Corporate Finance Commons^™

Lessons Learned: Chester B. Feldberg, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Chester B. Feldberg worked for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) for 36 years in a variety of roles. In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, he served as a trustee for the AIG Credit Trust Facility (2009-2011). The trust was established in early 2009 to hold the equity stock of American International Group Inc. (AIG) that the U.S. government had received as a result of the 2008 AIG bailout. The three trustees were responsible for voting the stock, ensuring satisfactory corporate governance at AIG, and eventually disposing of the stock.

When he was named as a …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module Z: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Aidan Lawson, Steven Kelly, Lily S. Engbith, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, in the midst of the broader financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors used its emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to authorize the largest loan in its history, a $85 billion collateralized credit line to American International Group (AIG), a $1 trillion insurance and financial company that was experiencing severe liquidity strains. In connection with the loan, the government received an equity interest representing 79.9% of the company’s ownership. AIG continued to experience a depressed stock price, asset devaluations, and the risk of ratings downgrades leading to questions about its solvency. …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module F: The Aig Credit Facility Trust, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, American International Group, Inc. (AIG) experienced a liquidity crisis. To avoid the insurance giant’s bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) extended an $85 billion emergency secured credit facility to AIG. In connection with the credit facility, AIG issued 100,000 shares of preferred stock, with voting rights equal to and convertible into 79.9% of the outstanding shares of AIG common stock, to an independent trust (the Trust) set up by the FRBNY. Three trustees held the stock for the sole benefit of the US Treasury, exercised the rights, powers, authorities, discretions, and duties of the …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module E: Maiden Lane Iii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis

Journal of Financial Crises

Starting in mid-2007, American International Group (AIG) faced increasing collateral calls from counterparties looking to protect their positions in credit default swap (CDS) contracts that AIG had written on residential and commercial collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (US COP 2010, 28-30). Per these agreements, the AIG parent company was responsible for insuring the value of the CDOs against the risk of a negative credit event, such as default (GAO 2011, 5; US COP 2010, 29-30). AIG’s immediate need for liquidity on September 16, largely driven by a securities lending program and those collateral calls, prompted the Federal Reserve to lend the …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module D: Maiden Lane Ii, Lily S. Engbith, Devyn Jeffereis

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, American International Group (AIG) faced increasing difficulty in returning cash collateral to counterparties looking to terminate, rather than roll over, their securities lending agreements, in part because the company had invested the collateral in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), which were becoming illiquid. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) provided liquidity to the company, including through the Securities Borrowing Facility (SBF), which allowed for the repayment of cash collateral but did not address the falling values of the RMBS. In November 2008, the Federal Reserve Board authorized the creation of Maiden Lane II (ML II), a …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module C: Aig Investment Program, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) extended an $85 billion credit line to AIG to address its liquidity stresses, but AIG’s balance sheet remained under pressure. The insurance giant was projected to report large third-quarter losses and was at risk of being downgraded by major credit rating agencies. For these reasons, in early November 2008, the US Treasury invested $40 billion of Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) funds into AIG in exchange for 4 million shares of AIG Series D preferred stock and a warrant to purchase AIG common stock. The investment helped repay a …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module B: The Securities Borrowing Facility, Lily S. Engbith, Alec Buchholtz, Devyn Jeffereis

Journal of Financial Crises

In 2008, American International Group (AIG) was among the largest insurance corporations in the world and maintained a profitable securities lending program. However, AIG invested much of the cash collateral received from counterparties in residential mortgage-backed securities, whose value began to collapse rapidly and unexpectedly, creating liquidity strain for AIG when borrowers returned their securities. Because of these strains, credit downgrades, and losses, in September, the company sought assistance from the Federal Reserve which, on October 6, 2008, approved the establishment of the Securities Borrowing Facility by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). The FRBNY agreed to loan …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module A: The Revolving Credit Facility, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson

Journal of Financial Crises

On September 15, 2008, the big three rating agencies downgraded AIG’s credit ratings multiple levels, exacerbating liquidity strains that the company was experiencing due to increasing cash demands by securities borrowers and collateral calls by credit default swap (CDS) customers. To prevent AIG from filing for bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) announced on the following day that, pursuant to its emergency powers, it would provide the company with an $85 billion Revolving Credit Facility (RCF). The RCF was secured by AIG assets and interests in its subsidiaries and required AIG to grant the US Department of the Treasury a …

Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises B: U.S. Guarantees During The Global Financial Crisis, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

During 2008-09, the federal government extended multiple guarantee programs in an effort to restore the financial market and contain the panic and crisis in the market. For example, the Treasury provided a temporary guarantee program for the money market funds, the FDIC decided to stand behind certain debts and non-interest-bearing transaction accounts, and the Treasury, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve agreed to share losses in certain assets belonging to Citigroup. This case reviews these guarantee programs implemented during the global financial crisis by the government and explores the different rationale that shaped certain design features of each program.

Lessons Learned: Edwin (Ted) Truman, Yasemin Sim Esmen

Journal of Financial Crises

Insights on fighting financial crises from Ted Truman, an expert in responding to the international dimensions of financial crises. Topics include the initial US response to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 and the utiltiy of issuing Special Drawing Rights (SDR).

Basel Iii F: Callable Commercial Paper, Christian M. Mcnamara, Rosalind Bennett, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

One of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s responses to the global financial crisis of 2007-09 was to introduce the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), a short-term measure that evaluates whether a bank has enough liquidity to meet expected cash outflows during a 30-day stress scenario. One area in which this incentive has already resulted in changed practices is in the market for commercial paper. Banks often provide backup liquidity facilities to the issuers of commercial paper that the issuers can draw upon to repay a maturing issue of commercial paper if they are unable to sell a new issue to …

Basel Iii D: Swiss Finish To Basel Iii, Christian M. Mcnamara, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

After the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced the Basel III framework in 2010, individual countries confronted the question of how best to implement the framework given their unique circumstances. Switzerland, with a banking industry that is both heavily concentrated and very large relative to the size of its overall economy, faced a special challenge. It ultimately adopted what is sometimes referred to as the “Swiss Finish” to Basel III—enhanced requirements applicable to Switzerland’s “too-big-to-fail” banks Credit Suisse and UBS that go beyond the base requirements established by the BCBS. Yet the prominent role played by relatively new contingent …

Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) faced the critical task of diagnosing what went wrong and then updating regulatory standards aimed at preventing it from occurring again. In seeking to strengthen the microprudential regulation associated with the earlier Basel Accords while also adding a macroprudential overlay, Basel III consists of proposals in three main areas intended to address 1) capital reform, 2) liquidity standards, and 3) systemic risk and interconnectedness. This case considers the causes of the 2007-09 financial crisis and what they suggest about weaknesses in the Basel regime …

Ireland And Iceland In Crisis C: Iceland’S Landsbanki Icesave, Arwin G. Zeissler, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

At year-end 2005, almost all of the total assets of Iceland’s banking system were concentrated in just three banks (Glitnir, Kaupthing, and Landsbanki). These banks were criticized by certain financial analysts in early 2006 for being overly dependent on wholesale funding, much of it short-term, that could easily disappear if creditors’ confidence in these banks faltered for any reason. Landsbanki, followed later by Kaupthing and then Glitnir, responded to this criticism and replaced part of their wholesale funding by using online accounts to gather deposits from individuals across Europe. In Landsbanki’s case, these new deposits were marketed under the name …

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

As a global financial service provider, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) is supervised by banking regulatory agencies in different countries. Bruno Iksil, the derivatives trader primarily responsible for the $6 billion trading loss in 2012, was based in JPM’s London office. This office was regulated both by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) of the United States (US) and by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which served as the sole regulator of all financial services in the United Kingdom (UK). Banking regulators in the US and the UK have entered into agreements with one another to define basic parameters …

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale G: Hedging Versus Proprietary Trading, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In December 2013, the primary United States financial regulatory agencies jointly adopted final rules to implement Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which is often referred to as the “Volcker Rule”. Section 619 prohibits banks from engaging in activities considered to be particularly risky, including proprietary trading and owning hedge funds or private equity funds. Banking regulators designed the final rule against proprietary trading in part to prevent losses like the $6 billion London Whale loss that took place in 2012 at JPMorgan Chase. Given the controversial nature of the Volcker Rule, it is …

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale F: Required Securities Disclosures, Arwin G. Zeissler, Giulio Girardi, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

On April 13, 2012, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) Chief Financial Officer Douglas Braunstein took part in a conference call to discuss the bank’s first quarter 2012 earnings. Coming just a week after media reports first questioned the risks taken by JPM derivatives trader Bruno Iksil, Braunstein made a series of assertions about the trades. On May 10, JPM finalized its first quarter financial results, which included some disclosures regarding Iksil’s trading that were substantially different from Braunstein’s statements of April 13. At issue is whether the regulatory filings on April 13 and May 10, as well as verbal comments by Braunstein …

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale E: Supervisory Oversight, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

As a diversified financial service provider and the largest United States bank holding company, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) is supervised by multiple regulatory agencies. JPM’s commercial bank subsidiaries hold a national charter and therefore are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). Since the bank’s Chief Investment Office (CIO) invested the surplus deposits of JPM’s commercial bank units, the OCC was also CIO’s primary regulator. During the critical period from late January through March 2012, when CIO traders undertook the failed derivatives strategy that ultimately cost the bank $6 billion, JPM did not provide the OCC with …

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, And Models, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Value at Risk (VaR) is one of the most commonly used ways to measure and monitor market risk. At JPMorgan Chase (JPM), very large derivative positions established by Bruno Iksil in the Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) caused the bank’s Chief Investment Office (CIO) to exceed its VaR limit for four days in a row in January 2012. In response, the CIO changed to a new VaR model on January 30, which appeared to immediately reduce VaR by half. However, JPM soon discovered that this new VaR model had not been properly implemented and the bank went back to using the …