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Finance and Financial Management Commons™
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- Keyword
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- Agency problems (2)
- Conflicts of interest (2)
- Hedge funds (2)
- Public firms (2)
- CEO Turnover (1)
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- Corporate Governance (1)
- Corporate finance (1)
- Cross-section of stock returns (1)
- Financial institutions (1)
- Fundamental information (1)
- Institutional Blockholders (1)
- Sell-side analysts; Effort allocation; Limited attention; Career concerns; Earnings forecast; Stock recommendation; Firm information environment; Labor market outcomes (1)
- Short interest (1)
- Southeast Asia (1)
Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Finance and Financial Management
The Flow Of Funds In Asean, Philip C. Zerrillo
The Flow Of Funds In Asean, Philip C. Zerrillo
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
In his novel, Memoirs of a Geisha, Arthur Golden wrote, “Water can carve its way even through stone. And when trapped, water makes a new path.” Something similar seems to be happening with the flow of funds in ASEAN.
Powerful Blockholders And Ceo Turnover, Chi Shen Wei, Lei Zhang
Powerful Blockholders And Ceo Turnover, Chi Shen Wei, Lei Zhang
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We identify the power of institutional blockholders to influence management using previous occurrences of forced CEO turnover at other firms in the blockholders’ overall portfolio. We create a “powerful blockholder linkage” measure that strongly predicts future forced CEO turnover. These effects are larger when “powerful” blockholders are more motivated to monitor and when they have had valuable monitoring experience. Moreover, firms with powerful blockholders display higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, pursue more value-increasing mergers, and have higher firm value. Overall, our results suggest that an identifiable group of powerful blockholders play an important role in corporate governance.
Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Song Wee Melvyn Teo
Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Song Wee Melvyn Teo
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly underperform funds managed by unlisted firms. The underperformance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the underperformance, listed asset management firms raise more capital, by growing existing funds and launching new funds post listing, and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.
Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Song Wee Melvyn Teo
Public Hedge Funds, Lin Sun, Song Wee Melvyn Teo
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Hedge funds managed by listed firms significantly underperform funds managed by unlisted firms. The underperformance is more severe for funds with low manager deltas, poor governance, and no manager co-investment, or managed by firms whose prices are sensitive to earnings news. Notwithstanding the underperformance, listed asset management firms raise more capital, by growing existing funds and launching new funds post listing, and harvest greater fee revenues than do comparable unlisted firms. The results are consistent with the view that, for asset management firms, going public weakens the alignment between ownership, control, and investment capital, thereby engendering conflicts of interest.
Analyst Effort Allocation And Firms' Information Environment, Rong Wang, Jarrad Harford, Feng Jiang, Fei Xie
Analyst Effort Allocation And Firms' Information Environment, Rong Wang, Jarrad Harford, Feng Jiang, Fei Xie
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
We show that a firm’s information environment is significantly impacted by the characteristics of the other firms its analysts cover. Analysts strategically allocate effort among portfolio firms by devoting more effort to firms that are relatively more important for their career concerns. Specifically, controlling for analyst and firm characteristics, we find that within each analyst’s portfolio, firms ranked relatively higher based on market capitalization, trading volume, or institutional ownership receive more accurate, frequent, and informative earnings forecast revisions and stock recommendation changes that contain greater information content from that analyst. Firms’ relative rank across analysts varies widely, so this is …
Short Interest, Returns, And Unfavorable Fundamental Information, Ferhat Akbas, Ekkehart Boehmer, Bilal Erturk, Sorin Sorescu
Short Interest, Returns, And Unfavorable Fundamental Information, Ferhat Akbas, Ekkehart Boehmer, Bilal Erturk, Sorin Sorescu
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
Several months before information becomes public, the level of short interest contains value-relevant information about publicly traded corporations. Short interest predicts future bad news, negative earnings surprises, and downward revisions in analyst earnings forecasts. This informational content is stronger for stocks that are harder to short. We also find that nearly half of the well-known cross-sectional relation between short interest and future stock returns is related to future changes in firms’ value-relevant information. Our results suggest that short interest predicts future returns, in part, due to short sellers’ ability to uncover unfavorable information about firms.