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Articles 1 - 23 of 23
Full-Text Articles in Corporate Finance
The Impact Of Independent Directors On The Cash Conversion Cycle Of American Manufacturing Firms, John Obradovich, Amarjit Gill, Nahum Biger
The Impact Of Independent Directors On The Cash Conversion Cycle Of American Manufacturing Firms, John Obradovich, Amarjit Gill, Nahum Biger
John Obradovich
This study examined the impact of independent directors on the cash conversion cycle of American manufacturing firms. A sample of 189 American manufacturing firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for a period of five years (from 2009–2013) was used. The findings indicate that the presence of independent directors on the board of directors shortens the inventory period and cash conversion cycle of manufacturing firms. The study contributes to the literature on the factors that shorten the cash conversion cycle of the firm. The results may be used by financial managers and operations managers.
Outside Director-Shareholder Agency Conflicts: Evidence From Bank Consolidation, James Tompkins, Robert Hendershott
Outside Director-Shareholder Agency Conflicts: Evidence From Bank Consolidation, James Tompkins, Robert Hendershott
James Tompkins
Purpose – Takeovers create a potential conflict of interest between target shareholders and directors. While mergers generally create value for the target shareholders, their directors will typically lose their board seats and likely face a financial loss or loss of prestige. The purpose of this paper is to examine evidence to support or refute that directors may act in their own best interests at the expense of shareholders. Design/methodology/approach – The authors reason that if directors act in their own best interests, then acquiring firms will seek targets with older board members who are closer to director retirement and are …
Governance-Default Risk Relationship And The Demand For Intermediated And Non-Intermediated Debt, Husam Aldamen, Keith Duncan, Safdar Khan
Governance-Default Risk Relationship And The Demand For Intermediated And Non-Intermediated Debt, Husam Aldamen, Keith Duncan, Safdar Khan
Safdar Khan
This paper explores the impact of corporate governance on the demand for intermediated debt (asset finance, bank debt, non-bank private debt) and non-intermediated debt (public debt) in the Australian debt market. Relative to other countries the Australian debt market is characterised by higher proportions of intermediatedor private debt with a lower inherent level of information asymmetry in that private lenders have greater access to financial information (Gray, Koh & Tong 2009). Our firm level, cross-sectional evidence suggests that higher corporate governance impacts demand for debt via the mitigation of default risk. However, this relationship is not uniform across all debt …
Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven M. Davidoff
Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven M. Davidoff
Steven Davidoff Solomon
Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result …
Does Adopting Good Corporate Governance Impact The Cost Of Intermediated And Non-Intermediated Debt?, Husam Aldamen, Keith Duncan
Does Adopting Good Corporate Governance Impact The Cost Of Intermediated And Non-Intermediated Debt?, Husam Aldamen, Keith Duncan
Keith Duncan
This study examines the impact of good corporate governance practices on the reported cost of debt for Australian listed companies. Prior research has established that governance lowers the cost of non-intermediated debt (Sengupta, 1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife, 2006). We extend this analysis to the Australian corporate debt market which is dominated by intermediated or privately held debt. Our findings are consistent with the prior work and shows that increased corporate governance lowers cost of debt. However, when we split the sample companies into intermediated and non-intermediated debt sub-samples, we find this result only holds for the non-intermediated debt …
Governance-Default Risk Relationship And The Demand For Intermediated And Non-Intermediated Debt, Husam Aldamen, Keith Duncan, Safdar Khan
Governance-Default Risk Relationship And The Demand For Intermediated And Non-Intermediated Debt, Husam Aldamen, Keith Duncan, Safdar Khan
Keith Duncan
This paper explores the impact of corporate governance on the demand for intermediated debt (asset finance, bank debt, non-bank private debt) and non-intermediated debt (public debt) in the Australian debt market. Relative to other countries the Australian debt market is characterised by higher proportions of intermediatedor private debt with a lower inherent level of information asymmetry in that private lenders have greater access to financial information (Gray, Koh & Tong 2009). Our firm level, cross-sectional evidence suggests that higher corporate governance impacts demand for debt via the mitigation of default risk. However, this relationship is not uniform across all debt …
Corporate Governance And Access To Interest Bearing Debt, Husam Aldamen, Keith Duncan
Corporate Governance And Access To Interest Bearing Debt, Husam Aldamen, Keith Duncan
Keith Duncan
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to extend the growing body of literature on the impact of corporate governance on debt contracting by examining if better governance is associated with access to interest bearing debt. The paper aims to explore whether no-debt companies have governance structures that are qualitatively different to debt companies within a market with a distinct corporate finance structure, such as Australia.
Design/methodology/approach – The analysis is portioned into two stages. The first stage focuses on univariate analysis which includes descriptive statistics and analysis of variance (ANOVA). The second stage introduces multivariate analysis, in the …
Last Of The Tai-Pans: Improving The Sustainability Of Long-Term Financial Flows By Improving Hong Kong’S Corporate Governance, Bryane Michael
Last Of The Tai-Pans: Improving The Sustainability Of Long-Term Financial Flows By Improving Hong Kong’S Corporate Governance, Bryane Michael
Bryane Michael (bryane.michael@stcatz.ox.ac.uk)
Hong Kong leads the rank tables as an international financial centre. However, the data indicate that some parts of her corporate governance arrangements probably detract from – rather than contribute to – that leading position. In this brief, we show how excessive shareholding concentration, probably self-dealing, insufficient minority shareholder recourse to mechanisms aimed at protecting their investments, and Hong Kong’s close links with several “tax havens” probably weaken Hong Kong’s role as an international financial centre. We present 18 recommendations aimed at increasing the volume of international financial capital coming to the city by improving Hong Kong’s corporate governance.
The Effect Of Corporate Governance Variables On Share Price: A Comparison Of “A Class” And “B Class” Shares In The People's Republic Of China, Kevin Jih, Simone Kelly, Ray Mcnamara
The Effect Of Corporate Governance Variables On Share Price: A Comparison Of “A Class” And “B Class” Shares In The People's Republic Of China, Kevin Jih, Simone Kelly, Ray Mcnamara
Ray McNamara
This paper examines the interaction between corporate governance and earnings as they affect market performance. The research focuses on Chinese capital markets because of their unique characteristics with respect to elements of corporate governance. Specifically, Chinese companies may issue A-shares to Chinese citizens or B-shares to foreign investors and overseas Chinese or Chinese citizens with foreign currency. B-shares produce reports based on International Accounting Standards, have an independent board structure, and use international recognised auditor. Companies with A-shares only use Chinese Accounting Standards, do not have independent boards of directors and use Chinese auditors operating under Chinese audit standards.The differences …
The Effect Of Corporate Governance Variables On Share Price: A Comparison Of “A Class” And “B Class” Shares In The People's Republic Of China, Kevin Jih, Simone Kelly, Ray Mcnamara
The Effect Of Corporate Governance Variables On Share Price: A Comparison Of “A Class” And “B Class” Shares In The People's Republic Of China, Kevin Jih, Simone Kelly, Ray Mcnamara
Simone Kelly
This paper examines the interaction between corporate governance and earnings as they affect market performance. The research focuses on Chinese capital markets because of their unique characteristics with respect to elements of corporate governance. Specifically, Chinese companies may issue A-shares to Chinese citizens or B-shares to foreign investors and overseas Chinese or Chinese citizens with foreign currency. B-shares produce reports based on International Accounting Standards, have an independent board structure, and use international recognised auditor. Companies with A-shares only use Chinese Accounting Standards, do not have independent boards of directors and use Chinese auditors operating under Chinese audit standards.The differences …
Innate And Discretionary Accruals Quality And Corporate Governance, Pamela Kent, James Routledge, Jenny Stewart
Innate And Discretionary Accruals Quality And Corporate Governance, Pamela Kent, James Routledge, Jenny Stewart
Pamela Kent
This paper extends previous research on the association between corporate governance mechanisms and accruals quality. We derive measures of the discretionary and innate components of accruals quality and regress them against corporate governance characteristics. For discretionary accruals, we find use of a Big 4 audit firm and a larger audit committee as the primary governance mechanisms associated with higher accruals quality. For innate accruals quality, we find that higher quality is associated with an independent board of directors, a larger, more independent and more active audit committee, and use of a Big 4 audit firm. Our findings suggest a stronger …
Application Of Stakeholder Theory To Corporate Environmental Disclosures, Pamela Kent, Christopher Chan
Application Of Stakeholder Theory To Corporate Environmental Disclosures, Pamela Kent, Christopher Chan
Pamela Kent
Ullmann's (1985) three-dimensional model of social responsibility disclosure is tested to determine whether it can be operationalized to help explain the quantity and quality of environmental disclosures in Australian annual reports. The stakeholder power dimension of Ullmann's framework is significant in explaining environmental disclosures while content of the mission statement and existence or otherwise of environmental or social responsibility committees also find strong statistically significant support in the results. Ullmann's stakeholder theory has previously been applied to explain social disclosures in general (Roberts, 1992) and is an important theory because it introduces a measure of strategy. The current paper demonstrates …
La Riforma Del Controllo Contabile Delle Societa’ In Italia: “Schede Di Lettura” Del Decreto Legislativo 39/2010 In Tema Di Svolgimento Della Revisione Legale Dei Conti, Claudio Sottoriva
La Riforma Del Controllo Contabile Delle Societa’ In Italia: “Schede Di Lettura” Del Decreto Legislativo 39/2010 In Tema Di Svolgimento Della Revisione Legale Dei Conti, Claudio Sottoriva
Claudio Sottoriva
Il contributo offre una prima lettura delle novità apportate dal Decreto Legislativo n. 39/2010 attuativo della Direttiva 2006/43/CE, relativa alle revisioni legali dei conti annuali e dei conti consolidati. La disciplina dello svolgimento della attività di revisione legale dei conti trova quindi ora riferimenti normativi nelle norme del Codice Civile e in alcune norme speciali (principalmente nel T.U.F.) nonché per quanto non diversamente disciplinato nel Decreto 39/2010. La disciplina è destinata a trovare completamento con l'emanazione di specifici regolamenti attuativi del Decreto da parte del Ministero dell'Economia e delle finanze nonché da altre Autorità (Consob, Banca d'Italia, etc.). L'analisi consente …
Corporate Governance, Transparency And Performance Of Malaysian Companies, Mohd Che Haat, H. Raaman, Sakthi Mahenthiran
Corporate Governance, Transparency And Performance Of Malaysian Companies, Mohd Che Haat, H. Raaman, Sakthi Mahenthiran
Sakthi Mahenthiran
The paper aims to examine the effect of good corporate governance practices on corporate transparency and performance Malaysian listed companies.
The Impact Of Macroeconomic Uncertainty On Firms Changes In Financial Leverage, Atreya Chakraborty
The Impact Of Macroeconomic Uncertainty On Firms Changes In Financial Leverage, Atreya Chakraborty
Atreya Chakraborty
We investigate the relationship between a firm’s measures of corporate gov- ernance, macroeconomic uncertainty and changes in leverage. Recent research highlights the role of governance in financing decisions. Previous research also indicates that macroeconomic uncertainty affects a firm’s ability to borrow. In this paper we investigate how both these channels of influence affects firms’ financing decisions. Our findings show that macroeconomic uncertainty has an important role to play, both by itself and in interaction with a measure of corporate governance.
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
Paolo Santella
No abstract provided.
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
Carlo Drago
No abstract provided.
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
Paolo Santella
No abstract provided.
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
Carlo Drago
No abstract provided.
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
Paolo Santella
No abstract provided.
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo
Carlo Drago
No abstract provided.
Innate And Discretionary Accruals Quality And Corporate Governance, Pamela Kent, James Routledge, Jenny Stewart
Innate And Discretionary Accruals Quality And Corporate Governance, Pamela Kent, James Routledge, Jenny Stewart
James Routledge
This paper extends previous research on the association between corporate governance mechanisms and accruals quality. We derive measures of the discretionary and innate components of accruals quality and regress them against corporate governance characteristics. For discretionary accruals, we find use of a Big 4 audit firm and a larger audit committee as the primary governance mechanisms associated with higher accruals quality. For innate accruals quality, we find that higher quality is associated with an independent board of directors, a larger, more independent and more active audit committee, and use of a Big 4 audit firm. Our findings suggest a stronger …
Corporate Governance And Anti-Takeover Devices, Helen Lange, Ian Ramsay, Li-Anne Woo
Corporate Governance And Anti-Takeover Devices, Helen Lange, Ian Ramsay, Li-Anne Woo
Li-Anne Woo
This paper seeks to establish what form of management structure, ownership structure and financial characteristics are exhibited by firms that propose and subsequently adopt anti-takeover charter amendments (ATCAs) in Australia over the period June 1986 to December 1990. An ATCA is a restriction of partial takeover activity implemented through shareholder approval to changes in a firm's constitution. Approval for such changes is obtained through majority agreement from a plebiscite of shareholders. The study adopts a control sample design to analyse if characteristics differ statistically from adopting ATCA firms and those which do not adopt ATCAs during the investigation period. Following …