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Full-Text Articles in Corporate Finance
What Influences The Changes In Reit Ceo Compensation? Evidence From Panel Data, John M. Griffith, Mohammad Najand, H. Shelton Weeks
What Influences The Changes In Reit Ceo Compensation? Evidence From Panel Data, John M. Griffith, Mohammad Najand, H. Shelton Weeks
Finance Faculty Publications
This study examines what influences the changes in REIT CEO compensation using the following performance measures: average three-year total returns to shareholders, market value added, Tobin's q, and change in funds from operations. The impact of managerial power on the change in compensation is also examined. The empirical evidence indicates that firm performance and size do not influence the change in CEO salary, while risk, tenure, title, ownership, and age have significant impacts. Bonuses are not influenced by risk, size, or CEO power; however, they are influenced by performance. Option awards are affected by performance and CEO power.
Do Analysts Influence Corporate Financing And Investment?, John A. Doukas, Chansog (Francis) Kim, Christos Pantzalis
Do Analysts Influence Corporate Financing And Investment?, John A. Doukas, Chansog (Francis) Kim, Christos Pantzalis
Finance Faculty Publications
We examine whether abnormal analyst coverage influences the external financing and investment decisions of the firm. Controlling for self-selection bias in analysts' excessive coverage, we find that firms with high (low) analyst coverage consistently engage in higher (lower) external financing than do their industry peers of similar size. Our evidence also demonstrates that firms with excessive analyst coverage overinvest and realize lower future returns than do firms with low analyst coverage. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts favor the coverage of firms that have the potential to engage in profitable investment-banking business.
Financing Strategies Of The R & D Firm, Lawrence Fogelberg, John M, Griffith
Financing Strategies Of The R & D Firm, Lawrence Fogelberg, John M, Griffith
Finance Faculty Publications
This paper investigates the financing strategies of the R&D firm. Our hypotheses are based on Cho's (1992) game theory model where the firm develops a product but needs additional financing to bring it to market. The model generates a particularly rich set of hypotheses: 1) to fund the completion of its project and bring its product to market, the firm initiates negotiations with an established firm; 2) the majority of the acquisitions will be partial cash acquisitions through private secondary offerings. Confirming the model's hypotheses, we find that the majority of the acquisitions are partial cash acquisitions by significantly larger …