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Full-Text Articles in Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics

Monetary Incentives For Producing Counterfeit, Adulterated, And Misbranded Medicine: Case Studies And Examples, Heather R. Campbell, Robert A. Lodder Jul 2021

Monetary Incentives For Producing Counterfeit, Adulterated, And Misbranded Medicine: Case Studies And Examples, Heather R. Campbell, Robert A. Lodder

Pharmaceutical Sciences Faculty Publications

Background: Pharmaceutical fraud can be very profitable. Those working in pharmaceuticals are in a tempting position as the nature of the product and supply is complex, making detection of fraud difficult and expensive. However, a reliable pharmaceutical supply can often be a life-or-death situation for patients. Thus, when detection of fraud occurs, a Regulator's Dilemma often emerges (recall a drug for which a supplier is the sole source, or allow a substandard product to be sold)—generally resulting in pharmaceutical companies receiving minimal penalties even for the worst acts. Despite pharmaceutical companies' unique leverage over regulators and profitability, studies are rare …


Sweet Little Lies: Social Context And The Use Of Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Carol T. Kulik, Lin Chew Dec 2013

Sweet Little Lies: Social Context And The Use Of Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Carol T. Kulik, Lin Chew

Mara Olekalns

Social context shapes negotiators’ actions, including their willingness to act unethically. In this research, we test how three dimensions of social context – dyadic gender composition, negotiation strategy, and trust – interact to influence one micro-ethical decision, the use of deception, in a simulated negotiation. To create an opportunity for deception, we incorporated an indifference issue – an issue that had no value for one of the two parties – into the negotiation. Deception about this issue was least likely to be affected by trust or negotiation strategy in all-male dyads, suggesting that dyads with at least one female negotiator …


Maybe It’S Right, Maybe It’S Wrong: Structural And Social Determinants Of Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Chris Horan, Philip Smith Dec 2012

Maybe It’S Right, Maybe It’S Wrong: Structural And Social Determinants Of Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Chris Horan, Philip Smith

Mara Olekalns

Context shapes negotiators’ actions, including their willingness to act unethically. Focusing on negotiators use of deception, we used a simulated two-party negotiation to test how three contextual variables - regulatory focus, power, and trustworthiness - interacted to shift negotiators’ ethical thresholds. We demonstrated that these three variables interact to either inhibit or activate deception, providing support for an interactionist model of ethical decision-making. Three patterns emerged from our analyses. First, low power inhibited and high power activated deception. Second, promotion-focused negotiators favored sins of omission whereas prevention-focused negotiators favored sins of commission. Third, low cognition-based trust influenced deception when negotiators …


Maybe It’S Right, Maybe It’S Wrong: Structural And Social Determinants Of Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns Dec 2012

Maybe It’S Right, Maybe It’S Wrong: Structural And Social Determinants Of Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns

Mara Olekalns

Context shapes negotiators’ actions, including their willingness to act unethically. Focusing on negotiators use of deception, we used a simulated two-party negotiation to test how three contextual variables - regulatory focus, power, and trustworthiness - interacted to shift negotiators’ ethical thresholds. We demonstrated that these three variables interact to either inhibit or activate deception, providing support for an interactionist model of ethical decision-making. Three patterns emerged from our analyses. First, low power inhibited and high power activated deception. Second, promotion-focused negotiators favored sins of omission whereas prevention-focused negotiators favored sins of commission. Third, low cognition-based trust influenced deception when negotiators …


The Moral Poker Face: Games, Deception, And The Morality Of Bluffing, James Mcbain Sep 2003

The Moral Poker Face: Games, Deception, And The Morality Of Bluffing, James Mcbain

Faculty Submissions

Bluffing is essentially nothing more than a type of deception. But, despite its morally questionable foundation, it is not only permissible in certain contexts, but sometimes encouraged and/or required (e.g., playing poker). Yet, the question remains as to whether it is permissible to bluff in other contexts – particularly everyday situations. In this paper, I will look at László Mérő’s argument – one based in game theory and Kantian ethics – to the end that bluffing is morally permissible in everyday contexts. I will argue that Mérő’s argument is mistaken on two grounds. First, it includes an epistemic feature (i.e., …