Corporate Finance Commons^™

Noción Y Elementos Existenciales Del Título De Crédito, Bruno L. Costantini García

Bruno L. Costantini García

Discernir la noción y elementos de existencia de los títulos de crédito, considerando la doctrina y la denominación expresada en nuestra Ley General de Títulos y Operaciones de Crédito, conceptualizando el término de los documentos que consignan un derecho crediticio propio de su naturaleza y deslindando de manera dogmatica y exegética los elementos que lo forman y le dan su funcionamiento, mediante una visión de las instituciones jurídicas que les dan su existencia y aplicación dentro del devenir de los actos de comercio.

Generalidades De La Propiedad Intelectual En México, Bruno L. Costantini García

Bruno L. Costantini García

Presentación de las Generalidades de la Propiedad Intelectual en México (Propiedad Industrial y Derechos de Autor), legislación que la rige, aplicación y modalidades

La Jurisprudencia En México, Bruno L. Costantini García

Bruno L. Costantini García

Breve presentación de la jurisprudencia en México, su aplicación, objetivos y fines para el Derecho Mexicano. ¿Por qué es util para el derecho? ¿Quién la emite?

Notariado Y Correduria Y Su Registro En México, Bruno L. Costantini García

Bruno L. Costantini García

Introducción al Derecho Notarial y Registral en México, cuyo objeto es conocer los elementos de las figuras del notario y del corredor público, la formalización de sus actos y su registro.

The Marginalist Revolution In Corporate Finance: 1880-1965, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries fundamental changes in economic thought revolutionized the theory of corporate finance, leading to changes in its legal regulation. The changes were massive, and this branch of financial analysis and law became virtually unrecognizable to those who had practiced it earlier. The source of this revision was the marginalist, or neoclassical, revolution in economic thought. The classical theory had seen corporate finance as an historical, relatively self-executing inquiry based on the classical theory of value and administered by common law courts. By contrast, neoclassical value theory was forward looking and as a result …

A Preface To Neoclassical Legal Thought, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Most legal historians speak of the period following classical legal thought as “progressive legal thought.” That term creates an unwarranted bias in characterization, however, creating the impression that conservatives clung to an obsolete “classical” ideology, when in fact they were in many ways just as revisionist as the progressives legal thinkers whom they critiqued. The Progressives and New Deal thinkers whom we identify with progressive legal thought were nearly all neoclassical, or marginalist, in their economics, but it is hardly true that all marginalists were progressives. For example, the lawyers and policy makers in the corporate finance battles of the …

Making Sense Of The New Financial Deal, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

In this Essay, I assess the enactment and implications of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress’s response to the 2008 financial crisis. To set the stage, I begin by very briefly reviewing the causes of the crisis. I then argue that the legislation has two very clear objectives. The first is to limit the risk of the shadow banking system by more carefully regulating the key instruments and institutions of contemporary finance. The second objective is to limit the damage in the event one of these giant institutions fails. While the new regulation of the instruments of contemporary finance—including clearing and exchange …

At The Conjunction Of Love And Money: Comment On Julie A. Nelson, Does Profit-Seeking Rule Out Love? Evidence (Or Not) From Economics And Law, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Political Economy Of Fraud On The Market, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Inside-Out Corporate Governance, David A. Skeel Jr., Vijit Chahar, Alexander Clark, Mia Howard, Bijun Huang, Federico Lasconi, A.G. Leventhal, Matthew Makover, Randi Milgrim, David Payne, Romy Rahme, Nikki Sachdeva, Zachary Scott

All Faculty Scholarship

Until late in the twentieth century, internal corporate governance—that is, decision making by the principal constituencies of the firm—was clearly distinct from outside oversight by regulators, auditors and credit rating agencies, and markets. With the 1980s takeover wave and hedge funds’ and equity funds’ more recent involvement in corporate governance, the distinction between inside and outside governance has eroded. The tools of inside governance are now routinely employed by governance outsiders, intertwining the two traditional modes of governance. We argue in this Article that the shift has created a new governance paradigm, which we call inside-out corporate governance.

Using the …