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Full-Text Articles in Business Administration, Management, and Operations
Does Regulatory Scrutiny Change Investment Behavior? Evidence Of Suboptimal Portfolio Rebalancing After The Financial Crisis, Willie Dion Reddic
Does Regulatory Scrutiny Change Investment Behavior? Evidence Of Suboptimal Portfolio Rebalancing After The Financial Crisis, Willie Dion Reddic
Business Administration - Dissertations
Insurers that show losses are expected to sell tax-free securities and replace them with taxable securities since they can no longer benefit from tax savings. However, rebalancing these portfolios after the financial crisis would entail recognizing additional losses during a time period when their financial performance was under stress and their industry was under increased scrutiny. I examine portfolio rebalancing behavior using the period after the financial crisis as a proxy for increased regulatory scrutiny. I predict and find that insurers with losses subsequent to the financial crisis were less likely to increase their ratio of taxable/nontaxable securities. Insurers may …
The Struggle For Power And Pay: Implications Of Board Of Directors' Power On Monitoring Effectiveness And Pay For Performance Sensitivity, Mariana Judith Lebron
The Struggle For Power And Pay: Implications Of Board Of Directors' Power On Monitoring Effectiveness And Pay For Performance Sensitivity, Mariana Judith Lebron
Business Administration - Dissertations
Boards of directors monitor and incentivize CEOs to make decisions that maximize shareholder value; however, research has been inconsistent in identifying the relationship between board composition and monitoring effectiveness (Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, & Dalton, 1998). Integrating an economic perspective (agency theory) with a socio-psychological perspective (upper echelon theory), this paper examines how outsiders' and insiders' power bases relate to pay-for-performance by proposing and empirically examining a multi-dimensional model of board power bases: ownership, prestige, and structural. I argue that board structural and composition characteristics can be used as proxy indicators of board power. Using data from 37, 066 directors of …