Corporate Finance Commons^™

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.

Cuarto Congreso Nacional De Organismos Públicos Autónomos, Bruno L. Costantini García

Bruno L. Costantini García

Memorias del Cuarto Congreso Nacional de Organismos Públicos Autónomos

"El papel de los Organismos Públicos Autónomos en la Consolidación de la Democracia"

Bankruptcy Or Bailouts?, Kenneth M. Ayotte, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

The usual reaction if one mentions bankruptcy as a mechanism for addressing a financial institution’s default is incredulity. Those who favor the rescue of troubled financial institutions, and even those who prefer that their assets be promptly sold to a healthier institution, treat bankruptcy as anathema. Everyone seems to agree that nothing good can come from bankruptcy. Indeed, the Chapter 11 filing by Lehman Brothers has been singled out by many the primary cause of the severe economic and financial contraction that followed, and proof that bankruptcy is disorderly and ineffective. As a result, ad-hoc rescue lending to avoid bankruptcy …

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Paolo Santella

No abstract provided.

The Italian Chamber Of Lords Sits On Listed Company Boards. An Empirical Analysis Of Italian Listed Company Boards From 1998 To 2006 - Presentation (Powerpoint Format), Paolo Santella, Carlo Drago, Andrea Polo

Carlo Drago

No abstract provided.

Hedge Fund Activism In The Enforcement Of Bondholder Rights, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock

All Faculty Scholarship

Activist hedge funds have transformed how bondholders respond to violations of their contractual rights. Insurance companies and mutual funds, the traditional investors in bonds, often slept on their rights and turned active only little and late. Hedge funds, by contrast, seek out opportunities for activism in order to make profits. In the wake of their activism, hedge funds have not only benefitted themselves, but their fellow bondholders as well. Alas, the remedy scheme for violations of bondholders rights – in particular, the centrality of the acceleration remedy – introduces its own set of imperfections. When treasury interest rates have increased …

Confronting The Circularity Problem In Private Securities Litigation, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

Many critics argue that private securities litigation fails effectively either to deter corporate misconduct or to compensate defrauded investors. In particular, commentators reason that damages reflect socially inefficient transfer payments—the so-called circularity problem. Fox and Mitchell address the circularity problem by identifying new reasons why private litigation is an effective deterrent, focusing on the role of disclosure in improving corporate governance. The corporate governance rationale for securities regulation is more powerful than the authors recognize. By collecting and using corporate information in their trading decisions, informed investors play a critical role in enhancing market efficiency. This efficiency, in turn, allows …

Top Cop Or Regulatory Flop? The Sec At 75, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

In their forthcoming article, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, Professors John C. Coffee, Jr., and Hillary Sale offer compelling reasons to rethink the SEC’s role. This article extends that analysis, evaluating the SEC’s responsibility for the current financial crisis and its potential future role in regulation of the capital markets. In particular, the article identifies critical failures in the SEC’s performance in its core competencies of enforcement, financial transparency, and investor protection. The article argues that these failures are not the result, as suggested by the Treasury Department Blueprint, of a balkanized regulatory system. Rather, …

Competing Narratives In Corporate Bankruptcy: Debtor In Control Vs. No Time To Spare, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

When a company like Chrysler or United Airlines files for bankruptcy, it offers narrative explaining the way out of its predicament. In support of its claim that the business is worth saving, the company may argue that it simply needs time to renegotiate its obligations with its creditors. Alternatively, it may say that asset values are deteriorating rapidly and it is imperative that the bankruptcy court immediately approve a sale of the company, or some other rapid disposition. These two possibilities correspond to the principal resolution narratives in current Chapter 11 bankruptcy practice, which I refer to as Debtor in …

Samuel Zell, The Chicago Tribune, And The Emergence Of The S Esop: Understanding The Tax Advantages And Disadvantages Of S Esops, Michael S. Knoll

All Faculty Scholarship

Samuel Zell’s acquisition of the Chicago Tribune Company (the Tribune) in December 2007 using a little-known type of Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) made headlines. In a complicated transaction, which took nearly a year to complete, the Tribune converted from a subchapter C corporation to a subchapter S corporation, established an ESOP that purchased 100 percent of the company’s equity, and sold Zell a call option giving him the right to purchase 40 percent of the company’s equity. Press reports claim that Zell’s novel structure enabled Zell to outbid other suitors. And financial commentators predict that many acquirers will employ …

Taxation And The Competitiveness Of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth Funds To Invest In The United States?, Michael S. Knoll

All Faculty Scholarship

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) control vast amounts of capital and have made and are continuing to make numerous large, high-profile investments in the United States, especially in the financial services industry. Those investments in particular and SWFs in general are highly controversial. There is much discussion of the advantages and disadvantages to the United States of investments by SWFs and there is an intense and ongoing debate over what should be the United States’ policy towards investments by SWFs. In the course of that debate, some critics have called upon the US government to abandon its long-held public position of …

Strengthening Special Committees, Elizabeth Pollman

All Faculty Scholarship

Special committees make some of the most important decisions facing corporations. High-quality decision-making on these critical issues has become even more urgent in this time of economic volatility and outrage about corporate irresponsibility. Indeed, special committees may be increasingly in the spotlight as the current economic crisis will likely lead to a flood of shareholder litigation and, when credit markets thaw, a wave of strategic transactions. Sometimes a board will create a special committee of just one person to handle a crucial matter. This Article proposes that courts or legislatures firmly establish a preference or requirement that special committees consist …

Neoclassicism And The Separation Of Ownership And Control, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

"Separation of ownership and control" is a phrase whose history will forever be associated with Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means' The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), as well as with Institutionalist economics, Legal Realism, and the New Deal. Within that milieu the large publicly held business corporation became identified with excessive managerial power at the expense of stockholders, social irresponsibility, and internal inefficiency. Neoclassical economists both then and ever since have generally been critical, both of the historical facts that Berle and Means purported to describe and of the conclusions that they drew. In fact, however, within …