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The Relationship Between Incentive Compensation And Forced Ceo Turnover, Atreya Chakraborty, Shahbaz Sheikh, Narayanan Subramanian
The Relationship Between Incentive Compensation And Forced Ceo Turnover, Atreya Chakraborty, Shahbaz Sheikh, Narayanan Subramanian
Atreya Chakraborty
We study the relationship between incentive compensation and performance related CEO turnover. Our theoretical model predicts that the slope of the compensation contract and forced turnover may be complements. Our results support this prediction. We find that incentives and turnover are positively related. This relationship however, varies with the equity ownership of CEOs and does not hold for CEOs who own more than 5% equity. Moreover, this relationship is stronger if the firm under performs its industry. Our results suggest that high-powered incentives may increase the signaling power of performance measures and lead to higher likelihood of turnover.
Dual Agency: Corporate Boards With Reciprocally Interlocking Relationships, Kevin F. Hallock
Dual Agency: Corporate Boards With Reciprocally Interlocking Relationships, Kevin F. Hallock
Kevin F Hallock
[Excerpt] This paper studies reciprocal interlocks of boards of directors of large firms where an employee of firm A sits on firm B's board and at the same time an employee of firm B sits on firm A's board. The study of Boards of Directors by those in economics and finance is not new. In fact, Dooley (1969) writes of interlocking directorates, but his definition is different in that he presents evidence of interlock where "at least one director ... sat on the board of at least one other of the largest companies". Books by Mizruchi (1982) and Pennings (1980) …