Corporate Finance Commons^™

Institutional Trading During A Wave Of Corporate Scandals: 'Perfect Payday'?, Gennaro Bernile, Johan Sulaeman, Qin Wang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper examines the role of institutional trading during the option backdating scandal of 2006-2007. Unlike their inability to anticipate other corporate events, institutional investors as a group display negative abnormal trading imbalances (i.e., buy minus sell volumes) in anticipation of firm-specific backdating exposures. Consistent with informed trading, the underlying trades earn positive abnormal short- and long-term profits. Moreover, the negative abnormal imbalances are larger in magnitude when backdating is likely a more severe issue. Local institutions, in particular, display negative trading imbalances earlier in event-time and earn consistently higher trading profits than non-local institutions. Although we find some evidence …

Customer's Short Positions And Supplier's Investment Decisions, Xia Chen, Guojin Gong, Shuqing Luo

Research Collection School Of Accountancy

Short interest contains valuable information about a firm’s business fundamentals. We investigate whether such information affects business partners’ real investment decisions in the supply-chain setting. We predict and find that a supplier’s future investments (including inventory, R&D, and tangible asset investments) decrease with its customer’s current short interest. This negative relation is stronger when the supplier faces greater difficulty in assessing its customer’s business fundamentals and when short interest is more likely to indicate longlasting deterioration in the customer’s fundamentals. Additional analysis does not support the alternative explanation that the supplier adjusts investments in response to unfavorable information obtained via …

When Everyone Misses On The Same Side: Debiased Earnings Surprises And Stock Returns, Chin-Han Chiang, Wei Dai, Jianqing Fan, Harrison Hong, Jun Tu

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

In event studies of capital market efficiency, an earnings surprise has historically been measured by the consensus error, defined as earnings minus the consensus or average of professional forecasts. The rationale is that the consensus is an accurate measure of the market’s expectation of earnings. But since forecasts can be biased due to conflicts of interest and some investors can see through these conflicts, this rationale is flawed and the consensus error a biased measure of an earnings surprise. We show that the fraction of forecasts that miss on the same side (FOM), by ignoring the size of the misses, …

The Discreet Trader, Seth Wing

Honors Projects in Finance

This paper examines insider trading, specifically trades by corporate insiders around quarterly earnings announcements. Announcements were broken up into three categories: earnings above analyst expectations, earnings below expectations, and earnings in line with expectations. Trade data was collected from the thirty companies of the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 2012-’13. The trades were sorted by purchases and sales by date and analyzed with the earnings report of which the trades were made. Only trades in the interval from twenty days before the announcement date to twenty days after the announcement date were considered. The prediction was that corporate insiders would …

Institutional Shareholding And Information Content Of Dividend Surprises: Re-Examining The Dynamics In Dividend-Reappearance Era, Abu S. Amin, Shantanu Dutta, Samir Saadi, Premal P. Vora

WCBT Faculty Publications

We examine the role of institutional investors’ investment horizon on the information content associated with dividend announcement surprises in the “dividend-reappearance era”. We find that the presence of institutional investors negatively affects the announcement period cumulative abnormal return (CAR), which suggests that institutional investors reduce information content of dividend announcements. This result is primarily driven by the fact that institutional investors, especially the not-short-horizon investors, do not prefer dividend surprises – which leads to lower announcement period CAR. We do not find support for institutional investors’ informed trading argument. Our study reveals that in order to understand the dynamics between …

The Broken Buck Stops Here: Embracing Sponsor Support In Money Market Fund Reform, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

Since the 2008 financial crisis, in which the Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck,” money market funds (MMFs) have been the subject of ongoing policy debate. Many commentators view MMFs as a key contributor to the crisis because widespread redemption demands during the days following the Lehman bankruptcy contributed to a freeze in the credit markets. In response, MMFs were deemed a component of the nefarious shadow banking industry and targeted for regulatory reform. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) misguided 2014 reforms responded by potentially exacerbating MMF fragility while potentially crippling large segments of the MMF industry.

Determining the …