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Articles 1 - 14 of 14
Full-Text Articles in Corporate Finance
The Uneasy Case For The Inside Director, Lisa Fairfax
The Uneasy Case For The Inside Director, Lisa Fairfax
All Faculty Scholarship
In the wake of recent scandals and the economic meltdown, there is nearly universal support for the notion that corporations must have independent directors. Conventional wisdom insists that independent directors can more effectively monitor the corporation and prevent or otherwise better detect wrongdoing. As the movement to increase director independence has gained traction, inside directors have become an endangered species, relegated to holding a minimal number of seats on the corporate board. This Article questions the popular trend away from inside directors by critiquing the rationales in favor of director independence, and assessing the potential advantages of inside directors. This …
Innate And Discretionary Accruals Quality And Corporate Governance, Pamela Kent, James Routledge, Jenny Stewart
Innate And Discretionary Accruals Quality And Corporate Governance, Pamela Kent, James Routledge, Jenny Stewart
Pamela Kent
This paper extends previous research on the association between corporate governance mechanisms and accruals quality. We derive measures of the discretionary and innate components of accruals quality and regress them against corporate governance characteristics. For discretionary accruals, we find use of a Big 4 audit firm and a larger audit committee as the primary governance mechanisms associated with higher accruals quality. For innate accruals quality, we find that higher quality is associated with an independent board of directors, a larger, more independent and more active audit committee, and use of a Big 4 audit firm. Our findings suggest a stronger …
Application Of Stakeholder Theory To Corporate Environmental Disclosures, Pamela Kent, Christopher Chan
Application Of Stakeholder Theory To Corporate Environmental Disclosures, Pamela Kent, Christopher Chan
Pamela Kent
Ullmann's (1985) three-dimensional model of social responsibility disclosure is tested to determine whether it can be operationalized to help explain the quantity and quality of environmental disclosures in Australian annual reports. The stakeholder power dimension of Ullmann's framework is significant in explaining environmental disclosures while content of the mission statement and existence or otherwise of environmental or social responsibility committees also find strong statistically significant support in the results. Ullmann's stakeholder theory has previously been applied to explain social disclosures in general (Roberts, 1992) and is an important theory because it introduces a measure of strategy. The current paper demonstrates …
Securities Intermediaries And The Separation Of Ownership From Control, Jill E. Fisch
Securities Intermediaries And The Separation Of Ownership From Control, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
The Modern Corporation and Private Property highlighted the evolving separation of ownership and control in the public corporation and the effects of that separation on the allocation of power within the corporation. This essay explores the implications of intermediation for those themes. The article observes that intermediation, by decoupling economic ownership and decision-making authority within the shareholder, creates a second layer of agency issues beyond those identified by Berle and Means. These agency issues are an important consideration in the current debate over shareholder empowerment. The article concludes by considering the hypothetical shareholder construct implicit in the Berle and Means …
La Riforma Del Controllo Contabile Delle Societa’ In Italia: “Schede Di Lettura” Del Decreto Legislativo 39/2010 In Tema Di Svolgimento Della Revisione Legale Dei Conti, Claudio Sottoriva
La Riforma Del Controllo Contabile Delle Societa’ In Italia: “Schede Di Lettura” Del Decreto Legislativo 39/2010 In Tema Di Svolgimento Della Revisione Legale Dei Conti, Claudio Sottoriva
Claudio Sottoriva
Il contributo offre una prima lettura delle novità apportate dal Decreto Legislativo n. 39/2010 attuativo della Direttiva 2006/43/CE, relativa alle revisioni legali dei conti annuali e dei conti consolidati. La disciplina dello svolgimento della attività di revisione legale dei conti trova quindi ora riferimenti normativi nelle norme del Codice Civile e in alcune norme speciali (principalmente nel T.U.F.) nonché per quanto non diversamente disciplinato nel Decreto 39/2010. La disciplina è destinata a trovare completamento con l'emanazione di specifici regolamenti attuativi del Decreto da parte del Ministero dell'Economia e delle finanze nonché da altre Autorità (Consob, Banca d'Italia, etc.). L'analisi consente …
Corporate Governance, Transparency And Performance Of Malaysian Companies, Mohd Che Haat, H. Raaman, Sakthi Mahenthiran
Corporate Governance, Transparency And Performance Of Malaysian Companies, Mohd Che Haat, H. Raaman, Sakthi Mahenthiran
Sakthi Mahenthiran
The paper aims to examine the effect of good corporate governance practices on corporate transparency and performance Malaysian listed companies.
Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, And Auditor Choice In Emerging Markets, Mahmud Hossain, Chee Yeow Lim, Patricia Mui Siang Tan
Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, And Auditor Choice In Emerging Markets, Mahmud Hossain, Chee Yeow Lim, Patricia Mui Siang Tan
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
In this study, we examine the effect of firm-level governance on the firm's choice of an external auditor. Further, we test how the relation between corporate governance and auditor choice may be affected by the strength of legal environment. The results show that firm-level governance scores are positively related to the firm's auditor choice. This association is strengthened by country-level legal protection. Specifically, the positive association between auditor choice and the firm-level governance scores is weaker (stronger) in a low (high) legal environment. These findings are robust after controlling for determinants that were found to be significant in earlier research. …
The Impact Of Macroeconomic Uncertainty On Firms Changes In Financial Leverage, Atreya Chakraborty
The Impact Of Macroeconomic Uncertainty On Firms Changes In Financial Leverage, Atreya Chakraborty
Accounting and Finance Faculty Publication Series
We investigate the relationship between a firm’s measures of corporate gov- ernance, macroeconomic uncertainty and changes in leverage. Recent research highlights the role of governance in financing decisions. Previous research also indicates that macroeconomic uncertainty affects a firm’s ability to borrow. In this paper we investigate how both these channels of influence affects firms’ financing decisions. Our findings show that macroeconomic uncertainty has an important role to play, both by itself and in interaction with a measure of corporate governance.
Why "Democracy" And "Drifter" Firms Can Have Abnormal Returns: The Joint Importance Of Corporate Governance And Abnormal Accruals In Separating Winners From Losers, Koon Boon Kee
Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)
Do managers exercise accounting discretion in an opportunistic or efficient manner? Good governance structures, which mitigate agency costs, are necessary to ensure that the accounting information supplied by management is not opportunistically manipulated. The output of quality accounting information, in turn, serves as an input to better governance structures. Thus, governance and earnings quality (EQ) are inexorably linked through a complementarity relationship. This suggests two previously unexamined relationships. Firstly, the governance effects on performance in the influential paper by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) is overrated without good EQ, measured by the magnitude of abnormal accruals (AA), as an input. …
Does Corporate Governance Matter, Evidence From Earnings Management Practices In Singapore, Lingxu Hu
Does Corporate Governance Matter, Evidence From Earnings Management Practices In Singapore, Lingxu Hu
Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)
This paper addresses two questions. First, do good corporate governance practices add values to company or does it lead to higher stock returns in Singapore? Second, does poorly governed listed company in SGX tend to manage their earnings by using discretionary accruals? Following the approach of Gompers et al. (2003), we formed two portfolios consisting of well-governed and poorly governed companies. Well governed companies are able to maintain a higher return relative to poorly governed companies. I also look at the firm valuation from the adoption of corporate governance practices. Our result shows a positive relationship between firm valuation and …
Corporate Governance And Earnings Management Before Share Repurchase Announcements In Singapore, Jian Ming Chua
Corporate Governance And Earnings Management Before Share Repurchase Announcements In Singapore, Jian Ming Chua
Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)
Share repurchase in Singapore was legalized in 1998. It is well known that investors view share repurchase as good news. This study is based on share repurchase announcements from 2006 to 2009. The mean Cumulative Market-Adjusted Returns (CAR) for the period [0, +1] and [-1, +1] are significant at 1.25% and 1.33% respectively. In Singapore, there are positive abnormal returns following share repurchase announcements in support of the ―free cash flow‖ hypothesis. By using the Singapore Corporate Governance Index as a proxy, the weakly governed companies exhibit the strongest, positive and significant CAR of 2.62% for the period [0, +1]. …
Moral Hazard, Firms’ Internal Governance And Management Earnings Forecasts, Jimmy Lee
Moral Hazard, Firms’ Internal Governance And Management Earnings Forecasts, Jimmy Lee
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
This paper investigates the role of management earnings forecasts in mitigating information asymmetry between investors andmanagers relating to moral hazard, and explains how earnings guidance facilitates monitoring. I demonstrate that firms that are more susceptible to moral hazard problems and more difficult to monitor are also more likely to issue annual earningsforecasts and they do so more frequently. In addition, I examine how firm internal governance drives forecasting decisions andshow that stronger board governance and managerial equity incentives are associated with higher likelihood and frequency of forecast issuance. Finally, I provide robust evidence that managerial equity incentives are associated with …
Why Does Corporate Governance Matter? Evidence From Seasoned Bond Offerings, Fang Wang
Why Does Corporate Governance Matter? Evidence From Seasoned Bond Offerings, Fang Wang
Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)
To examine the importance of corporate governance, I look at how management and investors behave in the event of seasoned bond offerings, controlling for the corporate governance structure of issuing firms. I find that companies with the weakest governance structure aggressively manipulate their earnings upwards during the two years prior to the debt issuances. And when the bond offerings are announced to the market, these same firms experienced positive abnormal returns over a three day event period, indicating that investors of poorly governed firms value a debt financing for the alleged decrease in agency cost.
The Impact Of Macroeconomic Uncertainty On Firms Changes In Financial Leverage, Atreya Chakraborty
The Impact Of Macroeconomic Uncertainty On Firms Changes In Financial Leverage, Atreya Chakraborty
Atreya Chakraborty
We investigate the relationship between a firm’s measures of corporate gov- ernance, macroeconomic uncertainty and changes in leverage. Recent research highlights the role of governance in financing decisions. Previous research also indicates that macroeconomic uncertainty affects a firm’s ability to borrow. In this paper we investigate how both these channels of influence affects firms’ financing decisions. Our findings show that macroeconomic uncertainty has an important role to play, both by itself and in interaction with a measure of corporate governance.