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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Corporate Finance
Corporate Policy And The Coherence Of Delaware Takeover Law, Richard E. Kihlstrom, Michael L. Wachter
Corporate Policy And The Coherence Of Delaware Takeover Law, Richard E. Kihlstrom, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article presents a model that can be used to explain key elements of Delaware takeover law. By incorporating corporate policy as a key variable in the model, Delaware law’s management discretion rule can be shown to be best suited for maximizing the value of the corporation and the shareholders’ interest under a set of reasonable assumptions. By allowing for occasional market mispricing and the agency costs associated with managing to the market, we demonstrate that a shareholder choice regime would likely lead to suboptimal investment decisions. In our model, managers are assumed to have better information regarding alternative corporate …
Shareholder Value And Auditor Independence, William W. Bratton
Shareholder Value And Auditor Independence, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
This Article questions the practice of framing problems concerning auditors’ professional responsibility inside a principal-agent paradigm. If professional independence is to be achieved, auditors cannot be enmeshed in agency relationships with the shareholders of their audit clients. As agents, the auditors by definition become subject to the principal’s control and cannot act independently. For the same reason, auditors’ duties should be neither articulated in the framework of corporate law fiduciary duty, nor conceived relationally at all. These assertions follow from an inquiry into the operative notion of the shareholder-beneficiary. The Article unpacks the notion of the shareholder and tells a …
The Case For Repealing The Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax, Terrence R. Chorvat, Michael S. Knoll
The Case For Repealing The Corporate Alternative Minimum Tax, Terrence R. Chorvat, Michael S. Knoll
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
A Jurisdictional Approach To Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, Peter B. Oh
A Jurisdictional Approach To Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, Peter B. Oh
Articles
This article challenges our persistent path dependence on defunct distinctions between corporations and certain limited unincorporated associations. Recent federal tax regulations have inspired proposals for consolidated treatment of all limited business organizations through uniformly based or universally applicable statutes. I contend these proposals are preoccupied with how hybrid organizations such as the limited liability company and the limited liability partnership amalgamate, and thus implicitly preserve, traditional dichotomies between corporations and partnership categorizations as well as entities and aggregate theories. The continued use of these schemes compromises the legal basis for such proposals.
By critically examining certain jurisdictional principles, this article …
Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley And Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, William W. Bratton
Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley And Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Corporate Control Transactions: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Corporate Control Transactions: Introduction, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient, Michael L. Wachter
Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
This paper evaluates the impact of developments in the understanding of asset value pricing for alternative legal standards for takeover defenses: the management discretion and the shareholder rights positions. Both sides place considerable, albeit implicit, reliance on alternative views of the efficiency of financial markets. Developments in finance theory show that when financial markets are only "relatively efficient," stock prices can incorrectly value the corporation at any point in time, at the same time as investors cannot outperform the market on an ongoing basis. I focus on financial market anomalies arising from the failure of the capital asset pricing model …