Finance and Financial Management Commons^™

Curriculum Vitae, Karen Ahmed

Publications – Dreihaus College of Business

No abstract provided.

Executive Compensation: The Role Of Shari’A Compliance, William Martin, Karen Ahmed

Publications – Dreihaus College of Business

Abstract Purpose The purpose of this paper is to illuminate issues surrounding executive compensation as it relates to current understandings of Islamic business law. Methodology We review the emerging bodies of literature in the fields of executive compensation and opinions of stock options under Shari’a law. Findings It appears that the trend in offering employee stock options as part of a Shari’a compliant compensation package is acceptable in most cases, yet because of its close association with the more problematic idea of derivative transactions, the company must be vigilant in obtaining the approval from its Shari’a Standards Board before offering …

Resume, Karen Ahmed

Publications – Dreihaus College of Business

No abstract provided.

The Never Ending Attraction Of The Ponzi Scheme, Pearl Jacobs, Linda Schain

Criminal Justice Faculty Publications

In the 1920’s, Charles Ponzi engaged in a notorious money making scheme. This scheme had been tried before but no one prior to Charles Ponzi had managed to swindle millions of dollars out of unsuspecting people. Thus, the scheme bears his name. In December 2008, Bernard Madoff, a major Ponzi schemer, was exposed. He managed to con investors out of over $65 billion over a thirty year period. Madoff was a highly respected financial expert. The investors were mostly well educated and supposedly financially savvy. How did this happen? This paper will examine some theories which may help explain both …

Inside-Out Corporate Governance, David A. Skeel Jr., Vijit Chahar, Alexander Clark, Mia Howard, Bijun Huang, Federico Lasconi, A.G. Leventhal, Matthew Makover, Randi Milgrim, David Payne, Romy Rahme, Nikki Sachdeva, Zachary Scott

All Faculty Scholarship

Until late in the twentieth century, internal corporate governance—that is, decision making by the principal constituencies of the firm—was clearly distinct from outside oversight by regulators, auditors and credit rating agencies, and markets. With the 1980s takeover wave and hedge funds’ and equity funds’ more recent involvement in corporate governance, the distinction between inside and outside governance has eroded. The tools of inside governance are now routinely employed by governance outsiders, intertwining the two traditional modes of governance. We argue in this Article that the shift has created a new governance paradigm, which we call inside-out corporate governance.

Using the …