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Finance and Financial Management Commons™
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- Keyword
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- Board member departures; CEO compensation; compensation; harvester directors; venture capital; corporate governances (1)
- Finance; investing; investments; endowment; endowments (1)
- Institutional investors; corporate finance; corporate bankruptcy; stocks; organizational performance; stockholders; asset acquisitions; bankruptcies; bankrupt; net buyers (1)
- Management science (1)
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Finance and Financial Management
The Interaction Between Spending Policies And Asset Allocation For College And University Endowment, Ryan Erickson
The Interaction Between Spending Policies And Asset Allocation For College And University Endowment, Ryan Erickson
Honors Projects in Finance
The analysis revealed better combinations of asset allocation and spending policy for college and university endowments that efficiently balance the desirable outcomes of stable spending in real terms against maintaining the purchasing power of the endowment over time (intergenerational equity). Using the variability and correlation of historical asset class returns, we created a forward-looking, projection-based, multivariate Monte Carlo simulation of individual asset class returns. The simulation incorporates the relationships between inflation and asset class returns, and the relationships among asset class returns. The projected time series of asset class returns produced a time series of endowment portfolio returns given an …
Ceo Compensation After Harvester Director Departure, Victor Jarosiewicz
Ceo Compensation After Harvester Director Departure, Victor Jarosiewicz
Finance Department Faculty Journal Articles
I examine the effects of board member departures on CEO compensation using a sample of high growth IPO firms. Agency theory predicts that a reduction in board monitoring by harvester directors (VCs and private equity investors) will result in an increase in CEO pay. I find that departures of the last harvester director on a board result in an immediate and lasting increase in CEO equity compensation, while prior departures by other harvester directors are not significant. The results hold even when controlling for other governance mechanisms such as CEO wealth, CEO turnover, board composition, and external blockholder ownership.
What Do Institutional Investors Know And Act On Before Almost Everyone Else: Evidence From Corporate Bankruptcies, Elena Precourt, Henry Oppenheimer
What Do Institutional Investors Know And Act On Before Almost Everyone Else: Evidence From Corporate Bankruptcies, Elena Precourt, Henry Oppenheimer
Accounting Department Faculty Journal Articles
We analyze investment behavior of institutional managers who hold and trade shares of firms that file for bankruptcy. We find that during the five-year period preceding a bankruptcy filing, institutional investors (except those managing investment companies) are net buyers with a positive abnormal net number of shares traded during the period. Institutional managers start to sell shares of bankrupt firms sooner in some firms than in others; these earlier sales are of smaller firms with weaker operating performance, and lower equity risk. We do not find evidence that institutional stockholders trade strategically and avoid material price declines before they occur.