Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- African American Studies (1)
- Applied Statistics (1)
- Arts and Humanities (1)
- Categorical Data Analysis (1)
- Community-Based Research (1)
-
- Econometrics (1)
- Economic Policy (1)
- Income Distribution (1)
- Law (1)
- Law and Economics (1)
- Law and Society (1)
- Longitudinal Data Analysis and Time Series (1)
- Physical Sciences and Mathematics (1)
- Political Economy (1)
- Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration (1)
- Race and Ethnicity (1)
- Race, Ethnicity and Post-Colonial Studies (1)
- Statistical Models (1)
- Statistics and Probability (1)
- Work, Economy and Organizations (1)
- Workers' Compensation Law (1)
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
State Level Earned Income Tax Credit’S Effects On Race And Age: An Effective Poverty Reduction Policy, Anthony J. Barone
State Level Earned Income Tax Credit’S Effects On Race And Age: An Effective Poverty Reduction Policy, Anthony J. Barone
CMC Senior Theses
In this paper, I analyze the effectiveness of state level Earned Income Tax Credit programs on improving of poverty levels. I conducted this analysis for the years 1991 through 2011 using a panel data model with fixed effects. The main independent variables of interest were the state and federal EITC rates, minimum wage, gross state product, population, and unemployment all by state. I determined increases to the state EITC rates provided only a slight decrease to both the overall white below-poverty population and the corresponding white childhood population under 18, while both the overall and the under-18 black population for …
Passive Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense To Pay Too Little?, Jonah B. Gelbach, Jonathan Klick, Lesley Wexler
Passive Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense To Pay Too Little?, Jonah B. Gelbach, Jonathan Klick, Lesley Wexler
All Faculty Scholarship
Economists have long recognized employers’ ability to construct benefits packages to induce workers to sort themselves into and out of jobs. For instance, to encourage applications from individuals with a highly valued but largely unobservable characteristic, such as patience, employers might offer benefits that patient individuals are likely to value more than other individuals. By offering a compensation package with highly valued benefits but a relatively low wage, employers will attract workers with the favored characteristic and discourage other individuals from applying for or accepting the job. While economic theory generally views this kind of self-selection in value neutral terms, …