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Full-Text Articles in Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Tobacco Politics And Electoral Accountability In The United States, Per G. Fredriksson, Khawaja Mamun
Tobacco Politics And Electoral Accountability In The United States, Per G. Fredriksson, Khawaja Mamun
WCBT Working Papers
This paper investigates whether reputation-building strategies guide U.S. governors’ state cigarette tax choices, and whether the federal cigarette tax influences such behavior. Using 1975-2000 data, we find evidence that governors in states with relatively important agricultural tobacco production and tobacco manufacturing, and which are densely populated by smokers, appear prone to reputation-building. Moreover, lame ducks are more prone to raise the state cigarette tax the lower the federal tax.
Gubernatorial Reputation And Vertical Tax Externalities: All Smoke, No Fire?, Per G. Fredriksson, Khawaja Mamun
Gubernatorial Reputation And Vertical Tax Externalities: All Smoke, No Fire?, Per G. Fredriksson, Khawaja Mamun
WCBT Working Papers
This paper investigates whether reputation-building strategies guide U.S. governors’ responses to changes in federal cigarette taxes (i.e. vertical tax interactions). Using 1975-2000 state cigarette tax data, we find that reputation-building strategies affect the nature of vertical tax externalities. Lame duck governors exhibit a more negative response to changes in the federal cigarette tax. Thus, by reducing the state tax base and by causing a decline in the state tax, an increase in the federal tax rate reduces state tax revenues in states headed by lame ducks.