside and outside governance has eroded. The tools of inside governance are now routinely employed by governance outsiders, intertwining the two traditional modes of governance. We argue in this Article that the shift has created a new governance paradigm, which we call inside-out corporate governance.

Using the …