Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Corporate Finance
Japanese Corporate Governance: Structural Change And Financial Performance, Asli M. Colpan, Toru Yoshikawa, Takashi Hikino, Hiroaki Miyoshi
Japanese Corporate Governance: Structural Change And Financial Performance, Asli M. Colpan, Toru Yoshikawa, Takashi Hikino, Hiroaki Miyoshi
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
This paper analyzes institutional and legal changes related to corporate governance and their impact on financial performance in Japan since the second half of the 1990s. We attempt to address two issues systematically: (1) how much the governance reforms of Japanese firms transformed the conventional system of alliance capitalism and managerial control; and (2) what economic outcomes those governance changes have yielded. As the Commercial Code and other legal and institutional frameworks were revised, Japanese firms experienced shifts in terms of stock ownership, corporate control and managerial organizations. Our empirical results show that the influence of new ownership composition and …
Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?, Xia Chen, Jarrad Harford, Kai Li
Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?, Xia Chen, Jarrad Harford, Kai Li
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
Within a cost–benefit framework, we hypothesize that independent institutions with long-term investments will specialize in monitoring and influencing efforts rather than trading. Other institutions will not monitor. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, we show that only concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger performance. Further, the presence of these institutions makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely. These institutions make long-term portfolio adjustments rather than trading for short-term gain and only sell in advance of very bad outcomes. Examining total institutional holdings or even concentrated holdings by other types of institutions masks important variation in the …
Bonding To The Improved Disclosure Environment In The Us: Firms Listing Choices And Their Capital Market Consequences, Ole-Kristian Hope, Tony Kang, Yoonseok Zang
Bonding To The Improved Disclosure Environment In The Us: Firms Listing Choices And Their Capital Market Consequences, Ole-Kristian Hope, Tony Kang, Yoonseok Zang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
This paper examines whether the current reporting and disclosure requirements for foreign registrants in the United States affect foreign firms' decisions to list on a U.S. exchange. We find that while firms from a weak disclosure environment are more likely to cross-list and either trade over-the-counter or be placed privately among institutional investors, they are less likely to list on an exchange in which firms are required to comply with U.S. GAAP. This is consistent with the idea that the decrease in the potential private control benefits accruing to managers discourages them from listing on an organized exchange. We further …
Hedge Funds In Corporate Governance And Corporate Control, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
Hedge Funds In Corporate Governance And Corporate Control, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
Hedge funds have become critical players in both corporate governance and corporate control. In this article, we document and examine the nature of hedge fund activism, how and why it differs from activism by traditional institutional investors, and its implications for corporate governance and regulatory reform. We argue that hedge fund activism differs from activism by traditional institutions in several ways: it is directed at significant changes in individual companies (rather than small, systemic changes), it entails higher costs, and it is strategic and ex ante (rather than intermittent and ex post). The reasons for these differences may lie in …
Classified Boards And Firm Value, Michael D. Frakes
Classified Boards And Firm Value, Michael D. Frakes
Faculty Scholarship
Classified boards constitute one of the most potent takeover defenses for U.S. firms today. However, as with takeover defenses more generally, economic theory offers an ambiguous prediction as to the effect that classified boards have on bottom-line firm value. A resolution of this ambiguity will require sound and convincing empirical methodology. In an effort to address limitations in the existing empirical literature, this article approaches the relationship between corporate governance and firm value while taking various measures to account for unobserved sources of heterogeneity across firms. Using the instrumental variables model developed by Hausman and Taylor, I find evidence of …