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Full-Text Articles in Corporate Finance
The Relationship Between Incentive Compensation And Forced Ceo Turnover, Atreya Chakraborty, Shahbaz Sheikh, Narayanan Subramanian
The Relationship Between Incentive Compensation And Forced Ceo Turnover, Atreya Chakraborty, Shahbaz Sheikh, Narayanan Subramanian
Atreya Chakraborty
We study the relationship between incentive compensation and performance related CEO turnover. Our theoretical model predicts that the slope of the compensation contract and forced turnover may be complements. Our results support this prediction. We find that incentives and turnover are positively related. This relationship however, varies with the equity ownership of CEOs and does not hold for CEOs who own more than 5% equity. Moreover, this relationship is stronger if the firm under performs its industry. Our results suggest that high-powered incentives may increase the signaling power of performance measures and lead to higher likelihood of turnover.
Repricing And Executive Turnover, Narayanan Subramanian, Atreya Chakraborty, Shahbaz Sheikh
Repricing And Executive Turnover, Narayanan Subramanian, Atreya Chakraborty, Shahbaz Sheikh
Atreya Chakraborty
We examine whether the threat of executive turnover faced by a firm affects its decision to reprice stock options held by its executives. We estimate a model of voluntary turnover among top executives and show that the predicted turnover from this model is positively related to the probability of repricing. The relationship is robust to the inclusion of several known determinants of repricing. Our results are consistent with a model in which a tight labor market makes executives hard to replace, forcing firms to reprice stock options when they go underwater.