Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
The Downside Of The Network Ties Between Ceo/Cfos And Auditors Through External Directorships: Evidence From Auditor Selection And Subsequent Audit Quality, Jaeyoon Yu, Byungjin Kwak, Myung Seok Park, Yoonseok Zang
The Downside Of The Network Ties Between Ceo/Cfos And Auditors Through External Directorships: Evidence From Auditor Selection And Subsequent Audit Quality, Jaeyoon Yu, Byungjin Kwak, Myung Seok Park, Yoonseok Zang
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
This study examines whether the professional ties of Chief Executive Officers/Chief Financial Officers (CEO/CFOs) to auditors through external directorships affect auditor selection and subsequent audit quality. Professional ties to auditors arise when the CEO/CFO of a firm (referred to as the home firm) serves as an outside director of another firm that hires an auditor (a connected auditor). Using a sample of firms with auditor switches over the period 2003-2012, we find that home firms are more likely to appoint connected auditors. Furthermore, utilizing a difference-in-differences approach, we find that home firms appointing connected auditors experience a significant decline in …
Non-Audit Fees, Institutional Monitoring, And Audit Quality, Chee Yeow Lim, David K. Ding, Charlie Charoenwong
Non-Audit Fees, Institutional Monitoring, And Audit Quality, Chee Yeow Lim, David K. Ding, Charlie Charoenwong
Research Collection School Of Accountancy
We posit that the effect of non-audit fees on audit quality is conditional on the extent of institutional monitoring. We suggest that institutional investors have incentives and the ability to monitor financial reporting quality. Because of the reputation concerns and potential litigation exposure, auditors are likely to provide high audit quality, when they also provide non-audit services to clients, particularly when clients are subject to high institutional monitoring. We find evidence that, as non-audit fees increase, audit quality (measured by performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals and earnings-response coefficients) reduces only for clients with low institutional ownership but not for clients with …